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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction regarding this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
§78A-4-103(2). 
REFERENCES TO THE PARTIES 
Petitioners/Appellants: 
Certified Building Maintenance ("CBM") 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm") 
Respondents/Appellees: 
Enrique Antonio ("Antonio") 
Workers Compensation Fund ("WCF") 
Utah Labor Commission ("Commission") 
Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission ("Board") 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Did the Board err in affirming the order of the Administrative Law 
Judge ("ALJ") which required CBM and State Farm to pay medical 
benefits for Antonio's left knee condition because the ALJ's August 25, 
2010 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim Order were 
insufficient? 
Standard of Review: substantial evidence [Martinez v. Media-Paymaster 
Plus, 164 P.3d 384, 390-91 (Utah 2007); Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. 
Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 843-44 (Utah App. 1992)]. 
Preservation of Issue: Objections to Medical Panel Report dated January 
19, 2011 (R., pages 129-144); Reply to WCF's Response to Objections 
dated February 7, 2011 (R., pages 147-149); Motion for Review dated 
March 24, 2011 (R., pages 158-173); Reply to WCF's Response to Motion 
for Review dated April 25, 2011 (R., pages 178-180); Order on Motion for 
Review dated May 31,2011 (R., pages 181-185) 
1 
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Did the Board err in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM 
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition 
because the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim 
Order dated August 25, 2010 which failed to provide the Medical Panel 
("Panel") complete factual findings were inconsistent with her 
determination in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
dated February 23, 2011 that the Panel had been provided all the 
factual findings for consideration in rendering their opinion thereby 
abdicating her responsibility as fact-finder to the Panel? 
Standard of Review: correction of error [Olsen v. Labor Commission, 249 
P.3d 586, 590 (Utah App. 2011); Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-5 
Utah App. 1991); Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 
1079 (Utah 1986)] 
Preservation of Issue: Objections to Medical Panel Report dated January 
19, 2011 (R., pages 129-144); Reply to WCF's Response to Objections 
dated February 7, 2011 (R., pages 147-149); Motion for Review dated 
March 24, 2011 (R., pages 158-173); Reply to WCF's Response to Motion 
for Review dated April 25, 2011 (R., pages 178-180); Order on Motion for 
Review dated May 31,2011 (R., pages 181-185) 
Did the Board err in affirming the AU's order which required CBM 
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition 
because the ALJ abused her discretion by overruling CBM/State 
Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 
2010? 
Standard of Review: reasonableness [Salt Lake County v. Labor 
Commission, 208 P.3d 1087, 1090 (Utah App. 2009); AE Clevite, Inc. v. 
Labor Commission, 996 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah App. 2000)] 
Preservation of Issue: Objections to Medical Panel Report dated January 
19, 2011 (R., pages 129-144); Reply to WCF's Response to Objections 
dated February 7, 2011 (R., pages 147-149); Motion for Review dated 
March 24, 2011 (R., pages 158-173); Reply to WCF's Response to Motion 
for Review dated April 25, 2011 (R., pages 178-180); Order on Motion for 
Review dated May 31,2011 (R., pages 181-185) 
Did the Board err in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM 
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
because the ALJ violated CBM/State Farm's due process rights by 
overruling their objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 
10,2010? 
Standard of Review: correction of error [Olson v. Labor Commission, 249 
P.3d 586, 590 (Utah App. 2011); Color Country Management v. Labor 
Commission, 38 P.3d 969, 972 (Utah App. 2001)] 
Preservation of Issue: Objections to Medical Panel Report dated January 
19, 2011 (R., pages 129-144); Reply to WCF's Response to Objections 
dated February 7, 2011 (R., pages 147-149); Motion for Review dated 
March 24, 2011 (R., pages 158-173); Reply to WCF's Response to Motion 
for Review dated April 25, 2011 (R., pages 178-180); Order on Motion for 
Review dated May 31,2011 (R., pages 181-185) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
On October 5, 2009, Antonio filed an Application for Hearing with the 
Commission regarding his worker's compensation claim. R., pages 1-6. The 
Commission issued its Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings and Order for 
Answer on October 6, 2009. R., pages 7-8. CBM and State Farm filed their 
Answer on November 5, 2009 and their First Amended Answer on July 2, 2010. 
R., pages 11-14, 93-103. A hearing was held on August 16, 2010 before ALJ 
Debbie L. Harm to adjudicate Antonio's claim. 
On August 25, 2010, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Interim Order in which the ALJ found that there were conflicting medical 
opinions related to causation of the injury and referred the matter to the Panel for 
review. R., pages 113-117. 
3 
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The Panel issued its report dated December 10, 2010 and the ALJ sent this 
report to the parties on December 30, 2010. R., pages 123-128. In her Notice to 
the Parties dated December 30,2010, the ALJ allowed the parties 20 calendar days 
from the date of the notice to file objections, and she also indicated that if no 
written objections were timely filed, then the Medical Panel Report would be 
deemed admitted into evidence. R., page 123. CBM and State Farm timely filed 
their Objections to Medical Panel Report on January 19, 2011 alleging, among 
other things, that key pieces of unrefuted evidence were not considered by the 
Panel. R., pages 129-144. WCF filed their Response to CBM/State Farm's 
objections on January 31, 2011 and CBM/State Farm filed their Reply to WCF's 
Response on February 7,2011. R., pages 145-149. 
On February 23, 2011, the ALJ issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order in which she overruled CBM/State Farm's objections to the 
Medical Panel Report, admitted the report into evidence, and, relying upon this 
report, ordered that CBM and State Farm must pay Antonio's medical expenses for 
the work injury pursuant to the fee schedule with interest. R., pages 150-157. She 
also ordered CBM and State Farm to pay add-on attorney's fees. R., page 155. 
CBM and State Farm filed their Motion for Review on March 24, 2011. R., 
pages 158-173. The Board issued their Order on Motion for Review and Order of 
Remand on May 31, 2011. R., pages 181-185. In their Order, the Board affirmed 
4 
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the ALJ's award of medical benefits, but set aside and remanded the portion of the 
ALJ's order which awarded add-on attorney's fees. Id. On June 28, 2011, CBM 
and State Farm filed their Petition for Review seeking review by this court of the 
portion of the Board's Order which affirmed the ALJ's award of medical benefits. 
Statement of the Relevant Facts 
Antonio claims that he injured his left knee while working for CBM on 
January 20, 2008 when he slipped on ice. This claim was insured by State Farm. 
Following this injury, Antonio underwent left knee arthroscopic surgery on 
September 4, 2008 conducted by Nicholas R. Goucher, M.D., his treating 
physician. R., page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 6, page 52. 
Antonio further alleged that he injured his left knee on February 12, 2009 while 
working for CBM when he slipped and fell on ice. This claim was insured by 
WCF. These two injuries were the subject of the hearing on August 16,2010. 
On February 9, 2009, Antonio sought medical treatment with Dr. Goucher. 
R., page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 6, page 57. Dr. Goucher 
provided an injection to Antonio's left knee. Id. Antonio testified at hearing that 
he had no pain in his left knee the day following this injection and leading up to the 
date of the February 12, 2009 work injury, and that when the February 12, 2009 
incident occurred, his left knee pain increased from zero to 7-8 on a pain scale of 
0-10. The testimony in this regard was as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mr. Sanchez: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Sanchez: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Sanchez: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Sanchez: 
Antonio: 
After this incident with the oil and carpet, when 
was the next time you saw Dr. Groucher (sic) after 
that? 
I can't remember when it was. 
Was it before the incident that occurred on 
February 12th, 2009? 
Yes, I think so. 
What did Dr. Groucher (sic) recommend? 
He gave me an injection in my knee of steroids. 
Did that help you? 
He said that in two weeks, I will not feel pain but 
after those 2 weeks if I feel pain, he gave me 
another appointment to come back. 
R., page 187, Hearing Transcript, page 36, lines 10-23. 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Dr. Groucher (sic) also gave you an injection into 
your left knee; is that right? 
Yeah, he gave me an injection. 
And the injection was—to help reduce the pain in 
your left knee; is that right? 
He said that in two weeks-the pain was going to 
go away for two weeks. 
For two weeks after the injection was given to 
you? 
Yes. 
Now, this injection happened on February 9, 2009. 
Does that sound about right? 
I cannot remember the date. 
If Dr. Groucher's (sic) medical records indicate 
that it occurred on February 9, 2009, you don't 
disagree with that, do you? 
No. 
6 
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R., page 187, Hearing Transcript, page 56, lines 13-25; page 57, lines 1-5. 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
When he gave you the injection, did the pain go 
down at that time? 
Not at that time. But I can't remember how long 
time had passed, but it went away. 
Did it go away ~ can you remember that it went 
away pretty quickly after the injection? 
Probably the next day I didn't have pain anymore. 
All right. So by the next day after the injection 
occurred you had zero pain in your left knee, is 
that right? 
Yes, I didn't have pain. 
Would you agree then that the pain was staying 
away for at least three or four days after that 
injection happened? 
Yes, I didn't have pain. 
All right...you have indicated in response to your 
attorney's questions that you then had another 
accident on February 12th, 2009. Does that sound 
right? 
Yes. 
Right before this February 12th, 2009 accident 
happened you had already had the injection by Dr. 
Groucher (sic), would you agree? 
Yes. 
Leading up to that February 12th, 2009 injury, the 
injection had reduced your pain to zero, would you 
agree? 
Yes. It did get ~ it went away. 
Therefore, so we're clear, just before the February 
12th, 2009 accident happened, you weren't feeling 
any pain in your left knee, right? 
7 
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Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
I didn't have any — I cannot remember exactly if it 
was that, but I was always using my knee 
protector. 
All right. But you weren't feeling pain after 
because you had had that injection right before the 
February 12th, 2009 accident, correct? 
Yes, I didn't have pain. 
R., page 187, Hearing Transcript, page 57, lines 13-25; page 58, lines 1-25; page 
59, lines 1-2. 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
Mr. Francis: 
Antonio: 
When you fell on February 12th, 2009, using that 
zero to ten scale of pain, the pain level in your left 
knee at that moment increased to about 7 or 8, 
would you agree? 
In that moment, yeah, it hurt. 
So therefore, as we talked about earlier, your pain 
level right before that happened was zero, right? 
Yes, I didn't have pain. 
So at the moment it happened on February 12th, 
2009, your pain level in your left knee went from 
zero to about seven to eight? 
In that moment, yes, it hurt. 
R., page 187, Hearing Transcript, page 64, lines 20-25; page 65, lines 1-7. 
After the February 12, 2009 incident occurred, Dr. Goucher met with 
Antonio on March 4, 2009. R., page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 
6, page 58. Noting that Antonio "slipped again 3 weeks ago," Dr. Goucher 
indicated that "the injection we gave him worked for about a week. He was feeling 
really good but then slowly started to get bad over the last couple of weeks." Id. 
WCF retained Stephen P. Marble, M.D. to perform an examination of 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Antonio's left knee on June 28, 2010. R., page 186, Joint Medical Record 
Exhibits, Exhibit 10, pages 69-76. In his report, Dr. Marble reviewed Antonio's 
deposition and Dr. Goucher's March 9, 2010 report and concluded that the 
mechanism of injury on February 12, 2009 was "benign." R., page 186, Joint 
Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 10, pages 69, 71, 75. In his conclusion, he 
opined that Antonio at worst experienced a temporary aggravation on February 12, 
2009, but that "he returned to preinjury status within a week or less." Id. at 75. 
In her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim Order dated August 
25, 2010, the ALJ found only the following facts with regard to Dr. Goucher's left 
knee injection on February 9, 2009 and concerning the description of the February 
12,2009 incident: 
Dr. Gouchner (sic) gave (Antonio) an injection in his knee (on 
February 9, 2009). (Antonio) had no pain in his knee the day 
following the injection although he continued to use his knee brace at 
work. 
On February 12, 2009, (Antonio) was carrying gallon cans of 
chemicals in each hand from one building to another at work when he 
slipped on ice, landing on his buttocks with his knees bent and feet on 
the ground in front of him and then his legs went straight out in front 
after his buttocks hit the ground. (Antonio) had increased left knee 
pain. 
R., page 114. 
The Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010 referred to Dr. 
Goucher's February 9, 2009 injection and the ensuing February 12, 2009 incident 
9 
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as follows: 
(Antonio) was seen again by Dr. Goucher on 2/9/09 because of knee 
pain. "He had been doing very well but then started getting some pain 
again in his knee." Dr. Goucher described a slip at work that occurred 
in December which might have reinjured the knee. An injection of 
cortisone and Marcaine was given into the knee. A recurrent tear of 
the meniscus was suspected. 
The Findings of Fact describe an injury that occurred on 2/12/09 when 
(Antonio) again slipped on ice carrying gallons of chemicals, falling 
and landing on his buttocks with his knees bent. There was some 
increased left knee pain. 
R., page 125. 
The Panel went on to describe Antonio's "current symptoms" as they 
pertained to the February 12,2009 incident in the following manner: 
(Antonio) described the February 2009 incident as being minor. He 
described having increased pain for perhaps 15 minutes after which it 
subsided and returned to the baseline. 
R., page 126. 
In concluding that there was no causal connection between the February 12, 
2009 industrial accident and Antonio's left knee condition after February 12, 2009, 
the Panel indicated in their report the following: 
We are basing this opinion on the information we obtained during our 
interview. We did not find (Antonio's) responses to be ambiguous. 
He clearly indicated there was continued knee pain which increased 
over time following his arthroscopy. It was this continued and 
increasing pain interfering with work and his quality of life that 
caused him to seek further medical attention. He indicated that the 
incidents of December 2008 and February 12, 2009 while causing 
some increased pain, represented temporary aggravations that returned 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to baseline. It was the baseline that was causally related to the 
1/20/08 work accident. 
R., page 127. . 
When CBM and State Farm filed their Objections to Medical Panel Report 
on January 19, 2011, they included a medical report from Terry A. Brown, M.D. 
R., pages 134-136. In this report, Dr. Brown noted that Antonio had an increase in 
pain from zero to 7-8 when the February 12,2009 incident occurred. R., page 136. 
In part, this evidence supported his opinion that Antonio's left knee problems and 
need for treatment were caused by the February 12,2009 incident. 
In her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 
2011, the AU overruled CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel 
Report and indicated that CBM/State Farm's "objection goes to the weight the 
report should be given rather than its admission into the record for which the 
objection allows and forms no basis for excluding the report from the record. 
There is nothing contained within (CBM/State Farm's) objection which would 
prevent the panel's report from being entered into the evidentiary 
record...(CBM/State Farm) also submitted excerpts from (Antonio's) deposition. 
However, the time to address such issues was at the evidentiary hearing when 
(Antonio) gave testimony if it was inconsistent with his hearing testimony. Thus, 
(Antonio's) deposition testimony is not dispositive of the medical issues in this 
case." R., page 151. The ALJ further determined that, in addition to the medical 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
records, "the panel also had all the factual finding(s) to consider in rendering their 
opinion so (they) could consider the mechanism of injury of all the accidents to 
render their opinion. The panel also took time to ensure (Antonio) understood the 
questions being posed through the translator so that a thorough examination was 
performed." R., page 153. 
As a result, the ALJ determined that Antonio's "left knee condition after 
February 12, 2009 is medically caused by the January 20, 2008 industrial 
accident." R., page 154. Because of this, she ordered that CBM and State Farm 
were responsible for Antonio's necessary and ongoing medical expenses to treat 
his left knee. R., page 155. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
By ostensibly limiting Antonio's left knee pain relief to the day following 
the injection as described in her insufficient Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Interim Order dated August 25, 2010, the ALJ severely prejudiced CBM and 
State Farm because she failed to provide key evidence to the Panel that Antonio's 
left knee pain completely subsided following the February 9, 2009 injection by Dr. 
Goucher up to the time of the February 12, 2009 incident with a significant 
increase in pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 incident. As it turned out, the 
Panel was left with this impression and based their opinion on the ALJ's 
incomplete rendition of the evidence along with Antonio's inconsistent history 
12 
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reported to them. Despite CBM/State Farm's objections to the Panel's deficient 
report, the ALJ persisted in her narrow view of the evidence and refused to strike 
the Panel's report or provide further information to the Panel so that they could 
render an opinion based on a thorough assessment of the evidence presented at 
hearing. In doing so, the ALJ issued an inconsistent ruling that the Panel had been 
provided "all the factual findings" necessary to render an opinion, and based on the 
deficient report issued by the Panel, she awarded medical benefits against CBM 
and State Farm. In the process, CBM/State Farm's due process rights were 
violated. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. The Board erred in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM 
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition 
because the ALJ's August 25, 2010 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Interim Order were insufficient. 
In order to successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, "the party 
must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.. .The reviewing court, however, 
retains discretion to consider independently the whole record and determine if the 
decision below has adequate factual support." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 
164 P.3d 384, 390-91 (Utah 2007). 
On the face of the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim 
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Order dated August 25, 2010, the ALJ clearly neglected to include the unrefuted 
evidence that Antonio's level of pain was at zero leading up to the moment of the 
February 12, 2009 incident with a significant increase in pain at the time of the 
February 12, 2009 incident. This was done despite closing argument by counsel 
for CBM and State Farm requesting the ALJ to consider this omitted evidence. R., 
page 187, Hearing Transcript, page 82, lines 16-25; page 83, lines 1-21. While the 
ALJ mentioned that Antonio "had no pain in his knee the day following the 
injection," she did not provide the additional evidence that Antonio continued to 
have no pain in his left knee up to the time of the February 12,2009 incident with a 
significant increase in pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 incident. This 
additional evidence omitted by the ALJ was not specifically mentioned in any 
medical records, but was presented by Antonio in his hearing testimony and was 
unrefuted. It is the fact that this hearing testimony presented by Antonio himself 
was unrefuted which makes the ALJ's omission so significant, and which causes 
the ALJ's failure to include it in her findings of fact to be erroneous. 
Dr. Goucher's March 4, 2009 report does not lead to a contrary conclusion. 
In his report, Dr. Goucher noted that Antonio had "slipped again 3 weeks ago." R., 
page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 6, page 58. This was an apparent 
reference to the February 12,2009 incident. In light of this reference, Dr. Goucher 
also stated that "the injection (on February 9,2009) we gave him worked for about 
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a week. He was feeling really good but then slowly started to get bad over the last 
couple of weeks." [emphasis supplied] Id. The problem with this piece of 
evidence is that it gives the impression that the February 9, 2009 injection 
continued to provide Antonio relief from his left knee pain even at the time of the 
February 12, 2009 incident and for about a week after the February 12, 2009 
incident. Likewise, Dr. Marble's conclusions that the mechanism of injury on 
February 12, 2009 was "benign," and that Antonio at worst suffered a temporary 
aggravation on February 12, 2009, but "returned to preinjury status within a week 
or less" were clearly made without knowing about or considering Antonio's 
hearing testimony. Indeed, Dr. Marble's review of Antonio's deposition does not 
express any awareness or consideration of the numbing effect of the February 9, 
2009 injection on Antonio's left knee leading up to the February 12, 2009 with a 
significant increase in left knee pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 incident, 
once again leaving the Panel with no understanding of this evidence other than Dr. 
Goucher's confusing and contrary history. All of this portrays a very different 
picture than the unrefuted testimony provided by Antonio at hearing. By omitting 
the full extent of Antonio's unrebutted testimony in her findings of fact, the ALJ 
left out a key piece of evidence, thereby rendering her findings of fact insufficient 
for the Panel's review and in arriving at her ultimate order. 
As noted in Adams v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 821 
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P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. App. 1991), "an administrative agency cannot discharge its 
statutory responsibilities without making findings of fact on all necessary ultimate 
issues under the governing statutory standards. It is also essential that [an 
administrative agency] make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical 
subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as to 
demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. The 
importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is essential to a 
proper determination by an administrative agency. To that end, findings should be 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, 
or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached." [emphasis supplied] 
The ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim Order dated 
August 25, 2010 were insufficient (by leaving out significant evidence that 
Antonio had no left knee pain leading up to the February 12, 2009 incident with a 
significant increase of pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 incident). These 
findings of fact fall short of the ALJ's responsibility to provide "complete, 
accurate, and consistent findings of fact (which is) essential to a proper 
determination by an administrative agency." Adams, supra. The incompleteness 
of the ALJ's August 25, 2010 findings of fact was made apparent when the Panel 
determined that Antonio was experiencing "continued knee pain which increased 
over time following his arthroscopy," believed that the February 12, 2009 incident 
16 
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was "minor," based their "opinion on the information (they) obtained during (their) 
interview, and "did not find (Antonio's) responses to be ambiguous." [emphasis 
supplied] Given Antonio's testimony, his left knee pain was hardly continuous and 
increasing following the February 9,2009 injection, the February 12,2009 incident 
was not "minor" considering his pain level soared from zero to 7-8, and his 
responses to the Panel were in no way unambiguous when compared to his omitted 
hearing testimony. Ultimately, the ALJ based on her Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 largely on this deficient 
Medical Panel Report resulting from the insufficient findings of fact provided in 
her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated August 25, 2010 to the 
Panel. 
For these reasons, CBM and State Farm request that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be set aside, that 
CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 
2010 be sustained, that the ALJ's order requiring CBM and State Farm to pay for 
Antonio's medical expenses with interest be reversed, that a hearing be ordered to 
clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010, and/or that further 
evidence as requested herein be submitted to the Panel for consideration and 
clarification. 
II. The Board erred in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM 
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition 
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because the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim 
Order dated August 25,2010 which failed to provide the Panel complete 
factual findings were inconsistent with her determination in her 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 
2011 that the Panel had been provided all the factual findings for 
consideration in rendering their opinion thereby abdicating her 
responsibility as fact-finder to the Panel. 
Incorrectly, the ALJ determined in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order dated February 23, 2011 that, in addition to the medical records, "the 
panel also had all the factual finding(s) to consider in rendering their opinion so 
(they) could consider the mechanism of injury of all the accidents to render their 
opinion." [emphasis supplied] R., page 153. 
According to Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah App. 1991), 
the Commission's "findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached. The failure of an agency to make adequate findings of 
fact in material issues renders it findings arbitrary and capricious unless the 
evidence is clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion...A finding 
may be implied if it is clear from the record, and therefore apparent upon review, 
that the finding was actually made as part of the tribunal's decision. We may not 
merely assume, however, that an undisclosed finding was in fact made. The party 
wishing to defend an agency decision must carry it burden of showing that the 
undisclosed finding was actually made." [emphasis supplied] 
18 
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In this case, the ALJ's Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Interim 
Order dated August 25, 2010 only indicated that Antonio "had no pain in his knee 
the day following the injection," but did not explain that Antonio continued to have 
no pain in his left knee leading up to the time of the February 12, 2009 incident 
with a significant increase in pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 incident as 
presented by Antonio in his unrefuted hearing testimony. 
In this way, the ALJ's determination in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 that "the panel also had all the factual 
finding(s) to consider in rendering their opinion so (they) could consider the 
mechanism of injury of all the accidents to render their opinion" is inconsistent 
with the deficient findings of fact in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Interim Order dated August 25,2010. 
This inconsistency is self-evident in the Panel's report because the Panel 
makes no mention of the omitted evidence. Given that the ALJ did not provide 
this information to the Panel and because Antonio apparently did not tell them, the 
Panel was left to gather additional facts, and ultimately rendered their opinion 
without understanding this important evidence. Indeed, the Panel inaccurately 
noted that Antonio "clearly indicated there was continued knee pain which 
increased over time following his arthroscopy. It was this continued and 
increasing pain interfering with work and his quality of life that caused him to seek 
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further medical attention." R., page 127. In their Objections to Medical Panel 
Report, CBM and State Farm pointed out this discrepancy and proffered medical 
evidence (Dr. Brown's January 16, 2011 report) supporting the significance of this 
omission. 
In addition, the effect of the ALJ's failure to provide complete findings of 
fact to the Panel was to abdicate to the Panel the ALJ's role as fact-finder. The 
ALJ (acting on behalf of the Commission) is always the ultimate fact-finder "even 
when a medical panel is convened...Thus while the ALJ/Commission may 
convene a medical panel to review applicant's medical condition, the 
ALJ/Commission may not abdicate its fact-finding responsibility to the medical 
panel." Speirs v. Southern Utah University, 60 P.3d 42, 44 (Utah App. 2002). 
Indeed, "it is not the role of the medical panel to resolve conflicts in the factual 
evidence regarding the injured party's activities. (The statute) places that 
responsibility solely on the Commission...The medical panel strays beyond its 
province when it attempts to resolve factual disputes, and the administrative law 
judge improperly abdicates his function if he permits the panel to so act." Price 
River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 1986). 
Here, the ALJ relinquished her fact-finding responsibility to the Panel by 
determining that the Panel had all the factual findings to consider in rendering their 
opinion even though this was not the case. Her limited portrayal of Antonio's left 
20 
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knee condition leading up to the February 12, 2009 incident failed to provide the 
Panel the entire picture. Because of this, the Panel was required to collect further 
facts from Antonio and ended up with Antonio's report to them that the February 
12, 2009 incident was "minor" coupled with the misconception that the injection 
on February 9, 2009 only provided pain relief the day after it was administered (as 
narrowly revealed by the ALJ). This version is substantially different than 
Antonio's testimony that the February 9, 2009 injection caused a reduction in his 
left knee pain to zero up to the time of the February 12, 2009 incident, and that 
Antonio's pain significantly increased to a pain level of 7-8 (despite the numbing 
effect of the injection) when the February 12, 2009 incident occurred. Had the 
Panel known the complete story (as was the ALJ's responsibility to provide), they 
may have reached the different opinion that Antonio suffered a new injury on 
February 12, 2009. 
In turning over the fact-finding responsibility to the Panel, the ALJ 
apparently assumed that the Panel would obtain any additional facts (such as 
Antonio's lack of left knee pain leading up to the February 12, 2009 incident) 
which she did not provide in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim 
Order dated August 25, 2010. This assumption on the part of the ALJ was evident 
when she noted in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated 
February 23, 2011 that "the panel also took time to ensure (Antonio) understood 
91 
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the questions being posed through the translator so that a thorough examination 
was performed." R., page 153. This is not the Panel's role, and it was error for the 
ALJ to proceed otherwise. 
Because the ALJ had in actuality not provided the Panel "all the factual 
finding(s)" and because the Panel failed to collect all necessary facts in arriving at 
their conclusions, the ALJ erroneously based her ultimate conclusions in her 
February 23, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order upon the 
deficient Medical Panel Report which was predicated on inadequate findings of 
fact (by leaving out Antonio's unrefuted testimony that he had no left knee pain 
leading up to the February 12, 2009 incident with a significant increase in pain at 
the time of the February 12,2009 incident). 
For these reasons, CBM and State Farm request that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be set aside, that 
CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 
2010 be sustained, that the ALJ's order requiring CBM and State Farm to pay for 
Antonio's medical expenses with interest be reversed, that a hearing be ordered to 
clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010, and/or that further 
evidence as requested herein be submitted to the Panel for consideration and 
clarification. 
III. The Board erred in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM 
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition 
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because the ALJ abused her discretion by overruling CBM/State 
Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 
2010. 
In the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated 
February 23, 2011, the ALJ agreed that "a significant medical issue existed as to 
the medical cause of (Antonio's) left knee condition requiring referral to a 
Commission medical panel for evaluation." R., page 153. As a result, CBM/State 
Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report were directed at the heart of the 
principal evidence upon which the ALJ based her decision. 
When CBM and State Farm objected to the Medical Panel Report, they 
pointed out that the Panel's report did not contain any reference to the unrefuted, 
significant evidence regarding Antonio's lack of left knee pain leading up to the 
February 12, 2009 incident (as backed by Dr. Brown's January 16, 2011 report and 
Antonio's testimony). As noted above, this occurred because the ALJ failed to 
provide this pivotal information to the Panel in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Interim Order dated August 25, 2010. For this reason, CBM and State 
Farm argued that the Panel's report did not constitute relevant, reliable and 
probable medical evidence and because it assumed facts not in evidence and lacked 
foundation. 
As noted in Hymas v. Labor Commission, 200 P.3d 218, 220 (Utah App. 
2008), the Commission's determination constitutes an abuse of discretion if it 
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"exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Also see Salt Lake County 
v. Labor Commission, 208 P.3d 1087, 1090 (Utah App. 2009). "The court's 
discretion is not unlimited," and "a court's ruling must be based on adequate 
findings of fact and on the law." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 279 (Utah 2000). 
Here, the ALJ overruled CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel 
Report and specifically found that "the panel also had all the factual finding(s) to 
consider in rendering their opinion so (they) could consider the mechanism of 
injury of all the accidents to render their opinion." R., page 153. In her Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011, the ALJ 
dismissed CBM/State Farm's objections by noting that "(CBM/State Farm) also 
submitted excerpts from (Antonio's) deposition. However, the time to address 
such issues was at the evidentiary hearing when (Antonio) gave testimony if it was 
inconsistent with his hearing testimony." R., page 151. Clearly, CBM and State 
Farm addressed these issues at the hearing with Antonio's hearing testimony. See 
excerpts of Antonio's hearing testimony, supra. Antonio's deposition testimony 
was completely consistent with his hearing testimony. Therefore, CBM and State 
Farm did not need to submit his deposition testimony at the hearing, and the ALJ 
already had this evidence available to her for inclusion in her findings of fact to 
provide to the Panel. CBM/State Farm's submission of Antonio's deposition 
testimony in their objection was simply illustrative of the unrefiited nature of 
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Antonio's testimony at hearing. 
Instead of sustaining the objection, the ALJ used the Panel's report in 
determining that the January 20, 2008 work injury (and not the February 12, 2009 
industrial accident) was the cause of Antonio's left knee condition after February 
12, 2009. At a minimum, the ALJ should have scheduled a hearing to clarify the 
Panel's report or submit the omitted evidence to the Panel for consideration and 
clarification as allowed under Utah Code §34A-2-601(l)(f)(i) and R602-2-2(B). 
Instead, she accepted the deficient Medical Panel Report and, predicating her order 
predominately on this report, ruled that the February 12, 2009 incident did not 
cause Antonio's continuing left knee problems. By overruling CBM/State Farm's 
objections and by primarily utilizing the Panel's report to support her February 23, 
2011 order, the ALJ's ultimate determination that CBM and State Farm were 
responsible for Antonio's medical treatment was clearly flawed. 
In overruling CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report in 
this manner, the ALJ exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality 
thereby abusing her discretion in this regard because the evidence she refused to 
provide to the Panel was unrefuted hearing testimony presented by Antonio 
himself The ALJ's abuse of her discretion was prejudicial to CBM and State 
Farm because the Panel may have reached a different decision had the ALJ 
provided all of the information to the Panel as noted in the objections to the 
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Medical Panel Report. Because the ALJ admitted the Panel's report without 
supplementing the evidence provided to the Panel as allowed by Utah Code §34A-
2-601(l)(f)(i) and R602-2-2(B), the ALJ largely predicated her ultimate award of 
medical benefits against CBM and State Farm on an incomplete analysis by the 
Panel. 
For these reasons, CBM and State Farm request that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be set aside, that 
CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 
2010 be sustained, that the ALJ's order requiring CBM and State Farm to pay for 
Antonio's medical expenses with interest be reversed, that a hearing be ordered to 
clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010, and/or that further 
evidence as requested herein be submitted to the Panel for consideration and 
clarification. 
IV. The Board erred in affirming the ALJ's order which required CBM 
and State Farm to pay medical benefits for Antonio's left knee condition 
because the ALJ violated State Farm/CBM's due process rights by 
overruling their objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 
10,2010. 
In Color Country Management v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 969 (Utah 
App. 2001), the court instituted a three factor analysis in determining whether a 
party's due process rights had been violated by the Commission's actions. These 
three factors involved an analysis of: 1) the private interest affected by the official 
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action; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest by the procedures used 
and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural protections; 3) the 
governmental interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens of additional or substitute procedures. Id. at 976. 
Regarding the first factor, the court in Color Country Management reasoned 
that, because the private interest affected by the official action involved the 
employer/insurer who had "a vested right in property it already holds, not merely 
an expectation of being able to receive something in the future," this factor applied. 
Id. at 977. Like the employer/insurer in Color Country Management, CBM/State 
Farm hold such a vested right (in the benefits ordered by the ALJ to be paid by 
CBM/State Farm), and therefore, the first factor is satisfied in this case. 
The second factor deals with "procedures that are available to ensure 
accurate decision making by the Commission." Id. These include: a requirement 
that the Commission afford parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, submit rebuttal evidence, present recorded 
testimony under oath, engage in discovery, and receive written orders with findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, agency review, agency reconsideration, appellate 
judicial review, and the right to seek a stay of orders. Id. Because the ALJ, after 
overruling CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report, failed to 
order a hearing to clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010 
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and/or submit further evidence to the Panel for consideration and clarification [as 
allowed by Utah Code §34A-2-601(l)(f)(i) and Rule 602-2-2(B)], CBM and State 
Farm were directly deprived of their opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, submit rebuttal evidence, present recorded 
testimony under oath, engage in discovery, and receive written orders with findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, agency review, agency reconsideration, appellate 
judicial review, and the right to seek a stay of orders regarding the merits of 
Antonio's claim. Here, there was erroneous deprivation of these procedures, and 
the value of a further hearing on the merits concerning the Panel's report and/or 
presentation for further evidence to the Panel is clear. In the absence of the full 
adversarial process, "accurate decision making by the Commission" was surely 
compromised. As a result, the second factor applies in this matter. 
As for the third factor, the benefit of safeguarding CBM and State Farm who 
were adversely affected by the ALJ's decision to overrule their objections to the 
Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010 without ordering a hearing to 
clarify the Medical Panel Report and/or submitting further evidence to the Panel 
for consideration and clarification [as allowed by Utah Code §34A-2-601(l)(f)(i) 
and Rule 602-2-2(B)] is not outweighed by the cost of requiring further 
administrative proceedings. In this case, CBM and State Farm were completely 
deprived of their ability to present legitimate, unrefuted evidence to the Panel in 
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the face of the ALJ's determination that "the panel also had all the factual 
finding(s) to consider in rendering their opinion so (they) could consider the 
mechanism of injury of all the accidents to render their opinion." This 
determination was simply not accurate and could have been suitably remedied by 
providing to the Panel the complete information as provided by Antonio in his 
unrefuted hearing testimony. As it stands, the Panel was left with the impression 
as stated in their report that the February 12, 2009 incident was "minor" and that 
the injection on February 9, 2009 provided pain relief the day after it was 
administered. This is a far cry from Antonio's unrefuted hearing testimony that the 
February 9,2009 injection caused his left knee pain to completely go away leading 
up to the time of the February 12, 2009 incident, and that when the February 12, 
2009 incident occurred, Antonio's pain significantly increased to a pain level of 7-
8. Based on this highly important evidence, the impact of the incident on February 
12, 2009 on Antonio's left knee was so pronounced that Antonio suffered an 
increase of pain level from zero to 7-8 despite the injection's absolute numbing 
effect. If the Panel had been fairly and accurately apprised of this information, 
then they may not have concluded that the February 12, 2009 incident was minor 
and only a temporary exacerbation, and may have reasonably determined that 
Antonio experienced a new injury to his left knee on February 12, 2009. The ALJ 
should have given the Panel the opportunity to consider this. By failing to allow 
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this, the ALJ substantially prejudiced CBM and State Farm by her erroneous 
application of the law. Olson v. Labor Commission, 249 P.3d 586, 590 (Utah App. 
2011); Color County Management, supra at 972. 
Consequently, CBM and State Farm's due process rights have been violated 
by the ALJ's decision to overrule their objections to the Medical Panel Report 
dated December 10, 2010 without ordering a hearing to clarify the Medical Panel 
Report and/or submitting further evidence to the Panel for consideration and 
clarification [as allowed by Utah Code §34A-2-601(l)(f)(i) and Rule 602-2-2(B)]. 
For these reasons, CBM and State Farm request that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be set aside, that 
CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 
2010 be sustained, that the ALJ's order requiring CBM and State Farm to pay for 
Antonio's medical expenses with interest be reversed, that a hearing be ordered to 
clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 2010, and/or that further 
evidence as requested herein be submitted to the Panel for consideration and 
clarification. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, CBM and State Farm request that the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be set aside, that the 
ALJ's order requiring CBM and State Farm to pay for Antonio's medical expenses 
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with interest be reversed, that CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel 
Report dated December 10, 2010 be sustained, that a hearing be ordered to clarify 
the Medical Panel Report dated December 10,2010, and/or that further evidence as 
requested herein be submitted to the Panel for consideration and clarification. 
Respectfully submitted this L\~~ day of December, 2011. 
RUEGSEGGER SIMONS SMITH & STERN, LLC 
Jeff Francis, (#11370) 
743 Horizon Court, Suite 103 
Grand Junction, CO 81506 
Telephone: 970.263.0500 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT 
CERTIFIED BUILDING 
MAINTENANCE and STATE 
FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
Petitioners/Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, 
APPEALS BOARD OF THE UTAH 
LABOR COMMISSION, ENRIQUE 
ANTONIO, and WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
JAN - 3 2012 
SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANTS 
Appellate Case No. 20110549-CA 
Agency Decision No. 09-0811 
Carrier No. 44-W200-227 
Petitioners/Appellants Certified Building Maintenance and State Farm Fire 
and Casualty Company, by their attorneys, Ruegsegger Simons Smith & Stern, 
LLC, file their Supplement to Brief of the Appellants as follows: 
1. On December 29, 2011, Petitioners/Appellants Certified Building 
Maintenance ("CBM") and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm") 
mailed their Brief of the Appellants in Support of Petition for Review to the Utah 
Court of Appeals and all parties. The Utah Court of Appeals and the parties 
received the Brief of the Appellants on December 30, 2011. The filing deadline 
for the Brief of the Appellants is January 3,2012. 
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2. In the Conclusion sections of the Brief of the Appellants on pages 17, 
22, 26, 30, and 31, CBM and State Farm ask, in addition to the relief requested for 
all issues, that the portion of the Order on Motion for Review and Order of 
Remand of the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission dated May 31, 2011 
(R., pages 181-185) which affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's award of 
medical benefits against CBM and State Farm be reversed for all of the reasons 
provided in the Brief of the Appellants. 
3. CBM and State Farm incorporate this Supplement to Brief of the 
Appellants as part of their Brief of the Appellants. 
4. This Supplement adds 501 words to the Brief of the Appellants for a 
total of 8,604 words and otherwise complies with Rule 24(f)(1). 
Respectfully submitted this J° day of December, 2011. 
RUEGSEGGER SIMONS SMITH & STERN, LLC 
BV:<|ft3Sr; ^ 
Jeff Francis, (#11370) 
743 Horizon Court, Suite 103 
Grand Junction, CO 81506 
Telephone: (970) 263-0500 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing SUPPLEMENT TO 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS by overnight mail, regular mail, and/or 
facsimile on this 3^>^day of December, 2011, addressed to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals 1 
Appellate Clerks' Office 
450 South State, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230 
Via facsimile: 801.578.3999 
Via overnight mail (original and 7 
copies) 
1 Alan Hennebold, Esq. 
Utah Labor Commission 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600 
Via facsimile: 801.530.6390 
Via overnight mail (2 copies) 
1 Mark J. Sanchez, Esq. 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Via facsimile: 801.303.7330 
Via overnight mail (2 copies) 
Ryan L. Andrus, Esq. 
Workers Compensation Fund 
100 West Towne Ridge Parkway 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Via facsimile: 385.351.8038 
Via overnight mail (2 copies) 
Ms. Rhonda Norris 1 
State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company 
P.O. Box 339410 
Greeley, CO 80633 
Via facsimile: 800.811.2358 
Via regular mail 
Mr. Jason Moyes 1 
Certified Building Maintenance 
27 S. Main Street 
Layton, UT 84041 
Via facsimile: 801.546.8238 
Via regular mail 
J^Ll^A 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANTS IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH 
ADDENDUM by overnight or regular mail on this 9 ^ ^ a v of December, 2011, 
addressed to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Appellate Clerks' Office 
450 South State, Fifth Floor 
1 Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230 
Via overnight mail (original and 7 
copies) 
Alan Hennebold, Esq. 
Utah Labor Commission 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146600 
1 Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600 
Via overnight mail (2 copies) 
Mark J. Sanchez, Esq. 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 100 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Roberta N. ADAMS, Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah, and Unicorp, Respondents. 
No. 900597-CA. 
Nov. 5,1991. 
Workers' compensation claimant sought judi-
cial review of decision of Industrial Commission 
denying her benefits as result of her alleged repetit-
ive motion syndrome. The Court of Appeals, Bench 
, P.J., held that Industrial Commission did not suffi-
ciently indicate factual basis for its decision merely 
by summarizing contradictory evidence presented, 
without in any way indicating which evidence it 
found to be more credible, and stating in conclusory 
terms that preponderance of medical evidence es-
tablished that claimants symptoms were not work 
related. 
Vacated and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
II] Workers' Compensation 413 ©^>1939.1 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
or 
413kl939.1 k. In General; Ques-
tions of Law or Fact. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 413kl939) 
Question of whether Industrial Commission's 
findings were sufficiently detailed to permit mean-
ingful appellate review was legal determination that 
required no deference to Commission. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-16(4). 
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A € ^ 
486 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15Ak484 Findings 
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited 
Cases 
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 0^*488 
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15Ak488 L Conclusions. Most Cited Cases 
Administrative agency must make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law that are adequately de-
tailed to permit meaningful appellate review. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C ^ 
486 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15A1V(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15 Ak484 Findings 
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited 
Cases 
Administrative agency's failure to disclose spe-
cific subsidiary finding may or may not be fatal to 
agency's decision, where agency's findings reveal 
steps taken by agency in reaching its decision. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
14] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C^? 
484,1 
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15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15Ak484 Findings 
15Ak484.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 15Ak484) 
Administrative finding may be implied if it is 
clear from record on review that finding was actu-
ally made as part of administrative tribunal's de-
cision; however, reviewing court may not simply 
assume that any undisclosed finding was in fact 
made. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[5] Administrative Law and Procedure ISA €=> 
750 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General 
15Ak750 k. Burden of Showing Error. 
Most Cited Cases 
Party wishing to defend administrative 
agency's decision must carry burden of showing 
that any undisclosed findings were actually made. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[6] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1741 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court 
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Suffi-
ciency 
413kl741 k. Recital of Evidence. 
Most Cited Cases 
Industrial Commission did not satisfy its oblig-
ation to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact 
to permit meaningful appellate review, where Com-
mission merely set forth competing diagnoses 
without in any way indicating which diagnoses it 
found to be more credible and stated in conclusory 
terms that preponderance of medical evidence did 
not establish that claimant's symptoms were caus-
ally connected to job. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[7] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A £=> 
486 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15A1V Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15Ak484 Findings 
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited 
Cases 
Administrative bodies may not rely upon find-
ings that contain only ultimate conclusions. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[8] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A €=^ 
486 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15 Ak484 Findings 
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited 
Cases 
Mere summary of contradictory evidence 
presented at administrative hearing does not consti-
tute "findings of fact" sufficient to permit judicial 
review; administrative agency must indicate what it 
determines in fact occurred, and not merely what 
the contradictory evidence indicates might have oc-
curred. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4). 
[9] Workers* Compensation 413 €=>1939.5 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
or 
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413kl939.5 k. Conflicting Evid-
ence. Most Cited Cases 
It is responsibility of administrative law judge 
in workers' compensation proceeding to resolve 
factual conflicts. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[10] Workers1 Compensation 413 €=>1740 
413 Workers1 Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XV1(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court 
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Suffi-
ciency 
413kl740 k. Opinion or Reasons. 
Most Cited Cases 
Workers' Compensation 413 C^>1744 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court 
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Suffi-
ciency 
413kl744 k. Ultimate or Eviden-
tiary Facts. Most Cited Cases 
To address errors claimed by workers' com-
pensation claimant in decision of Industrial Com-
mission, Court of Appeals had to have findings that 
indicated respectively the issues decided, the legal 
interpretations and applications made, and the sub-
sidiary factual findings in support of Industrial 
Commission's decision. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[11] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1738 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court 
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Suffi-
ciency 
413kl738 k. In General Most Cited 
Cases 
To satisfy its statutory obligation to make find-
ings of fact sufficiently detailed to permit meaning-
ful appellate review, Industrial Commission, at 
minimum, had to identify medical condition from 
which claimant was suffering, and to give some ex-
planation, factual or legal, as to how claimant failed 
to prove causation. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4). 
[12] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1366 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
413XVI(L)2 Particular Matters 
413kl356 Injuries or Death for Which 
Compensation May Be Had 
413kl366 k. Aggravation or Accel-
eration of Previously Impaired Condition. Most 
Cited Cases 
Workers' compensation claimant with preexist-
ing medical condition must prove both legal and 
medical causation. 
[13] Workers' Compensation 413 €^1738 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVi(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court 
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Suffi-
ciency 
413kl738 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Court of Appeals is unable to assume that any 
given finding was in fact made by Industrial Com-
mission, where multiple conflicting versions of 
facts create matrix of possible factual findings. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4). 
[141 Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
€^>816 
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ISA Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
i 5 AV(F) Determination 
15Ak816 k. Annulment, Vacation or Set-
ting Aside of Administrative Decision. Most Cited 
Cases 
Administrative agency's failure to make suffi-
ciently detailed findings of fact to permit meaning-
ful appellate review does not necessarily require 
vacation of order complained of, if agency's error 
has not substantially prejudiced petitioner. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[15] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
€=>749 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General 
15Ak749 k. Presumptions. Most Cited 
Cases 
When considering error that is strictly of ad-
ministrative agency's own making, such as failing 
to make adequate findings, any doubt about wheth-
er petitioner was prejudiced is resolved in petition-
er's favor. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[16] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
€=^784.1 
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15 Ak784 Fact Questions 
15Ak784.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 15Ak784) 
There is substantial prejudice inherent in 
agency's failure to make adequate factual findings, 
when evidence is not clear and uncontroverted. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[17] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
€>=>485 
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15 AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15 Ak484 Findings 
15Ak485 k. Necessity and Purpose. 
Most Cited Cases 
Complete, accurate, and consistent findings of 
fact are essential to proper determination by admin-
istrative agency. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[18] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
€==>485 
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15 Ak484 Findings 
15Ak485 k. Necessity aind Purpose. 
Most Cited Cases 
Factual findings are integral part of logical pro-
cess that administrative tribunal must go through in 
reaching a decision. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[19] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1939.2 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413k 1939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
or 
413kl939.2 k. Review of Fact 
Questions in General. Most Cited Cases 
Any doubt as to whether workers' compensa-
tion claimant was prejudiced by Industrial Commis-
sion's failure to make adequate factual findings sup-
porting its denial of benefits would be resolved in 
claimant's favor in case in which evidence was not 
clear and uncontroverted. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16 
(4). 
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[20] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
€=^816 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(F) Determination 
15Ak816 k. Annulment, Vacation or Set-
ting Aside of Administrative Decision. Most Cited 
Cases 
As general rule, appropriate relief for agency's 
failure to make adequate findings is to vacate order 
complained of and to order agency to make more 
adequate findings in support of, and more folly ar-
ticulate reasons for, die determination which it 
made. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[21] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1935 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XV1 Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XV1(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12 Scope and Extent of Re-
view in General 
413kl935 k. Presumptions and Burden 
of Showing Error. Most Cited Cases 
Absent adequate findings, there is no presump-
tion that Industrial Commission's decision denying 
workers' compensation benefits was correct 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[22] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1951 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)13 Determination and Disposi-
tion of Proceeding 
413kl951 k. Further Proceedings Be-
fore Board, Commission, or Trial Court Most Cited 
Cases 
Upon vacation of Industrial Commission's or-
der denying workers' compensation benefits, based 
on Commission's failure to make adequate findings 
in support of its decision, Commission was free to 
deny benefits or grant benefits as might be dictated 
by its new findings and conclusions of law. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
*3 Linda M. Barclay (argued), Howard, Lewis & 
Petersen, Provo, for petitioner. 
Richard Sumsion (argued), Salt Lake City, for 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. 
Benjamin J. Simms, Salt Lake City, for Industrial 
Com'n of Utah. 
Before BENCH, PJ , and GREENWOOD, and 
ORME, JJ. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Roberta Adams seeks review of the 
Industrial Commission's decision to deny her bene-
fits under the Utah Occupational Disease Disability 
Law, Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-2-1 to -65 (1988). We 
vacate the Commission's order. 
FACTS 
Adams worked as a telemarketer for Unicorp. 
Her duties consisted primarily of dialing telephone 
numbers and talking on the telephone while sitting 
at a desk. She was not equipped with a headset or 
any type of automatic dialing equipment. She was 
required to dial manually and hold the receiver to 
her ear and mouth. After working at Unicorp for 
approximately one year, Adams left Unicorp to 
seek medical attention for debilitating pain she 
claimed had developed gradually as a result of her 
employment. In general, Adams now claims that 
the repetitive motion of calling on a manual phone 
and holding the phone to her mouth and ear caused 
her neck pain, neck stiffness, muscle spasm, pain in 
her right arm and shoulder, a "pins and needles" 
sensation and numbness in her right shoulder and 
arm, and fatigue. 
When Adams informed her supervisor of her 
pain, he referred her to his chiropractor, Dr. Robert 
Pope, for treatment. Dr. Pope examined her and 
diagnosed her as having "cervico-brachial syn-
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drome, carpal tunnel syndrome, myofascitis, and 
brachial neuralgia." Adams's condition was sub-
sequently described by Dr. Pope as "repetitive mo-
tion syndrome." Dr. Pope also indicated that he be-
lieved there was a very high probability that 
Adams's condition resulted from her job duties. 
Adams then began to see another chiropractor, 
Dr. Arnold Otterson, whose office was closer to her 
home. Dr. Otterson diagnosed Adams as having 
acute traumatic cervico-brachial syndrome with as-
sociated brachial neuralgia. Dr. Otterson likewise 
described Adams's condition as repetitive motion 
syndrome. He treated.her for several months and 
her condition improved. Dr. Otterson indicated to 
the Industrial Commission that in his professional 
opinion, Adams's "condition was directly related to 
her employment due to repetitive use of the phone." 
Adams was next seen and evaluated by Dr. 
Richard Jackson, an orthopedic surgeon. His evalu-
ation indicated that Adams was suffering from a de-
generative C5-6 disc. Inasmuch as Dr. Jackson did 
not deal with head and neck problems, he referred 
Adams to Dr. Joseph R. Watkins, a neurologist Dr. 
Watkins diagnosed Adams as having "work related 
cervical strain with some head discomfort and right 
shoulder discomfort" and "stress syndrome with 
multiple other symptoms, essentially resolved with 
resolution of work." 
The Workers' Compensation Fund (the Fund) 
required Adams to undergo an independent medical! 
evaluation by Dr. Edward Spencer. Dr. Spencer ob-
served from the medical records that Adams had 
spondylosis of the C4-5 and C5-6 disc with narrow-
ing at the C5-6 level. He also observed a narrowed 
L4-5 and L5-S1 disc with osteophyte formation 
from L5 at the L5-S1 level. Dr. Spencer diagnosed 
Adams as having probable "conversion disorder," 
"chronic cervical and lumbar disc disease," " chon-
dromalacia of the patello-femoral joint," and " 
obesity and poor conditioning." He further found 
that her major problem was psychological and did 
not require any additional medical or surgical treat-
ment for her condition. 
The Fund then required Adams to be examined 
by Dr. Leonard W. Jarcho, the *4 former head of 
the Neurology Department at the University of 
Utah. Dr. Jarcho concluded that Adams did not 
have any neurological problem that he could identi-
fy. He also indicated that he believed that the min-
imal orthopedic problem was not connected to 
Adams's complaints or her prior employment. Dr. 
Jarcho described Adams's reactions, activities and 
movements during the examination as "strange," 
and concluded that Adams was in need of psychiat-
ric diagnosis and treatment. 
As directed by the Fund, Adams was then ex-
amined by Dr. David L. McCann, a psychiatrist, 
who was assisted by Dr. Leslie M. Cooper, a clinic-
al psychologist. Dr. McCann concluded that Adams 
suffered from a personality disorder and did not 
have any physical impairment or other problems as-
sociated with her employment, but that her com-
plaints were motivated by a desire to obtain com-
pensation. 
A hearing was then held where the foregoing 
conflicting diagnoses were presented to an adminis-
trative law judge (A.L.J.). The A.L.J, denied bene-
fits. Adams appealed the A.L.J.'s decision to the 
Commission, which affirmed the decision and ad-
opted the findings and conclusions of the A.L.J, as 
its own. Adams now seeks review of the Commis-
sion's decision. 
Adams presents three claims for our determina-
tion: (1) the Commission's findings and conclusions 
should be reversed because they are insufficient as 
a matter of law, (2) the Commission's factual find-
ings are not supported by substantial evidence, and 
(3) her condition constitutes a compensable condi-
tion under Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 
P.2d 330 (Utah App.1990) (interpreting Allen v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)). Inas-
much as we find that the Commission's findings are 
insufficient and order additional findings, we do not 
address points (2) and (3). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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Our review of the Commission's denial of be-
nefits is governed by the Utah Administrative Pro-
cedures Act (UAPA). UAPA provides, in relevant 
part: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that 
a person seeking judicial review has been sub-
stantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(h) the agency action is ... (iv) otherwise arbit-
rary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1990). 
[1] Adams claims that she is entitled to relief 
under subsection (h). FNl The question of whether 
the Commission's action constitutes arbitrary action 
for want of adequate findings is governed by our 
determination of whether this court is able to con-
duct a meaningful review. Whether the findings are 
adequate is therefore a legal determination that re-
quires no deference to the Commission. 
FNl. Adams also claims the following sub-
sections of section 63-46b-16(4) constitute 
grounds for relief: 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the 
issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously inter-
preted or applied die law; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a de-
termination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
Inasmuch as we reverse the Commis-
sion's order because its failure to make 
adequate findings constituted arbitrary 
action warranting relief under subsection 
(h), we need not address the standards of 
review for subsections (c), (d), and (g). 
ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS 
[2] An administrative agency must make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law that are ad-
equately detailed so as to permit meaningful appel-
late review. 
In order for us to meaningfully review the find-
ings of the Commission, the findings must be 
"sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidi-
ary facts to disclose the steps by which the ulti-
mate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P2d 
1336 (Utah 1979)).... *5 [T]he failure of an 
agency to make adequate findings of fact in ma-
terial issues renders its findings " arbitrary and 
capricious " unless the evidence is "clear, uncon-
troverted and capable of only one conclusion." 
Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 
(Utah 1983)). 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 
335 (Utah App.1990), cert denied, 815 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1991) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly described 
the detail required in administrative findings in or-
der for findings to be deemed adequate. 
[An administrative agency] cannot discharge its 
statutory responsibilities without making findings 
of fact on all necessary ultimate issues under the 
governing statutory standards. It is also essential 
that [an administrative agency] make subsidiary 
findings in sufficient detail that the critical subor-
dinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved 
in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a 
logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclu-
sions. The importance of complete, accurate, and 
consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper 
determination by an administrative agency. To 
that end, findings should be sufficiently detailed 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual 
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conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and 
law, are reached. See generally, Rucker v. Dalton, 
598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such 
findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of re-
viewing [an administrative agency's] order in ac-
cordance with established legal principles and of 
protecting the parties and the public from arbit-
rary and capricious administrative action. 
Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986) 
(emphasis added). 
[3][4][5] If agency findings reveal the steps 
taken by the agency in reaching its decision, the 
failure to disclose a specific subsidiary finding may 
or may not be fatal to the agency's decision. A find-
ing may be implied if it is clear from the record, 
and therefore apparent upon review, that the finding 
was actually made as part of the tribunal's decision. 
See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-788, (Utah 
1991).FN2 We may not merely assume, however, 
that an undisclosed finding was in fact made. The 
party wishing to defend an agency decision must 
carry its burden of showing that the undisclosed 
finding was actually made. 
FN2. In so stating, we acknowledge that 
our ruling in Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335, a 
pre-UAPA case, that material subsidiary 
findings may not be implied is limited un-
der UAPA and the supreme court's lan-
guage in Ramirez. UAPA recognizes the 
possibility of implied factual findings. See 
section 63-46b-16(4Xg). An agency de-
cision may therefore be upheld under 
UAPA despite the absence of express writ-
ten findings regarding a material fact if the 
reviewing court can determine that the ma-
terial finding was in fact made, although 
not expressly written. 
For this Court to sustain an order, the findings 
must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that 
the Commission has properly arrived at the ulti-
mate factual findings and has properly applied 
the governing rules of law to those findings.... It 
is not the prerogative of this Court to search the 
record to determine whether findings could have 
been made by the Commission to support its or-
der, for to do so would be to usurp the function 
with which the Commission is charged. 
Mountain States Legal Found, v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047, 1052 (Utah 1981). 
[6] The findings made by the A.LJ. and adop-
ted by the Commission in the present case are inad-
equate in that they do not disclose the steps taken 
by the Commission in reaching its decision to deny 
Adams benefits. The Commission's "findings" 
amount to the following single conclusory state-
ment as to causation: "The preponderance of med-
ical evidence in this case establishes that the applic-
ant's various listed symptoms are not related to her 
work as a telemarketer at Unicorp." 
[7] Because the Commission concluded that 
Adams failed to prove causation, the Commission 
denied her benefits. The Commission correctly in-
dicated in its adopted conclusions of law that causa-
tion is one of the ultimate factual conclusions that 
must *6 be proven by a claimant See, e.g., Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
However, the Commission's conclusion that Adams 
failed to prove causation, without supporting find-
ings, is arbitrary. "Administrative bodies may not 
rely upon findings that contain only ultimate con-
clusions." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 
818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah App.1991). See also Vali 
Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of Health 
Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah 
App.1990) (statement of ultimate facts alone was 
essentially pro forma). Cf Mountain States Legal 
Found, 636 P.2d at 1052 ("Ultimate findings ... 
must be sustained if there are adequate subordinate 
findings to support them"). Given the numerous 
legal and factual questions regarding causation in 
this case,1™ the Commission's solitary finding 
that Adams failed to prove causation does not give 
the parties any real indication as to the bases for its 
decision and the steps taken to reach it, nor does it 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
821 P.2d 1 
(Cite as: 821 P.2d 1) 
Page 9 
give a reviewing court anything to review. 
FN3. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 
35-2-27(28) (1988); Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
[8][9] While the purported "Findings of Fact" 
written by the A.LJ. contain an informative sum-
mary of the evidence presented, such a rehearsal of 
contradictory evidence does not constitute findings 
of fact. In order for a finding to truly constitute a 
"finding of fact," it must indicate what the A.L.J, 
determines in fact occurred, not merely what the 
contradictory evidence indicates might have oc-
curred. "[I]t is the responsibility of the administrat-
ive law judge to resolve factual conflicts." Lan-
caster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 
1987). 
As is apparent in the recitation of the various 
diagnoses presented to the A.L.J., the doctors each 
had differing explanations for Adams's medical 
condition and whether it was caused by her employ-
ment. The evidence did not merely indicate two 
possible versions of a fact whereby we could con-
clude that the denial of benefits necessarily indic-
ates that the Commission accepted one version over 
another. The evidence shows several possible con-
figurations and degrees of injury and/or disease, if 
any, and the causes, if any, thereby creating a mat-
rix of possible factual findings. A mere summary of 
the conflicting evidence in this case therefore does 
not give a clear indication of the A.L J.'s or the 
Commission's view as to what in fact occurred. 
Since we cannot even determine why the Commis-
sion found there was no causation shown, we 
clearly cannot assume that the Commission actually 
made any of the possible subsidiary findings. The 
findings are therefore inadequate. 
[10] In order for this court to address the errors 
claimed by Adams, we must have findings that in-
dicate respectively (1) the issues decided, see sec-
tion 63-46b-16(4Xc); (2) the legal interpretations 
and applications made, see section 63-46b-16(4Xd); 
and (3) the subsidiary factual findings in support of 
the decision, see section 63-46b-16(4)(g). A simple 
conclusion that Adams failed to prove medical 
causation does not contain any of the foregoing in-
formation. 
[11] At a minimum, there should have been a 
finding in the present case identifying the occupa-
tional disease or injury, if any, suffered by Adams. 
The Commission could not logically conclude that 
Adams's medical condition, if any, was not caused 
by her employment without first establishing what 
her medical condition was.044 This it failed to do. 
The Commission's findings of fact simply do not 
"resolve all issues of material fact necessary to jus-
tify the conclusions of law and judgment entered 
thereon." Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank 673 P.2d 
590,601 (Utah 1983) (footnote omitted). 
FN4. See, e.g„ Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335 
(error for A.LJ. to apply higher standard 
required of applicants with pre-existing 
conditions that contributed to the injury 
without first finding that the applicant had 
a pre-existing condition which contributed 
to the injury). 
[12] The Commission should have also given 
some explanation, factual or legal, as to how 
Adams failed to prove causation. *7 An applicant 
with a pre-existing condition must prove both legal 
and medical causation. See Allen, 729 P.2d at 
25-27. The Commission relied upon Allen, but its 
findings do not make it clear whether it believed 
that Adams failed to prove medical or legal causa-
tion. Both issues were apparently involved in this 
matter. Inasmuch as our standard of review varies 
depending upon whether Adams failed to prove leg-
al or medical causation, the Commission's failure to 
identify whether Adams failed to prove legal or 
medical causation prevents us from reviewing that 
conclusion. 
[13] When multiple conflicting versions of the 
facts create a matrix of possible factual findings, 
we are unable on appeal to assume that any given 
finding was in fact made. See, e.g., Carlton v. 
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Carlton, 756 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah App.1988) (finding 
giving only a lump sum total valuation of all marit-
al property was inadequate to permit review of dis-
puted valuations of individual marital assets). Be-
cause of the matrix of factual possibilities in the 
present case, we are unable to conduct a meaningful 
review. We therefore hold that the Commission's 
denial of benefits based upon a solitary finding re-
garding the ultimate issue of causation fails "to dis-
close the steps by which the ultimate factual con-
clusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are 
reached," id, and therefore renders the action arbit-
rary. 
PREJUDICE 
[14][15] Our conclusion that the Commission 
acted arbitrarily by failing to enter adequate find-
ings and legal conclusions does not end our inquiry, 
however. As required by section 63-46b-16(4), the 
agency's error must "substantially prejudice" the 
petitioner before we may grant relief. The Utah Su-
preme Court recently indicated in Morton Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 
581, 584-585 (Utah 1991), that the substantial pre-
judice language in section 63-46b-16(4) prevents an 
appellate court from granting relief if an agency er-
ror is harmless. The supreme court defined harm-
less error as being an error "sufficiently incon-
sequential that ... there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the proceed-
ings." Id We also note that when considering an er-
ror that is strictly of the agency's own making, such 
as failing to make adequate findings, any doubt 
about whether a petitioner was prejudiced is re-
solved in the petitioner's favor. Angell v. Board of 
Review of Indus. Comm'n, 750 P.2d 611, 613 (Utah 
App.1988). 
[16][17][18] We recognize as a matter of law 
the substantial prejudice inherent in the failure to 
make adequate findings when the evidence is not 
clear and i^ncontroverted. Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335. 
"The importance of complete, accurate, and con-
sistent findings of fact is essential to a proper de-
termination by an administrative agency." Milne 
Truck Lines, 720 P.2d at 1378. The findings are an 
integral part of the logical process a tribunal must 
go through in reaching a decision. See, e.g, Allred 
v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Utah App.1990) 
(final determination to be supported by adequate 
findings "made in the course of employing" the 
analytical approach established by the court on ap-
peal). Cf Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 
(Utah 1988) ("trial court must make adequate find-
ings and conclusions demonstrating that it has con-
sidered [relevant] factors" (emphasis added)). Once 
an administrative agency attempts to state its find-
ings, identify the applicable law, and articulate its 
logic, it may discover that critical facts are not 
properly before it,™5 that the law is other *8 than 
anticipated, or that its initial logic is flawed. In 
such situations, a result contrary to the initial con-
clusions of the body may be dictated. The process 
of articulation clearly enhances agency self-
discipline and protects against arbitrary and capri-
cious decisions. Without the safeguard of adequate 
findings, there is no guarantee that the agency fol-
lowed a logical process in reaching its decision. If, 
on the other hand, the agency identifies the facts, 
law, and reasoning supporting its decision, it re-
veals its logical process and the parties can be as-
sured that a logical process occured, even if it is in 
some manner flawed. 
FN5. We recognize that an administrative 
agency may hear evidence that is legally 
inadmissible under the technical rules of 
evidence; under the "residuum rule," 
however, its findings of fact cannot be 
based exclusively on such inadmissible 
evidence. "They must be supported by a 
residuum of legal evidence competent in a 
court of law." Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor 
Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984) 
. See also Mayes v. Department of Employ-
ment Sec, 754 P.2d 989, 992 n. 1 (Utah 
App.1988) (explaining inconsistent stand-
ards for admitting evidence and relying 
upon evidence admitted). The process of 
articulating the critical facts gives an ad-
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ministrative agency pause to ascertain 
what evidence it may properly rely upon to 
make such findings in light of the residu-
um rule. See, eg, Tolman, at 31-32 (at a 
minimum, issues regarding admissibility of 
evidence should have been addressed in 
the findings). 
If an agency's logical process is flawed, its 
shortcomings can be corrected on review, but only 
if the agency creates findings revealing the evid-
ence upon which it relies, the law upon which it re-
lies, and its interpretation of the law. Absent ad-
equate findings, a petitioner wishing to challenge 
an agency's factual findings will not be able to mar-
shal the evidence in support of the findings. See 
generally Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of 
the Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah 
App.1989) (party challenging factual findings of 
agency must marshal evidence in support of such 
finding and show that it is not substantial). Nor will 
a petitioner be able to challenge the agency's un-
declared interpretation of the law or its undisclosed 
logic. See, e.g, State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 
771 n. 11 (Utah App.1990) (trial court's failure to 
make adequate findings "placed appellate counsel 
at a disadvantage in framing and developing their 
arguments on appeal"). 
[19] If findings are inadequate, this court will 
also be unable to effectively and efficiently perform 
its duty of review. uTo enable this Court to determ-
ine whether an order is arbitrary and capricious, the 
Commission must make findings of fact that are 
sufficiently detailed to apprise the parties and the 
Court of the basis for the Commission's decision." 
Mountain States Legal Found, 636 P.2d at 1051 
(citations omitted). While these disadvantages may 
not be reflected in the initial outcome of the hearing 
below, they directly affect the ultimate outcome of 
the matter on review and are therefore relevant to 
the question of prejudice. It is axiomatic that the 
denial of Adams's claim without the possibility of 
meaningful review by this court, as provided for by 
UAPA, is clearly prejudicial. 
The Fund has not established that the Commis-
sion's failure to make adequate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law was harmless as defined in Mor-
ton International, at 584-585. ™* We therefore re-
solve any doubt in Adams's favor and hold that 
Adams was prejudiced by the Commission's failure 
to make adequate factual findings and legal conclu-
sions. 
FN6. It is possible in some cases that the 
failure to make adequate findings is never-
theless harmless. See, e.g, Nyrehn, 800 
P.2d at 335 (failure to make findings ne-
cessary to determine whether a higher legal 
standard should be applied before applying 
the higher standard was harmless error 
when the undisputed facts of the case satis-
fied the higher standard). Cf Olson v. 
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 1985) 
(even though findings were inadequate as 
to financial needs of wife, no remand was 
necessary because even accepting the 
wife's evidence as true, there was no abuse 
of discretion by trial court). 
RELIEF 
[20][21][22] As a general rule, the appropriate 
relief for an agency's failure to make adequate find-
ings is to vacate the order complained of and to or-
der the agency to "make more adequate findings in 
support of, and more fully articulate [the] reasons 
for, the determination ... made." Vali Convalescent 
& Care Insts., 191 P.2d at 450. However, as we 
have acknowledged herein, absent adequate find-
ings there is no presumption that the Commission's 
decision is correct. The process of articulation may 
or may not cause the Commission to reach a differ-
ent decision. Since we vacate the Commission's or-
der denying benefits, it is free to deny benefits or 
grant benefits as may be dictated by its new find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law.™7 
FN7. We express no opinion on the merits 
of Adams's remaining claims inasmuch as 
they may be resolved by the Commission's 
entry of adequate findings. Her remaining 
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claims are best left for another day. 
*9 CONCLUSION 
We vacate the Commission's order denying 
Adams benefits and direct the Commission to pro-
duce adequate findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and enter a new order. 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur. 
UtahApp.,1991. 
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n 
821 P.2d 1 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
AE CLEVITE, INC. and Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company, Petitioners, 
v. 
LABOR COMMISSION and Charles Tjas, Re-
spondents. 
No.990218-CA. 
Feb. 10,2000. 
Employer and its insurer sought review of Utah 
Labor Commission decision awarding workers1 
compensation benefits for an at-home injury. The 
Court of Appeals, Wilkins, J., held that: (1) as gen-
eral proposition, workers' compensation statute ap-
plies to "work at home" situations if injuries arise 
out of and in die course of employment, and (2) in-
juries to claimant, a salesperson who used personal 
residence as his base of operations, in fall on icy 
driveway that he was salting in anticipation of de-
livery of work-related materials arose out of and in 
course of employment. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A €==> 
754.1 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General 
15Ak754 Discretion of Administrative 
Agency 
15Ak754.1 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
When the Legislature has granted an agency 
discretion to determine an issue, Court of Appeals 
reviews the agency's action for reasonableness. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16. 
[2] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1338 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
413XVI(L)1 In General 
413kl338 k. Presumptions in general. 
Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals resolves any doubt respecting 
the right to workers' compensation in favor of the 
injured employee. U.C.A.1953,34A-2-401. 
13] Workers' Compensation 413 0=:>516 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413Vffl(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413Vin(A)lInGeneral 
413k516 k. Necessity that injury be ac-
cidental in general. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 413k553) 
Workers' Compensation 413 C=>604 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIU Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(C) Injuries Arising Out of and in 
Course of Employment in General 
413k604 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Workers' Compensation 413 0=^1421 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evid-
ence 
413XVI(N)1 In General 
413kl421 k. Preponderance of evid-
ence. Most Cited Cases 
To qualify for workers' compensation benefits, 
employee must suffer injury caused by accident, 
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and, in addition, prove by preponderance of evid-
ence both that accident occurred in the course of 
employment and that accident arose out of employ-
ment. U.C. A. 1953, 34A-2-401 (1998). 
[4] Workers1 Compensation 413 €=^>714 
413 Workers'Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(D) Particular Causes, Circum-
stances, and Conditions of Injury 
413VIII(D)17 Place of Injury with Refer-
ence to Plant or Premises of Employer 
413k714 k. Outside workers in gener-
al. Most Cited Cases 
Injuries sustained by salesperson who used per-
sonal residence as base of operations, in fall on icy 
driveway that he was salting in anticipation of de-
livery of work-related materials by mail carrier, oc-
curred in the course of employment for woiker's 
compensation purposes, even though salesperson 
was not performing work-related duty or in an em-
ployer-controlled area when injuries occurred. 
U.C.A.1953,34A-2-401. 
[5J Workers' Compensation 413 ©==>617 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(C) Injuries Arising Out of and in 
Course of Employment in General 
413k614 In Course of Employment in 
General 
413k617 k. What are injuries in course 
of employment in general. Most Cited Cases 
Accident occurs in the course of employment, 
for workers' compensation purposes, when it occurs 
while the employee is rendering services to his em-
ployer which he was hired to do or doing something 
incidental thereto, at the time when and the place 
where he was authorized to render such service. 
U.CA.1953,34A-2-401. 
[61 Workers' Compensation 413 €^>615 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(C) Injuries Arising Out of and in 
Course of Employment in General 
413k614 In Course of Employment in 
General 
413k615 k. In general. Most Cited 
An activity is incidental to the employee's em-
ployment, for workers' compensation purposes, if it 
advances, directly or indirectly, his employer's in-
terests. U.C.A.1953,34A-2-401. 
17] Workers' Compensation 413 0=>714 
413 Workers'Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(D) Particular Causes, Circum-
stances, and Conditions of Injury 
413VIII(D)17 Place of Injury with Refer-
ence to Plant or Premises of Employer 
413k714 k. Outside workers in gener-
al. Most Cited Cases 
Neck injuries suffered by salesperson when he 
fell on icy driveway of his personal residence, as he 
put down salt in anticipation of mail carrier's arrival 
with work-related materials, arose out of employ-
ment for worker's compensation purposes, in view 
of the "work at home" arrangement between sales-
person and employer. U.C.A.1953,34A-2-401. 
[8] Workers' Compensation 413 €^714 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(D) Particular Causes, Circum-
stances, and Conditions of Injury 
413Vffl(D)17 Place of Injury with Refer-
ence to Plant or Premises of Employer 
413k714 k. Outside workers in gener-
al. Most Cited Cases 
As a general proposition, Workers' Compensa-
tion Act applies to "work at home" situations when 
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a person sustains an injury by an accident arising 
out of and in the course of employment. 
U.C.A.1953,34A-2-401. 
*1073 Dori K. Petersen and Michael E. Dyer, 
Blackburn & Stoll, LC, Salt Lake City, for Petition-
ers. 
Gary E. Atkin and K. Dawn Atkin, Atkin & Ander-
son, Salt Lake City, for Respondent Tjas. 
Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Labor Commission. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS, and WILKINS. 
FNl 
FN1. Justice Wilkins heard the arguments 
in this case and participated in its resolu-
tion prior to his swearing-in as a member 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
OPINION 
WILKINS, Judge: 
T| 1 Petitioners Ae Clevite, Inc., and its insur-
ance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 
seek review from a final order of the Utah Labor 
Commission (Commission) entered on February 26, 
1999, awarding Mr. Charles Tjas workers' com-
pensation benefits from an injury occurring at his 
home. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
K 2 Neither party disputes the facts of this case. 
In its ruling the Commission found that Mr. Tjas 
sustained a severe neck injury causing quadriplegia 
on January 13, 1997, while spreading salt on the 
driveway of his residence. When the injury oc-
curred, Mr. Tjas was employed by Ae Clevite, an 
automotive supply company, as a district sales 
manager in Utah and several surrounding states. 
Because Ae Clevite did not have an office in Salt 
Lake City, it authorized Mr. Tjas to use his person-
al residence in Salt Lake City as a base of opera-
tions for his work. Ae Clevite provided Mr. Tjas 
with various office supplies, a car, and frequently 
delivered company correspondence and other ma-
terials to Mr. Tjas's home by U.S. mail or private 
*1074 courier. Part of Mr. Tjas's duties included 
making sales calls and performing office work at 
home. 
] 3 The night before the accident, several 
inches of snow fell on Mr. Tjas's steep driveway. 
The next morning, Mr. Tjas drove to several local 
sales calls but did not clear the snow. Although Mr. 
Tjas's son removed the snow later that morning, the 
driveway remained icy. After returning home in the 
mid-afternoon, Mr. Tjas spent nearly an hour load-
ing his car with material for an upcoming sales trip 
and waited for a large package to be delivered in 
connection with the business trip. When Mr. Tjas 
observed the mailman approaching, he decided to 
spread salt on the driveway so the postman could 
make his delivery more safely. In doing so, 
however, Mr. Tjas slipped on the ice and fell, suf-
fering a severe neck injury. 
% 4 Mr. Tjas subsequently filed a claim for 
workers1 compensation benefits with the Utah 
Labor Commission for his injuries. The Commis-
sion's Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded 
that Mr. Tjas's injury arose out of and in the course 
of his employment and awarded benefits. The 
Labor Commission subsequently affirmed the ALJ's 
decision awarding Mr. Tjas compensation pursuant 
to section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Code. Ae Clevite 
and its insurance carrier filed this petition for judi-
cial review. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
T[ 5 This case involves the application of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act to a "work at 
home" situation. Specifically, we consider whether 
the Commission erred in determining that Mr. 
Tjas's injury "arose out of and in the course of* his 
employment with Ae Clevite, thus entitling him to 
workers' compensation benefits under Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-401 (1997), the Utah Workers' Com-
pensation Act. 
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[1] T[ 6 The applicable standard of review for a 
formal adjudicative hearing is governed by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1997); see also Caporoz v. 
Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997). "When the Legislature has granted 
an agency discretion to determine an issue, we re-
view the agency's action for reasonableness." Ca-
poroz, 945 P.2d at 143; see Cross v. Board of Re-
view of Indus. Comm'n, 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992) (stating "[w]hen there exists a grant 
of discretion, 'we will not disturb the Board's ap-
plication of its factual findings to the law unless its; 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonable-
ness and rationality' ") (citation omitted). Absent a 
grant of discretion, we use a correction-of-error 
standard a 'in reviewing an agency's interpretation 
or application of a statutory term.' " Cross, 824 
P.2d at 1204 (citation omitted). 
[2] % 7 In this case, the Legislature has granted 
the Commission discretion to determine the facts 
and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming 
before it. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997). 
¥m
 As such, we must uphold the Commission's 
determination that Mr. Tjas's injury "arose out of 
and in the course o f his employment, unless the 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonable-
ness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion under section 63-46b-16(hXi) of the 
UAPA. See Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 143 (indicating 
agency has abused its discretion when agency ac-
tion is unreasonable). Moreover, we resolve " 
'[a]ny doubt respecting the right of compensation in 
favor of the injured employee.' " Drake v. Industri-
al Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997) (citation 
omitted). 
FN2. This section provides: "The commis-
sion has the duty and the full power, juris-
diction, and authority to determine the 
facts and apply the law in this chapter or 
any other title or chapter it administers." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997). 
ANALYSIS 
[3] K 8 To qualify for workers' compensation 
benefits in Utah, a person must be an employee 
who suffers an injury caused by an accident. See 
Buczynski v. Industrial Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1169, 
1172 (Utah Ct.App.1997). In addition, the employ-
ee must prove two essential elements under section 
34A-2-401: (1) the accident occurred "in the course 
o f the employment, and (2) the accident* 1075 
"arose out o f the employment Id™* An employ-
ee must prove both elements by a preponderance of 
the evidence. See id Petitioners do not dispute that 
Mr. Tjas sustained an accidental injury. Rather, pe-
titioners argue that the injury does not satisfy either 
of the elements of section 34A-2-401 of the Utah 
Code. 
FN3. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(l) 
(1997) reads: 
Each employee ... who is injured ... by 
accident arising out of and in the course 
of the employee's employment, wherever 
such injury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on ac-
count of die injury ... and such amount 
for medical, nurse, and hospital services 
and medicines ... as provided in this 
chapter. 
A. "In the Course o f Employment 
[4][5][6] % 9 First, petitioners argue that Mr. 
Tjas's injury did not arise "in the course o f his em-
ployment because Ae Clevite never requested, dir-
ected, encouraged, or reasonably expected Mr. Tjas 
to salt his driveway and because Mr. Tjas was not 
in an "employer controlled" area when the injury 
occurred. Utah courts, however, have recognized 
that an employee's injury arises in the course of em-
ployment even if these circumstances are not 
present. Indeed, "[u]nder Utah law, an accident oc-
curs 'in the course of employment when it 'occurs 
while the employee is rendering sendees to his em-
ployer which he was hired to do or doing something 
incidental thereto, at the time when and the place 
where he was authorized to render such service. 
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Bitczynski, 934 P.2d at 1172 (citations omitted; em-
phasis added); see Black v. McDonald's of Layton, 
733 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1987) (indicating accident 
is in scope of employment when it occurs "within 
the period of employment, at a place or area where 
the employee may reasonably be, and while the em-
ployee is engaged in an activity at least incidental 
to his employment"); 82 Am.Jur.2d Workers' Com-
pensation § 266 (1992) (same). An activity is 
"incidental to the employee's employment if it ad-
vances, directly or indirectly, his employer's in-
terests" Black, 733 P.2d at 156 (emphasis added). 
% 10 In this case, the Commission concluded 
that Mr. Tjas's injury arose in the course of his em-
ployment because his efforts to make his driveway 
safe for the delivery of work-related materials was 
"reasonably incidental" to his work for Ae Clevite. 
Specifically, it ruled that the ability of Ae Clevite 
to have work-related materials delivered to Mr. 
Tjas's home by mail or courier service was an 
"integral part of the employment relationship," so 
that Mr. Tjas's activity was "reasonably incidental" 
to his business. We agree. Although Mr. Tjas was 
not performing a work-related duty or in an em-
ployer-controlled area when the injury occurred, he 
was removing an obstacle which could have im-
peded his work and was at the location of his regu-
lar place of work when the injury occurred. We re-
cognize that Mr. Tjas may have decided to salt the 
driveway at some other time for his own non-job 
related purposes, yet the fact remains that when he 
did, it was in an attempt to remove a hurdle that 
could have prevented the delivery of the expected 
business package. In other words, Mr. Tjas's act of 
salting the driveway was motivated in-part by a 
purpose to benefit Ae Clevite and thus was reason-
ably incidental, rather than tangentially related, to 
his employment. As such, the Commission cor-
rectly concluded that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose "in 
the course o f his employment. 
B. "Arising out o f Employment 
[7] K 11 Second, petitioners argue that Mr. 
Tjas's injury did not "arise out o f his employment 
with Ae Clevite. Specifically, petitioners contend 
that the injury arose from Mr. Tjas's duty as a 
homeowner to maintain his premises, a risk Mr. 
Tjas would have been equally exposed to apart 
from his employment. 
K 12 In Buczynski we stated that in Utah, 
[a]n accident arises out of employment when 
there is a causal relationship between the injury 
and the employment. Arising out of, however, 
does not mean that the accident must be caused 
by the employment; rather, the employment is 
thought of more as a condition out of which the 
event arises than as the force producing the event 
in affirmative fashion. 
*1076 934 P.2d at 1172 (citations and internal 
quotations omitted; emphasis in original); see also 
82 Am.Jur.2d Workers' Compensation § 269 (1992) 
(indicating the "arising out o f requirement must be 
satisfied by a showing of "causal connection 
between work and injury"; "the injury must have 
been one of the risks connected with the employ-
ment, flowing therefrom as a natural consequence 
and must have been directly connected with the 
work"). 
% 13 Under the facts of this case, we agree with 
the Commission that Mr. Tjasfs injury arose from a 
risk associated with his work for Ae Clevite due to 
the parties1 "work at home" arrangement As such, 
we hold the Commission did not err in ruling that 
Mr. Tjas's injury arose from his employment with 
Ae Clevite. 
CONCLUSION 
[8] \ 14 As a general proposition, the Workers' 
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 
(1997), applies to "work at home" situations when a 
person sustains an injury by an accident "arising 
out of and in the course o f the employees employ-
ment. Moreover, we hold that under these facts, Mr. 
Tjas's injury at his home falls within the category of 
compensability under section 34A-2-401 because it 
was an injury that arose out of and in the course of 
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his employment. 
K 15 Affirmed. 
U 16 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Judge, and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge. 
Utah App.,2000. 
Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Com'n 
996 P.2d 1072, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2000 UT 
App35,4A.L.R.6th723 
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COLOR COUNTRY MANAGEMENT dba Sizzler 
Restaurant and/or Mid-Century Insurance Com-
pany, Petitioner, 
v. 
LABOR COMMISSION and Nellie Thomas, Re-
spondents. 
No.20001019-CA. 
Dec. 6,2001. 
Employer sought judicial review of Labor 
Commission Appeals Board's decision that claimant 
had a permanent total disability and that employer's 
reemployment plan was insufficient The Court of 
Appeals, Davis, J., held that: (1) statute required 
Commission to evaluate and approve reemployment 
plan; (2) reemployment plan was defective for fail-
ure to include subsistence benefits and include the 
correct physical work restrictions; (3) employer's 
due process rights were not violated by woikers' 
compensation procedures; (4) abstract of award 
based on interim order was issued in error. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part 
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*970 Carrie T. Taylor and Mark R. Sumsion, 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake City, 
for Petitioner. 
Aaron J. Prisbrey and Virginius Dabney, Dabney & 
Dabney, St George, for Respondents. 
Before JACKSON, Associate P.J., and DAVIS and 
THORNE,Jr.,JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge; 
\ 1 Color Country Management and Mid Cen-
tury Insurance Company (collectively Color Coun-
try) petition for review of the action of the Labor 
Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
34A-2-801(8) (1997), 63-46b-16 (1997),™ and 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. ™2 
FN1. The Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (UAPA) applies to all administrative 
proceedings commenced on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1988. See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-22(l) (1997); South Davis Cmty. 
Hosp. v. Dep't of Health, 869 P.2d 979, 
981 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Because any 
changes to UAPA during the pendency of 
this claim are of no consequence to the dis-
position of this appeal, we cite to the most 
recent version for the sake of convenience. 
FN2. Color Country refers to the Commis-
sion in its motion for review and 
throughout its brief although the decision 
under review was issued by the Appeals 
Board. A decision of die Appeals Board is 
treated as a final order of the Commission 
unless set aside by this court See Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(2XcXii) (1997). 
BACKGROUND 
\ 2 Because Color Country does not challenge 
the Appeals Board's findings of fact,, we recite the 
relevant facts from the Board's order on Color 
Country's motion for review. See Osman Home 
Imp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 958 P2d 240, 241 n. 1 
(UtahQ.App.1998). 
\ 3 Nellie Thomas was employed by Color 
Country at its Sizzler restaurant where she worked 
preparing salads and maintaining the salad bar. On 
October 15, 1994, Thomas, *971 while taking dirty 
dishes from the salad bar to the dish-washing sta-
tion, slipped in a puddle of greasy water, fell, and 
fractured her ulna, dislocated the radial head, and 
tore the rotator cuff in her left arm. She also sus-
tained injury to her spine. Thomas had six surgical 
procedures over the next few years, including the 
attachment of a metal plate in her arm; removal of a 
loose screw; a bone graft and reapplication of a dy-
namic compression plate; surgery on her rotator 
cuff; surgical removal of the second plate; a cast on 
her arm due to a new fracture through one of the 
screw holes; and another surgical procedure to re-
pair yet another fracture with another bone graft, 
this one through the callus. 
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% 4 On May 15,1997, Thomas filed an applica-
tion for a hearing regarding her workers1 compensa-
tion claim. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held 
an evidentiary hearing on January 6, 1998. On 
January 8, 1998, the ALJ awarded Thomas tempor-
ary total disability benefits of $140 per week and 
specifically reserved ruling on permanent partial 
and permanent total disability. 
\ 5 On June 23, 1998, the same AU issued a 
supplemental order, citing a January 20, 1998 re-
port *» by Dr. Scott Smith in which Dr. Smith 
gave Thomas a twenty percent whole person 
impairment rating based on the problems she had 
with her left arm, shoulder, and her neck. The ALJ 
awarded Thomas permanent partial disability bene-
fits based on the twenty percent whole person 
impairment, with a credit for amounts already paid 
by Color Country, and reserved ruling on perman-
ent total disability. 
FN3. Although the impairment rating was 
done January 20, 1998, it was not received 
by the Commission until June 22,1998. 
% 6 On August 11, 1998, the same ALJ issued a 
third order finding that because Thomas had 
readied medical stability, the issue of permanent 
total disability was now "ripe for determination," 
* and concluded Thomas was "tentatively perman-
ently totally disabled" He ordered Color Country 
to pay subsistence benefits of $140 per week, sus-
pended permanent partial payments, and informed 
the parties that Color Country could submit a reem-
ployment plan and request a hearing on the plan. 
% 7 In September 1998, Color Country submit-
ted a reemployment plan and requested a hearing. 
In the meantime, the first A U retired and a second 
ALJ held a hearing March 8, 2000, regarding the 
reemployment plan submitted by Color Country. 
On May 18, 2000, he issued an abstract based on 
the August 11, 1998 award. On June 14, 2000, the 
second ALJ issued an order in which he reaffirmed 
the earlier orders, rejected the reemployment plan, 
and entered a final award of permanent total disab-
ility. 
^ 8 Color Country subsequently filed two mo-
tions for review: one filed June 16, 2000, to have 
the Appeals Board review the propriety of the ab-
stract, and one filed July 14, 2000, to have the Ap-
peals Board review the compensation award. 
1 9 In its October 31,2000 order addressing the 
compensation award, the Board found that by Janu-
ary 20, 1998, Thomas had reached medical stability 
with permanent impairments to her left shoulder 
consisting of limitations to her range of motion, 
"joint crepitation, and distal clavicle resection." 
The Board determined that Thomas had a twenty-
nine percent impairment of the left shoulder, which 
it equated as a seventeen percent whole person 
impairment The Board described the neck impair-
ment as "critical signs of impairment without ra-
diculopathy or loss of motion, but with some evid-
ence of arthritis for [a] 5% whole person impair-
ment" The Board determined that these impair-
ments, when combined, produced a twenty percent 
whole person impairment 
\ 10 The Board agreed with the earlier findings 
by the A U that Thomas could not perform other 
work reasonably available when taking into consid-
eration her "age, education, past work experience, 
medical capacity and residual functional capacity." 
The Board noted that Thomas had over thirty years 
experience as a certified nursing assistant, but that 
she could not resume those duties due to her 
impairment The Board found that she could not re-
turn to her job at *972 Sizzler due to her impair-
ment, and that her circumstances limited her ability 
to do other work reasonably available in the area 
where she lived. 
\ 11 The Board then examined the reemploym-
net plan that Color Country submitted. The Board 
noted that the plan did not provide for "education, 
training, accommodation of physical problems or 
payment of continuing disability compensation to 
provide for ... subsistence during the period of re-
habilitation and reemployment" 
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% 12 Based on its findings, the Board con-
cluded that Thomas had carried her burden of prov-
ing permanent total disability and that she was en-
titled to an award of $131 per week, reduced from 
the $140 per week awarded by the ALJ. ™* 
FN4. The reduction of benefits is not an is-
sue on appeal. 
_ % 13 After the Board's October 31, 2000 de-
cision affirming the ALTs rejection of the reem-
ployment plan and the award of permanent total 
disability, Color Country filed a petition for judicial 
review in this court pursuant to section 34A-2-801 
(8), section 63-46b-16, and Rule 14 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
t H On January 22, 2001, the Commission 
denied the motion for review of the abstract by stat-
ing that the Appeals Board would not take any ac-
tion on the motion for review of the abstract be-
cause "it appears your motion for review is moot" 
due to a stay granted by the district court 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1 15 On appeal, Color Country argues that (1) 
the Commission misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-67 (1994); ** (2) its due process rights were 
violated by the Commission, and if the Commission 
interpreted and applied section 35-1-67 correctly, 
then section 35-1-67 is unconstitutional on its face 
and as applied; and (3) the abstract was improperly 
issued because there was no final order at the time 
it was issued. 
FN5. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1994) 
was the applicable statute for awarding 
permanent total disability benefits at the 
time Thomas sustained her workplace in-
jury. See Abel v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 
367, 369-70 (Utah Ct.App.1993). The cur-
rent version, as amended, is codified at 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (1997). 
[1] % 16 "Judicial review of final agency ac-
tions is governed by die Utah Administrative Pro-
cedures Act" Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor Comm'n, 
2001 UT App 8, 1 5, 18 P.3d 519. Under section 
63-46b-16, we may grant relief "only i£ on the 
basis of the agency's record, [we] determine[ ] that 
[Color Country] has been substantially prejudiced" 
because "the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitution-
al on its face or as applied" or if "the agency has er-
roneously interpreted or applied the law.n Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4Xa), (d) (1997). 
[2][3](4] \ 17 Whether die statute itself is un-
constitutional, and whether die agency interpreta-
tion of die statute is unconstitutional or incorrect, 
are questions of law that are reviewed under a cor-
rection of error standard. See Esquivel v. Labor 
Comm'n, 2000 UT 66, %% 13-19, 7 P.3d 777; Mor-
ton int% Ina v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 
587-89 (Utah 1991); Velarde v. Board of Review, 
831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah CtApp.1992). "Due pro-
cess challenges are questions of law that we review 
applying a correction of error standard." West Val-
ley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App 358,1 6, 993 P.2d 
252. Whettier there was a final order at die time die 
abstract was issued involves die construction of 
statutory provisions and is a question of law which 
we review for correctness. See Esquivel, 2000 UT 
66at113,7P.3d777. 
ANALYSIS 
f 18 We first address Color Country's claim 
that die Commission interpreted section 35-1-67 in-
correctly by requiring Commission approval of a 
reemployment plan. Color Country also argues the 
Commission erred by concluding that die reemploy-
ment plan must include subsistence payments and 
that the plan was unreasonable. 
J 19 According to Color Country, the hearing 
called for in section 35-1-67 is merely to determine 
whether die reemployment plan is *973 or has been 
successful, and it does not confer on the Commis-
sion the autiiority to approve or disapprove the ree-
mployment plan. 
[5] % 20 Section 35-1-67 allows an employer to 
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submit a reemployment plan for an employee who 
is seeking permanent total disability benefits: 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent 
total disability is not final, unless otherwise 
agreed to by the parties, until: 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier sub-
mits to the commission a reemployment plan as 
prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider 
reasonably designed to return the employee to 
gainful employment or the employer or its insur-
ance carrier provides the commission notice that 
the employer or its insurance carrier will not sub-
mit a plan; and 
(iii) the commission, after notice to the parties, 
holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to 
consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to 
review any reemployment plan submitted by the 
employer or its insurance carrier under Subsec-
tion (6XaXii). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1994) (emphasis 
added). When interpreting statutory provisions, we 
are guided by our primary purpose of giving effect 
to the legislative intent, and we first turn to the 
plain language of the statute to divine this intent. 
See Regal Ins, Co. v. Bott, 2001 UT 71, \ 10, 31 
R3d524. 
[6] \ 21 The verb "review" is defined as: "to go 
over or examine critically or deliberately"; "to go 
over with critical examination in order to discover 
excellences or defects"; and "to make a formal or 
official examination of the state o r something. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1944 
(1986). This meaning, taken together with the re-
quirement that the employer "submit" the plan, that 
the commission "consider" evidence, and that the 
plan be "reasonably designed to return the employ-
ee to gainful employment" convinces us that the 
plain meaning that the Legislature intended by its 
use of the word "review" in section 35-1-67(6) was 
to have the Commission independently evaluate and 
approve the employer's reemployment plan. We 
think it is clear that to require an entity to submit 
something to an agency charged with implementa-
tion of a remedial act and ask the agency to review 
it for reasonableness requires an evaluation and the 
agency's approval. The alternative construction 
urged by Color Country, if carried to its logical ex-
treme, would give employers who sought to avoid 
paying compensation the ability to draft a plan that 
an employee had no chance of fulfilling and then 
deny benefits because the employee was not co-
operating with reemployment efforts. This would 
be in direct contravention to the larger purpose and 
spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Wil-
stead v. Indus. Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 214, 407 P.2d 
692, 693 (1965) (stating the purpose of the Act is to 
insure income to an injured employee and his or her 
family and eliminate expense, delay, and uncer-
tainty of the employee in having to prove negli-
gence, and to place the burden of industrial injuries 
on industry); Industrial Comm'n v. Daly Mining 
Co., 51 Utah 602, 172 P. 301, 306 (1918) (rejecting 
employer's construction of the Act because it would 
in large measure "make it useless and of no materi-
al benefit"). We thus reject the construction urged 
by Color Country and conclude the Commission did 
not err in interpreting section 35-1-67 to require 
Commission approval of the reemployment plan. 
[7] \ 22 We also reject Color Country's argu-
ment that the Commission erred in ruling that die 
statute requires that the reemployment plan provide 
for the payment of subsistence benefits. Section 
35-l-67(6XcXii) plainly states that a plan " shall in-
clude payment of reasonable disability compensa-
tion to provide for the employee's subsistence dur-
ing the rehabilitation process." Utah Code Ann. § 
35-l-67(6XcXii) (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, 
not only was the Commission's decision that the 
subsistence benefits must be included in the plan 
correct, it was also correct to rule the plan was de-
fective for failing to do so. Moreover, the second 
ALJ pointed to an additional shortcoming of the 
plan when he rejected it. According to the June 14, 
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2000 order, the plan was defective because the 
physical work restrictions*974 for Thomas con-
tained in the plan were materially different than 
those specified by Dr. Smith and referred to in the 
August 1998 order awarding permanent total disab-
ility benefits. The ALJ noted that Kit Bertsch, who 
drafted the reemployment plan for Color Country, 
testified she was never given a copy of the August 
1998 order or Dr. Smith's restrictions for Thomas. 
She also testified that, had she received these ma-
terials, she would have relied upon them in drafting 
the reemployment plan. The Commission correctly 
applied the law in determining that the plan was not 
reasonable. 
% 23 Color Country next argues that its due 
process rights were violated by the Commission 
and that section 35-1-67 is unconstitutional because 
it violates the due process clauses of the Federal 
and Utah Constitutions. Color Country cites to the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitu-
tion in making this argument, but it does not articu-
late any basis for interpreting the two provisions 
differently or suggest that Article 1, Section 7 en-
titles it to greater protection than that afforded by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, we analyze this 
claim only under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and we undertake no inde-
pendent analysis of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,K 12 & 
n.3,999P.2d7. 
\ 24 Notwithstanding that the general policies 
and provisions of workers' compensation acts are 
not unconstitutional,**6 particular provisions of 
these acts may yet run afoul of the Constitution, 
and so we now turn to consider the specific due 
process challenges raised by Color Countiy. 
FN6. According to Professor Larson, the 
American system of workers' compensa-
tion that evolved near the turn of the twen-
tieth century differed from the German 
system, which incorporated contributions 
from the workers for insurance, in that it 
imposed "unilateral liability without fault 
upon the employer," and made the employ-
er "bear the entire burden of any insurance 
against that liability." 1 Arthur Larson & 
Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers1 Com-
pensation Law § 2.06, at 2-11 (2001). Nev-
ertheless, it is well-settled that workers1 
compensation acts in general, and the Utah 
Act specifically, do not violate the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment merely because they impose liability 
upon industry without regard to fault or be-
cause they have abrogated defenses avail-
able to employers at common law. See 
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 60 
Utah 161, 207 P. 148, 152 (1922), qf?d by 
263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153, 68 L.Ed. 366 
(1923). The United States Supreme Court 
rejected due process challenges to state 
workers' compensation acts brought by 
employers in a series of cases decided the 
same day in 1917. See New York C.K Co. 
v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct 247, 61 
L.Ed. 667 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 
U.S. 210, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678 
(1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washing-
ton, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct. 260, 61 L.Ed. 
685(1917). 
Over the years, the Utah Supreme Court 
has rejected several due process chal-
lenges to the Workers' Compensation 
Act brought by employers, beginning as 
early as 1918. See, e.g.t Scranton Leas-
ing Co. v. Indus. Comm% 51 Utah 368, 
170 P. 976, 979 (1918) (rejecting due 
process challenge brought by employer 
based on Commission's power to set in-
surance rates under the Act); see also 
United Air Lines Transport Corp. v. In-
dus. Comm'n, 107 Utah 52, 151 P.2d 
591, 595 (1944) (rejecting argument of 
employer/insurer that the Act was un-
constitutional because it allowed taking 
of property without due process). 
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[8] % 25 Color Country's due process argument 
has several components. First, it argues that its due 
process rights were violated because the issues of 
permanent partial and permanent total disability 
were not ripe for consideration at the time of die 
first hearing before die ALJ on January 6, 1998. 
The basis for this argument is that Thomas had not 
reached medical stability by the time of the first 
hearing, and she had not received any permanent 
work restrictions. Color Country argues that the 
permanent partial and permanent total disability 
claims should have been dismissed at the first hear-
ing, and because these issues were not dismissed, 
the Commission "exceeded its adjudicative author-
ity and denied [Color Country's] due process rights 
to a meaningful hearing" We reject this argument 
\ 26 The ALTs January 8, 1998 order awarded 
only temporary total disability benefits and ex-
pressly reserved ruling on die permanent partial and 
permanent total disability issues because Thomas 
had not readied medical stability. Workers' com-
pensation claims are best viewed as a process, 
rather than as a discrete event, and die Commission 
had continuing jurisdiction over *975 Thomas's 
claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1) (1994) 
(currently codified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420 
(1) (1997)); Continental Casualty Co. v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 79 Utah 532, 11 P2d 329, 337 (1932) 
(stating that a single application for benefits gives 
Commission plenary jurisdiction to determine eli-
gibility for all forms of benefits). Furthermore, we 
fail to see how Color Country was prejudiced by 
the ALTs actions because there was no award of 
permanent partial disability made until six months 
after the January 1998 order, and there was no per-
manent total disability award made until eight 
months after the January 1998 order. 
\ 27 The second due process argument focuses 
oh flie procedures used by the Commission. Color 
Country claims that the Commission deprived it of 
a meaningful opportunity to be heard by the manner 
in which the evidence was considered. Color Coun-
try claims it did not have adequate notice that the 
Commission would consider the permanent partial 
and permanent total disability issues witfiout an ad-
ditional hearing or post-hearing opportunities to 
submit additional evidence by bodi parties. In addi-
tion, Color Country complains that the Commission 
violated its due process rights when die first AU 
allowed Thomas to submit "post-hearing evidence 
regarding her impairment rating and work restric-
tions^ Color Country also complains tiiat the 
second AU violated its due process rights by fail-
ing to consider certain evidence submitted by it and 
by failing to appoint a medical panel. 
[9][10] \ 28 Under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 
(1994),°" the Commission is not bound by die 
usual rules of evidence or any formal rules of pro-
cedure. Although proceedings for workers' com-
pensation claims are very informal and of their own 
kind or class, die proceedings still must satisfy ba-
sic notions of fairness. See Utah Fuel Co. v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 59 Utah 46, 201 P. 1034, 1034-35 (1921). 
After a careful review of die record, we conclude 
that die procedures utilized here did not deprive 
Color Country of notice or a meaningful opportun-
ity to be heard. As we noted above, die permanent 
partial and permanent total awards were first made 
six and eight months, respectively, after die January 
6, 1998 hearing. Bofli parties submitted additional 
medical and odier evidence and directed arguments 
to die ALJ after die first hearing, and tiiere was no 
objection made to this informal process while it 
was going on. 
FN7. Currently codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-802(1997). 
% 29 In addition, die second ALJ, in his June 
14, 2000 order, reviewed all the evidence, including 
the functional capacity evaluation (FCE) by Mi-
chael Meek and die independent medical examina-
tion (JME) by Dr. Root** Thus, even if; as Color 
Country argues, die first ALJ failed to consider 
evidence submitted by Color Country, tiiere were 
two more independent analyses of all the evidence 
submitted in this case: one by the second ALJ after 
die March 8, 2000 hearing and again by die Board 
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on Color Country's motion for review, and we fail 
to see how Color Country was denied due process 
of law here. See Vati Convalescent & Care Inst. v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 649 P.2d 33, 36 (Utah 1982) 
(stating that due process does not always require a 
hearing prior to eveiy administrative action nor is it 
necessary to hold a hearing at a particular point in a 
proceeding so long as a hearing is held prior to a fi-
nal order becoming effective). 
FN8. In fact, the second A U had to inde-
pendently review the evidence and make 
his own findings on the issue of permanent 
total disability compensation because the 
first ALJ had mistakenly relied on Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (1997) instead of 
section 35-1-67, The second ALJ ad-
dressed Thomas's claim and re-analyzed 
the findings made by the first ALJ under 
section 35-1-67, applying the statutory 
factors and those in the pertinent section; 
of the Administrative Code, and he 
reached die same conclusion as the first 
AU: that Thomas was entitled to perman-
ent total disability compensation, 
[U] T 30 We also reject Color Country's claim 
that it was denied due process because there was no 
medical panel appointed. The appointment of a 
medical panel is discretionary and is called for 
when there are significant medical issues in dispute. 
See WUlardson v. Indus. Comm'n, 904 P.2d 671, 
674-75 (Utah 1995). Here, Color Country points to 
the reports of Drs. Root and Tebbs and claims there 
was a conflict in die evidence *976 between these 
reports and that of Dr. Smith. However, die second 
ALJ specifically addressed this in his June 14, 2000 
order. He considered all of this evidence and con-
cluded that there was no conflict in die evidence 
sufficient to mandate a medical panel because the 
reports of Drs. Root and Tebbs were from Novem-
ber 1996 and January 1997, respectively. The ALJ 
pointed out that tiiese reports were made over a 
year before Thomas readied medical stability and 
also noted that Dr. Root dealt only widi Thomas's 
Page 10 
arm injuries and failed to include die injuries to her 
neck in making his impairment rating. The AU 
concluded that there was "no conflict in the medical 
records as neither Dr. Root, nor Dr. Tebbs, preten-
ded to provide conclusive, comprehensive impair-
ment ratings ... at a point of medical stability." We 
also note, as did the ALJ, that Thomas underwent 
two more surgical procedures after the reports of 
Drs. Root and Tebbs were prepared. 
1 31 Moreover, as the Board noted in its Octo-
ber 2000 order, in Dr. Roofs 1998 IME, his ulti-
mate conclusion on Thomas's employability was: "I 
think her chances of being gainfully employed with 
all of these problems would be difficult" In die 
IME, I>r. Root also stated tfiat "Ms. Thomas's com-
plaints about neck and shoulder discomfort are dir-
ectly related to die initial injury in October of 
1994." Thus, Dr. Roofs conclusions were not in 
conflict with die conclusions of Dr. Smith on these 
issues. Considering all of the above, we cannot say 
the Commission abused its discretion by not ap-
pointing a medical panel. 
\ 32 Color Country also argues that if die Com-
mission's interpretation and application of section 
35-1-67 is correct, then section 35-1-67 is unconsti-
tutional on its face and as applied for additional 
reasons. Color Country argues that section 35-1-67 
violates the due process clause because it does not 
provide time frames for die second hearing or any 
opportunity for corrective action following a 
second hearing. Color Country also argues that the 
Act is unconstitutional because there is no provi-
sion for recoupment of monies paid as subsistence 
benefits to an employee pursuant to an interim or-
der if it later turns out that the finding of permanent 
total disability was erroneous. Color Country ar-
gues that it can be years before such an order is ju-
dicially reviewed, and because the employee does 
not have to hold the money in trust, there is "little 
or no chance of any recovery." 
f 33 It is clear tfiat Color Country has a prop-
erty interest in the monies it pays for compensation 
benefits and/or insurance premiums. It is equally 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 P.3d 969,436 Utah Adv. Rep. 4,2001 UT App 370 
(Cite as: 38 P.3d 969) 
Page 11 
clear that, for purposes of our due process analysis, 
(here has been state action here. This issue turns, 
then, on whether Color Country received all the 
process it was due before the Commission deprived 
it of its property interest. 
t 34 In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
349, 96 S.Ct. 893, 910, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the 
United States Supreme Court rejected a due proeess 
challenge brought by a recipient of social security 
disability benefits (SSDI) whose benefits had been 
terminated without a pre-termination hearing. In 
doing so, the Court identified three factors for ana-
lyzing procedural due process challenges: first, the 
private interest affected by the official action; 
second, "the risk of erroneous deprivation" of the 
interest by the procedures used and the probable 
value of additional or substitute procedural protec-
tions; and third, die governmental interest, 
"including the function involved and die fiscal and 
administrative burdens" of additional or substitute 
procedures. Id at 335, 96 S.Ct at 903; see also In 
re S.A., 2001 UT App 307, % 11, 432 Utah Adv. 
Rep.21,37P.3dll66. 
% 35 In addressing each of these factors in the 
context of the SSDI benefits at issue in Mathews, 
the Court noted that due process is not a " 
'technical conception with a fixed content unrelated 
to time, place and circumstances.' " Id at 334, % 
S.Ct at 902 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McEl-
roy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 
L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)). The Court pointed out that 
due process is flexible and calls for such procedures 
as are demanded by a particular situation. See id 
[12] \ 36 We adopted the reasoning and the 
factors from Mathews in Lander v. Industrial Com-
mission, 894 P.2d 552, 555-57 (Utah Ct.App.1995), 
where we rejected a due *977 process challenge to 
a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act 
brought by an employee. In Lander, we compared 
the employee's interest to that in Mathews and con-
cluded that the interest in Lander "[fell] short of a 
vested right to benefits" because Lander was not 
entitled to benefits yet, he was only entitled to ap-
ply for them. Id at 555. Unlike the employee in 
Lander, the employer/insurer here, Color Country, 
has an interest more akin to the SSDI recipient in 
Mathews; that is, it has a vested right in property it 
already holds, not merely an expectation of being 
able to receive something in the future. 
\ 37 The second Mathews factor, however, 
weighs in favor of the Commission. In addition to 
multiple hearings on the issue of disability under 
the Act, the Commission also has the ability to re-
consider prior rulings due to its continuing jurisdic-
tion over claims. See Spencer v. Indus. Common, 
733 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1987) (holding that the 
Commission has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
awards when there are significant changes or new 
developments in a claimant's condition). Moreover, 
the procedures contained in UAPA are available to 
ensure accurate decision making by the Commis-
sion. f*19 These include: a requirement that the 
Commission afford parties the opportunity to 
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-
examination, submit rebuttal evidence, and that 
testimony be under oath and recorded under section 
63-46b-8; an opportunity for discovery under sec-
tion 63-46b-7; written orders with findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and the reasoning relied upon 
under section 63-46b-10; agency review under sec-
tion 63-46b-12; agency reconsideration under sec-
tion 63-46M3; appellate judicial review under 
63-46b-16; and the right to seek a stay of orders un-
der 63-46b-18. These procedures closely approxim-
ate the full panoply of rights found in a full blown 
civil trial. 
FN9. Except as limited by section 
63-46b-l(2Xi). 
% 38 The Mathews Court pointed out that 'the 
decision whether to [award] disability benefits will 
turn, in most cases, upon 'routine, standard, and un-
biased medical reports by physician specialists/ " 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344, 96 S.Ct at 907 (quoting 
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404, 91 S.Ct 
1420, 1428, 28 L,Ed.2d 842 (1971)). The Mathews 
Court concluded that due to the nature of such de-
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cisions, the risk of error was low enough so that 
there was no need for a hearing before an employ-
ee's benefits were terminated, so long as there were 
procedures in place for a challenge to be brought 
following termination of benefits. See id. 
1 39 The reasoning of the Mathews Court ap-
plies equally here. The procedures under UAPA 
outlined above, the nature of the evidentiary de-
termination to be made, the fact that there were 
multiple hearings, continuing jurisdiction to cure 
defects, and the fact that the claimant bears the ulti-
mate burden, all persuade us that the risk of erro-
neous deprivation under existing procedures is low, 
and that there is little, if any, probable value in the 
additional procedures suggested by Color Country. 
% 40 The final Mathews factor requires an ex-
amination of the governmental interest at stake, in-
cluding the burdens of added procedures. As the 
Mathews Court noted: 
At some point the benefit of an additional safe-
guard to the individual affected by the adminis-
trative action and to society in terms of increased 
assurance that the action is just, may be out-
weighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of 
protecting those whom the preliminary adminis-
trative process has identified as likely to be found 
undeserving may in the end come out of the 
pockets of the deserving since resources available 
for any particular program of social welfare are 
not unlimited. 
Id at 348, 96 S.Ct. at 909. The concern with 
depleting limited social resources to add procedural 
protections is of particular significance here be-
cause one of the primary underlying purposes of the 
Act is to dispense with expense, delay, and uncer-
tainty of recovery for employees. See Wilstead, 407 
P.2dat693. 
\ 41 Thus, we do not agree with Color Country 
that section 35-1*67 is constitutionally deficient for 
failure to mandate additional hearings or require 
that specific time lines *978 be met. We also reject 
its argument that the Act provides for inadequate 
review. As we noted above, workers1 compensation 
claims are best viewed as a process, rather than as a 
discrete event. 
\ 42 We also reject Color Country's argument 
that the statute is unconstitutional because there is 
no provision for recoupment of money paid under 
an interim order that is later reversed In Kerens v. 
Industrial Commission, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1986), 
our supreme court ruled that an employer could not 
offset medical payments it had previously made for 
an employee's back injury that later turned out not 
to be compensable against an order to pay benefits 
based on the same employee's compensable neck 
injury. See id at 54-55. Although the court did not 
rule on the constitutionality of this, nor was it 
raised, other courts from other jurisdictions have 
considered this precise question and have ruled that 
failure to provide a means for such a recoupment is 
not a violation of due process. See, e.g., Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Duvall, 113 N.H. 28, 
300 A.2d 732, 734 (1973) (holding Hie New Hamp-
shire Act did not provide for recoupment and that 
this was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). Indeed, some states, as a result of employers 
obtaining stays during the sometimes lengthy ap-
peals process, have enacted legislation specifically 
denying stays or providing for payment of workers' 
compensation benefits during appeal, and these pro-
visions have also been held not to offend constitu-
tional principles. See, e.g., McAvoy v. KB. Sher-
man Co., 401 Mich. 419, 258 N.W.2d 414, 422 
(1977) (upholding provision that mandated paying 
70% of award to employee during pendency of ap-
peals); Merchants Mutual Ins. Co. v. Newport Hos-
pital, 108 R.I. 86, 272 A.2d 329, 331 (1971) 
(upholding statute with "no-stay" provision). 
% 43 On balance, we conclude that the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of Color Country's property 
interest under the procedures of section 35-1-67 and 
UAPA is so minimal that the benefits of any addi-
tional procedures are outweighed by their adminis-
trative costs. In addition to the fiscal and adminis-
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trative costs imposed by additional procedures, the 
delay and potential deprivation of benefits to 
claimants who have already met their initial burden 
of proving a compensable claim weighs heavily 
against Color Country, where the very purpose of 
the Act challenged is to do away with expense and 
delay and afford injured workers speedy, certain, 
and just compensation. Any claimed harm to em-
ployers and insurers in Color Country's position is 
also mitigated by the ability to spread the costs as-
sociated with the Act over an entire industry and 
(hen on to society as a whole by adjusting the ap-
propriate rates of insurance premiums and charges. 
The procedures used by the Commission under sec-
tion 35-1-67 and UAPA provided all the process 
that was constitutionally due before Color Countiy 
was deprived of its property interest™10 All 
things considered, Color Country's arguments are 
best directed to the Legislature. See Rekward v. In-
dus. Comm'n, 755 P2d 166, 169 (Utah 
CtApp. 1988) (rejecting appellant's argument for 
creation of a fifth class of disability benefits not 
contained within the Act and stating problem was 
one for the Legislature). 
FN10. Because we reject Color Country's 
"as applied" challenge, its facial challenge 
must necessarily fail. See United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct 
2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ("A fe-
cial challenge to a legislative Act is ... the 
most difficult challenge to mount success-
fully, since the challenger must establish 
that no set of circumstances exists under 
which the Act would be valid."). 
[13] K 44 Color Country's final argument is that 
the abstract should not have been issued by the 
second ALJ because there was no final order at the 
time. The Commission concedes this point in its 
brie£ although Thomas does not. 
^ 45 The abstract was issued under Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-212 (1997), which states that an ab-
stract "of any final order providing an award" can 
be filed under the Act with the clerk of the district 
court. At the time the abstract was issued, in May 
of 2000, the second ALfs findings, conclusions, 
and order based on the March 2000 hearing had not 
yet issued, and there was no oral ruling from the 
bench at that hearing. Thus, the only order the ab-
stract could have been based on was *979 the Au-
gust 1998 order by the first ALJ, tentatively award-
ing permanent total disability benefits to Thomas. 
Color Country argues that the August 1998 order, 
upon which the abstract is based, was not a final or-
der, and therefore, the abstract was issued in error. 
We agree.™11 
FN11. Color Country also argues that it is 
entitled to the costs and fees that arose 
from defending against the abstract, but 
because Color Countiy has failed to cite to 
authority of any kind in support of this ar-
gument, we decline to address it. See Utah 
R.App. P. 24(aX9); State v. Thomas, 961 
P2d 299,305 (Utah 1998). 
\ 46 The August 1998 order by the first ALJ 
made only a "tentative" award. Under Union Pa-
cific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17, agency action is not final 
if it is "preliminary, preparatory ... or intermediate 
with regard to subsequent agency action." Id z t \ 
16, 999 P.2d 17. Because the August 1998 order 
was of an interim nature, we conclude the order 
was not a final order, and hence, the abstract was 
improperly issued. 
CONCLUSION 
f 47 We reject Color Country's interpretation 
of section 35-1-67 and affirm the Commission's de-
termination that the reemployment plan was not 
reasonable. We reject Color Country's claim that 
the Commission and the statute deprived it of due 
process of law. We also conclude that the abstract 
was improperly issued. Accordingly, we reverse 
that part of the order issuing the abstract, and other-
wise affirm. 
\ 48 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Associate Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM A. 
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Linda Lee HYMAS, Petitioner, 
v. 
LABOR COMMISSION, SOS Staffing/Hyclone, 
and/or Insurance Company of the State of 
Pennsylvania, Respondents. 
NO.20070875-CA. 
Dec. 26,2008. 
Background: Employee's widow petitioned for re-
view of the Labor Commission's decision affirming 
the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) ruling that 
she was not entitled to death benefits after her hus-
band died of a heart attack while working at em-
ployer. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, P J., 
held that neither employee's widow nor employee's 
co-workers were qualified to testify as to the med-
ical cause of employee's death. 
Affirmed. 
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[2] Workers' Compensation 413 €==>1939.3 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
0 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
Pagel 
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413kl939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
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413 Workers' Compensation 
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413VIII(B) Remote and Proximate Con-
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Cases 
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To demonstrate medical causation, a workers' 
compensation claimant must show by evidence, 
opinion, or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exer-
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ulting injury or disability. 
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413XVI(A) In General 
413kl 173 k. Continuances. Most Cited 
Cases 
Labor Commission's decision that administrat-
ive law judge (ALJ) had not abused his discretion 
in denying motion for a continuance filed by em-
ployee's widow, who sought death benefits, did not 
exceed the bounds of reason and rationality; widow 
was not prepared for the hearing, and the ALJ had 
the discretion to deny any continuances that would 
allow for post-hearing evidence, and Commission's 
rules stated that requests for continuances could be 
granted or denied at the discretion of ALJ for good 
cause shown. U.A.C. R602-2-1. 
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413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evid-
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413XVI(N)1 In General 
413kl415 Opinion Evidence 
413kl417 k. Necessity of Expert 
Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Neither employee's widow, who sought death 
benefits, nor employee's co-workers were qualified 
to testify as to the medical cause of employee's 
death in workers' compensation action; lay testi-
mony was not competent to prove medical causa-
tion. 
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413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)5 Reference 
413kl730 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Referral of workers' compensation case to a 
medical panel is mandatory only where there is a 
medical controversy as evidenced through conflict-
ing medical reports, and whether there are conflict-
ing medical reports is a question of fact. U.A.C. 
R602-2-1. 
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413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
or 
413kl939.4 Sufficiency of Evid-
ence in Support 
413kl939.4(4) k. Substantial 
Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court must uphold the Labor Com-
mission's factual findings in workers' compensation 
case if such findings are supported by substantial 
evidence based upon the record as a whole. 
[9J Workers' Compensation 413 0=^1730 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)5 Reference 
413kl730 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Labor Commission's decision that administrat-
ive law judge (ALJ) was not required to submit the 
medical evidence in workers' compensation case to 
a medical panel did not exceed the bounds of reas-
on and rationality; referral of workers* compensa-
tion case to a medical panel was mandatory only 
where there was a medical controversy as evid-
enced through conflicting medical reports, and 
there were no conflicting medical reports. UA.C. 
R602-2-2. 
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Before GREENWOOD, P.J., McHUGH and ORME 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
% 1 Linda Lee Hymas (Mrs. Hymas) petitions 
for review of the Labor Commission's *220 de-
cision affirming the Administrative Law Judge's 
(ALJ) ruling that she is not entitled to death bene-
fits after her husband died of a heart attack while 
working at SOS Staffing. The ALJ held that Mrs. 
Hymas failed to establish medical causation 
between Mr. Hymas's death and his work. We af-
firm. 
BACKGROUND 
\ 2 Mrs. Hymas sought death benefits based on 
her claim that the physical stress of her husband's 
job at SOS caused or contributed to his death. The 
AU reviewed the medical record submitted by Mrs. 
Hymas, which included a letter from die medical 
examiner identifying the cause of death as a heart 
attack, but did not include records from Mr. 
Hymas's primary physician. The medical exam-
iner's letter stated that "the efforts of work related 
stress may be a factor in additional work load being 
placed on the heart," but did not opine as to wheth-
. er work activities had caused or contributed to Mr. 
Hymas's heart attack. The AU asked if the record 
was complete, and Mrs. Hymas's attorney respon-
ded that it was. Based on that evidence, the ALJ 
ruled that the medical records Mrs. Hymas submit-
ted did not meet the appropriate medical causation 
standard to show that a work accident or disease 
caused or contributed to Mr. Hymas's heart attack. 
% 3 Mrs. Hymas requested a continuance so that 
she could submit additional medical evidence. The 
ALJ denied the request, stating that "Mhe long-
standing rule is that you come to the hearing pre-
pared to present the evidence. And we dont make 
continuances based on the parties'—the sudden 
realization that they need more evidence." Mrs. 
Hymas also asked that she and her husband's co-
workers be allowed to testify regarding the medical 
Page 3 
causal connection between the work and her hus-
band's death, but the ALJ refused the request be-
cause Mrs. Hymas had failed in her initial burden 
of showing medical causation, and lay testimony 
could not overcome this deficiency. Mrs. Hymas re-
quested review by the Labor Commission. 
% 4 The Labor Commission affirmed the ALfs 
ruling, stating that (1) "[b]ecause Mrs. Hymas's 
witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the 
medical cause of Mr. Hymas's death, [the ALJ] did 
not err in rejecting their testimony" (2) "[Mrs. 
Hymas] did not submit the necessary medical evid-
ence at the hearing, or explain why it was not pos-
sible to obtain such evidence;" and (3) "Mrs. 
Hymas had a reasonable opportunity to present 
medical evidence to establish a medical causal con-
nection between Mr. Hymas's work and his death 
[but did not]." 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2] | 5 We review Mrs. Hymas's claim that 
the Labor Commission erred in denying her work-
ers' compensation benefits following the death of 
her husband. Mrs. Hymas raises several issues, 
each sharing the core argument that the Labor Com-
mission abused its discretion and violated her due 
process rights by not allowing additional evidence 
and testimony after the initial hearing before the 
AU. "[TJhe Legislature has granted the [Labor] 
Commission discretion to determine the facts and 
apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before 
it." Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT 
App 35,1 7, 996 P. 2d 1072. We will uphold the 
Labor Commission's determination unless it 
"exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and ration-
ality." Id. 
ANALYSIS 
[3] ^ 6 Compensation for a work-related death 
is governed by Utah Code section 34A-2-401 
(Workers Compensation Act), which states: 
(1) An employee ... who is injured and the de-
pendents of each such employee who is killed, by 
accident arising out of and in the course of the 
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employee's employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-
inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account 
of the injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
*221 (iii) in case of death, the amount of fu-
neral expenses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (Supp.2008). 
Claimants pursuing compensation under the Work-
ers Compensation Act must prove that the employ-
ee was killed "by accident," and must also show 
both medical and legal causation. See Allen v. In-
dustrial Comm'it, 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-23 (Utah 
1986). The Labor Commission determined that 
Mrs. Hymas had not proved medical causation, and 
thus determined it was unnecessary to consider 
whether Mr. Hymas's death was uby accident" or 
whether there was legal causation. 
% 7 Mrs. Hymas argues that the Labor Commis-
sion failed to follow the proper procedures. Spe-
cifically, she argues that die ALJ erred by not con-
sidering whether Mr. Hymas's death was an acci-
dent, not examining the facts concerning whether 
Mr. Hymas had a pre-existing condition, and not 
analyzing legal causation. 
\ 8 Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 
15 (Utah 1986), does not prescribe any particular 
sequence in which the elements of accident, legal 
causation, and medical causation must be ad-
dressed. See generally id. Indeed, in the interest of 
efficiency, if one element cannot be met, there is no 
reason to address the remaining issues. See Lan-
caster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 
1987) ("Because the result in this case turns on the 
issue of medical causation, we will not examine the 
issue of legal causation."). Here, the Labor Com-
mission concluded that the medical causation ele-
ment had not been met and chose not to consider 
the questions of accident or legal causation. If the 
Labor Commission properly concluded that medical 
causation had not been met, then there was no reas-
on to address the other issues. 
[4] % 9 We turn, then, to whether the Labor 
Commission's ruling on medical causation was an 
abuse of discretion. To demonstrate medical causa-
tion, a "claimant must show by evidence, opinion, 
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exertion re-
quired by his or her occupation led to the resulting 
injury or disability." Allen, 729 P.2d at 27. The 
Labor Commission determined that the evidence 
Mrs. Hymas offered did not do this. Mrs. Hymas 
challenges this decision. 
[5] % 10 First, the Labor Commission determ-
ined that Mrs. Hymas was not prepared for the 
hearing and that the ALJ had the discretion to deny 
any continuances that would allow for post-hearing 
evidence. The Labor Commission relied on its rules 
to support its position. Rule 602-2-1 of the Utah 
Administrative Code sets forth fee procedures for 
an adjudication of workers' compensation benefits 
before fee Labor Commission. See Utah Admin. 
Code R602-2-1. Among fee instructions are fee 
following: 
F. Discovery. 
6. Parties shall diligently pursue discovery so as 
not to delay the adjudication of the claim. If a 
hearing has been scheduled, discovery motions 
shall be filed no later than 45 days prior to fee 
hearing unless leave of the administrative law 
judge is obtained. 
H. Medical Records Exhibit. 
1. Hie parties are expected to exchange medical 
records during the discovery period. 
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2. Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical re-
cords contained in his/her possession to the re-
spondent for the preparation of a joint medical re-
cords exhibit at least twenty (20) working days 
prior to the scheduled hearing. 
5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the re-
spondent shall be delivered to the Division and 
the petitioner or petitioner's counsel at least ten 
(10) working days prior to the hearing. Late-filed 
medical records may or may not be admitted at 
the discretion of the administrative law judge by 
stipulation or for good cause shown. 
I. Hearing. 
3. No later than 45 days prior to the scheduled 
hearing, all parties shall file a signed pretrial 
disclosure form that identifies: (1) fact wit-
nesses the parties actually intend to call at the 
hearing; *222 [and] (2) expert witnesses the 
parties actually intend to call at the hearing.... 
7. Parties are expected to be prepared to present 
their evidence on the date the hearing is sched-
uled Requests for continuances may be granted 
or denied at the discretion of the administrative 
law judge for good cause shown. Lack of dili-
gence in preparing for the hearing shall not con* 
stitute good cause for a continuance. 
8. Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
Labor Commission, the evidentiary record shall 
be deemed closed at the conclusion of the hear-
ing, and no additional evidence will be accepted 
without leave of the administrative law judge. 
Id. (emphases added). Accordingly, the Labor 
Commission concluded that the ALJ had not abused 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
Page 5 
its discretion in denying Mrs. Hymas's motion for a 
continuance. Likewise, we conclude that the Labor 
Commission's decision did not exceed the bounds 
of reason and rationality. 
[6] '% 11 The Labor Commission also affirmed 
the ALJPs decision not to allow Mrs. Hymas or Mr. 
Hymas's co-workers to testify as to the cause of Mr. 
Hymas's heart attack because "the witnesses were 
not qualified to testify as to the medical cause of 
Mr. Hymas's death." The Labor Commission em-
phasized, as did the ALJ, that the witnesses Mrs. 
Hymas wished to call were not medical witnesses 
and that "medical evidence of causation is re-
quired." The Labor Commission referred to Griffith 
v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 264, 399 V2d 
204 (1965), which asks: "Where the injury com-
plained of affects die internal anatomy, by what 
means but through medical testimony can petitioner 
prove that her ailments were caused by the acci-
dent?" Id. at 206. The Labor Commission stated 
that die lay testimony may have been "relevant to 
other aspects of Mrs. Hymas's claim, such as the is-
sue of legal causation. But lay testimony is not 
competent to prove medical causation." Accord-
ingly, die Labor Commission concluded that die 
ALJ did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit 
the testimony of lay witnesses. Again, we conclude 
that the Labor Commission's decision did not ex-
ceed the bounds of reason and rationality. 
[7][8][9] J 12 Finally, the Labor Commission 
determined that the ALJ was not required to submit 
the medical evidence to a medical panel because 
medical panels are only mandatory where there is 
conflicting evidence, and, in this case, the medical 
records presented did not reveal any conflicting 
evidence. Rule 602-2-2 of the Utah Administrative 
Code states: 
A. A [medical] panel will be utilized by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge where one or more signi-
ficant medical issues may be involved. Generally 
a significant medical issue must be shown by 
conflicting medical reports. Significant medical 
issues are involved when there are: 
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1. Conflicting medical opinions related to causa-
tion of the injury or disease[.] 
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-2. Mrs. Hymas ar-
gues that a medical panel was necessary because 
there was a significant medical issue. In response, 
the Labor Commission contends that there were no 
conflicting medical opinions because nothing in the 
record before the ALJ presented controverted evid-
ence, and therefore, there was no evidence of "a 
significant medical issue." 
[RJeferral to a medical panel is mandatory only 
where there is a medical controversy as evid-
enced through conflicting medical reports. 
Whether there are conflicting medical reports is a 
question of feet We must uphold the Commis-
sion's factual findings if such findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence based upon the re-
cord as a whole. 
Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial 
CommH 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). Here, the 
Labor Commission's factual findings are clearly 
supported by the record: based on the information 
before the ALJ at the time of the hearing, there 
were no conflicting medical reports. Indeed, the 
Labor Commission also indicated that it had re-
viewed additional documentation from the parties 
and concluded that there were still no conflicting 
medical reports. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
Labor Commission's decision*223 does not exceed 
the bounds of reason and rationality. 
% 13 Affirmed. 
% 14 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH, 
Judge, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
UtahApp.,2008. 
Hymas v. Labor Com'n 
200 P.3d 218, 620 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 2008 UT 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., Peti-
tioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH and Linda Lee Taylor, 
Respondents. 
NO.910592-CA. 
Aug. 14,1992. 
Employer brought action challenging Industrial 
Commission order awarding workers' compensation 
benefits to claimant The Court of Appeals, Orme, 
J., held that: (I) employer failed to completely sat-
isfy its obligation to marshal evidence in connec-
tion with sufficiency of evidence challenge; (2) Ad-
ministrative Law Judge (ALT) did not prejudicially 
err when she submitted to medical panel question 
of whether there was "medically demonstrable 
causal connection" between industrial accident and 
claimant's subsequent injuries; and (3) medical pan-
el, in concluding that claimant's prior industrial in-
jury, rather than subsequent lifting of child, was 
primary cause of second back injury, did not act 
beyond its authority by assuming facts not in evid-
ence, weighing facts or acting as fact finder. 
Affirmed. 
WestHeadnotes 
[I] Workers* Compensation 413 €==>1935 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XV1(T)12 Scope and Extent of Re-
view in General 
413kl935 k. Presumptions and Burden 
of Showing Error. Most Cited Cases 
Employer challenging Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALPs) determination that workers' com-
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pensation claimant's disc fusion surgery was neces-
sitated by industrial accident which occurred during 
course of her employment failed to completely sat-
isfy its obligation to marshal evidence and, thus, 
findings would not be disturbed; in challenging 
ALfs decision, employer catalogued only evidence 
in record most helpful to its position, and fully neg-
lected to amass evidence supporting ALTs findings. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4Xg). 
[2] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1691 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)1 In General 
413kl691 k. Scope and Extent; Mat-
ters and Evidence Considered. Most Cited Cases 
Administrative Law Judge (AU) did not preju-
dicially err in workers* compensation proceeding 
when she submitted to medical panel question of 
whether there was "medically demonstrable causal 
connection" between industrial accident and 
claimant's subsequent injuries, even though applic-
able test required more of causal connection than 
phraseology of inquiry may have suggested, as ALJ 
properly reserved for herself ultimate determination 
on narrower issue of legal causation, and applied 
correct legal standard. U.CA.1953,35-l-77(2Xd). 
[3] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^553 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIH(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously 
Impaired Condition 
413k553 k. Necessity of Accident and 
Causal Connection. Most Cited Cases 
Correct standard for determining employer li-
ability for subsequent injuries occurring after indus-
trial injury does not amount to "but for" analysis. 
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[4] Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 7 1 9 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XV1 Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)3 Questions of Law and Fact 
413kl718 Arising Out of and in the 
Course of Employment 
413U719 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Determinations regarding factual circumstances 
surrounding industrial injury must be ruled on by 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), as opposed to 
medical panel, in workers1 compensation proceed-
ing. U.C.A.1953,35-l-77(2Xd). 
[5] Workers' Compensation 413 0^1687 
413 Workers'Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)i In General 
413kl687 k. In General Most Cited 
Cases 
Role of medical panel in workers' compensa-
tion proceeding is limited; it may not act as 
"factfinder" in same way Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) ultimately finds facts, it may not base its 
conclusions on assumption of facts not in evidence, 
and it may not, except in limited circumstances, as-
sess credibility of claimant's testimony. 
U.C.A.1953,35-1-77. 
[6] Workers' Compensation 413 €>=*1687 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)1 In General 
413kl687 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Medical panel, in concluding that workers' 
compensation claimant's prior industrial injury, 
rather than her subsequent lifting of child, was 
primary cause of second back injury, did not act 
beyond its authority by assuming facts not in evid-
ence, weighing facts or acting as fact finder, despite 
claim that panel's statement that claimant did not 
actually pick up child directly contradicted 
claimant's testimony; even if child was actually lif-
ted, claimant's act of lifting was not outside range 
of activity allowed by her treating physician and, 
thus, issue was essentially irrelevant U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-77. 
*842 David M. McConkie and Stuart F. Weed, Salt 
Lake City, for petitioner. 
Jay A. Meservy, Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
Before BILLINGS, ORME and RUSSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Petitioner challenges an Industrial (Commission 
order awarding workers' compensation benefits to a 
former employee. We affirm. 
FACTS 
The facts set forth here are based primarily on 
the findings made by the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) and adopted by the Industrial Ccwnmission in 
its Order Denying Motion for Review. 
Linda Lee Taylor was an employee of Inter-
mountain Health Care. On March 6, 1987, she sus-
tained an injury to her back while lifting S desk at 
the request of her department supervisor. Taylor 
sought and received medical attention for the injury 
shortly after March 6, 1987, was treated by a neuro-
logist, and was instructed to take a week off work 
at that time. After being treated conservatively over 
the summer, she was referred to an orthopedic spe-
cialist in the fall of 1987, and was hospitalized for 
one week in November of 1987. 
After a further 30-day absence from work, 
Taylor returned to work for short intervals begin-
ning in late December of 1987. However, constant 
sitting and bending while at work caused Taylor to 
experience severe discomfort in her back and right 
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leg. Thus, pursuant to her doctor's orders, Taylor 
stayed off work until July of 1988,™* during 
which time she received temporary total disability 
benefits. MC refused to rehire Taylor when she 
sought to resume her job duties in July of 1988. 
Taylor found employment with Interwest Medical, 
and worked there from October of 1988 until April 
of 1989, losing two to three days of woik per month 
due to her ongoing back problems. She continued to 
receive conservative medical care for her back 
problems until April 15,1989. 
FN1. A May 11, 1988, letter from Taylor's 
treating physician indicates that Taylor 
stopped working due to recurrent episodes 
of pain. 
On that day, Taylor attempted to lift her four 
month old grandchild from a baby *843 walker 
when she experienced a sudden, sharp pain in her 
back, similar to what she experienced in March of 
1987 while lifting the desk. Upon bending down to 
remove her grandchild from the walker, Taylor's 
back "went out," she was unable to pick up the 
child, and she could not straighten up. Taylor testi-
fied that she had experienced the same type of pain 
several times since the original desk-lifting accident 
in 1987. 
Following this incident, Taylor sought treat-
ment for extreme pain in her back, and was hospit-
alized on April 21, 1989. She was released by her 
doctor to return to woik in May of 1989, but had 
been terminated by Interwest. Although Taylor at-
tempted to find other work, because of restrictions 
placed on her activities by her then treating physi-
cian, she was only able to work on a part-time basis 
between April and September of 1989, when she 
was hospitalized for surgery. At that time, Taylor's 
treating physician performed disc fusion surgery in 
an attempt to alleviate some or all of Taylor's dis-
comfort. 
In April of 1990, a physician who had not 
treated Taylor reviewed Taylor's medical records 
and issued a report assessing the medical cause of 
the need for the disc fusion surgery. He opined that 
it was improbable that the surgery would have been 
necessary if the lifting incident in April of 1989 had 
not occurred.™2 
FN2. In an April 1989 letter to IHC, 
Taylor's treating physician noted he felt 
that Taylor's back problems were 25% the 
result of the 1987 industrial injury and 
75% nonindustrial. Sometime after per-
forming Taylor's disc fusion surgery, the 
same physician opined that Taylor's back 
problems beginning in April 1989,.and the 
subsequent surgery in September of 1989, 
were 50% related to the March 6, 1987, in-
dustrial injury and 50% die result of nonin-
dustrial degeneration. 
After the surgery, Taylor filed an Application 
for Hearing requesting payment of medical ex-
penses and disability benefits. Because there ap-
peared to be some medical controversy regarding 
the significance of the April 1989 lifting incident, 
the ALJ referred the matter to a medical panel to re-
solve the conflict The ALJ asked the medical panel 
whether there was "a medically demonstrable caus-
al connection between the applicant's back prob-
lems noted after April 15, 1989 and the March 6, 
1987 industrial accident" In its report, the medical 
panel answered the general inquiry in the affirmat-
ive and concluded that Taylor's September 1989 
surgery was 70% the result of the March 1987 in-
dustrial injury and 30% the result of the April 15, 
1989 incident lifting the baby. The ALJ then de-
termined that the September 1989 surgery was ne-
cessary primarily as a result of the March 1987 in-
dustrial injury, and that IHC was therefore respons-
ible for payment of the benefits requested by 
Taylor. IHC sought review of the matter by the In-
dustrial Commission, which affirmed the decision 
of the ALJ. IHC thereupon appealed to this court. 
On appeal, IHC argues that (1) the Industrial 
Commission incorrectly affirmed the ALJ's finding 
that the September 1989 disc fusion surgery was 
necessitated by the industrial accident because the 
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finding was not supported by substantial evidence; 
(2) the ALJ failed to adopt the correct standard to 
determine employer liability for nonindustrial injur-
ies occurring after an industrial accident; and (3) 
the medical panel acted beyond its authority by as-
suming facts not in evidence, weighing facts, and 
acting as a factfinder. 
EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT 
IHC assails the Industrial Commission's affirm-
ance of the ALTs decision. The thrust of IHCs at-
tack appears to be against the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the ALJ's factual findings, inso-
far as those findings led the ALJ to conclude that 
Taylor's September 1989 disc fusion surgery was 
necessitated by the industrial accident of March 
1987. However, IHC makes little effort to identify 
particular findings of fact which it challenges on 
this basis, or, indeed, to differentiate in its analysis 
between factual findings and legal conclusions. 
In any event, to successfully challenge findings 
of fact made in an administrative proceeding, the 
party seeking to upset *844 those findings must 
show that the findings are "not supported by sub-
stantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(g) (1990). See Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah 
App.1989). Under this "whole record test," a party 
challenging the findings must " marshall all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that des-
pite the supporting facts, and in light of the con-
flicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence." Id at 68 
(emphasis in original). Accord Heinecke v. Depart-
ment of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 & n. 7 (Utah 
App.1991). 
[1] In challenging the ALJ's decision, IHC 
catalogues only that evidence in the record most 
helpful to its position, and wholly neglects to amass 
the evidence supporting the ALPs findings. Thus, 
IHC has "failed to completely satisfy [its] obliga-
tion to marshal the evidence by 'persistently ar-
guing [its] own position without regard for the 
evidence supporting the [ALfs] findings.' " Hei-
necke, 810 P.2d at 464 (quoting Horton v. Gem 
State MuL, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App.1990)). 
FN3
 We therefore decline to disturb the findings 
made by the ALJ and ratified by the Industrial 
Commission. 
FN3. In Heinecke, we explained that while 
evidence contrary to the findings is relev-
ant to the appellate court's review of the 
"whole record," such evidence becomes 
relevant only when the court "scrutinizes 
the supporting evidence under the 
'substantial evidence viewed in light of the 
whole record test.' " 810 P.2d at 464 n. 8. 
Thus, evidence contrary to that supporting 
the findings should "be referred to in brief-
ing only after the supporting evidence has 
been separately marshalled " Id. Since IHC 
has failed to comply with the marshaling 
requirement in this case, we have no occa-
sion to consider the evidence supporting its 
position. 
APPROPRIATENESS OF QUESTION SUBMIT-
TED TO MEDICAL PANEL 
[2] IHC next claims the ALPs formulation of 
one of the questions submitted to the medical panel 
was legally incorrect. Specifically, IHC argues that 
in submitting to the medical panel the question of 
whether there was any "medically demonstrable 
causal connection between the industrial accident 
and the subsequent injuries," the ALJ adopted a 
substantially more liberal standard for causation 
than that adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In objecting to the wording of this question, 
IHC argued that, in place of the language requiring 
a "medically demonstrable causal connection" 
between the accident and Taylor's injuries, the 
question submitted to the panel should have in-
quired whether the September 1989 disc fusion sur-
gery was the "direct and natural result" of the 
March 6, 1987, industrial accident. IHC relies on 
Professor Larson's treatise and two Utah Supreme 
Court cases in support of its contentions. See 1 Lar-
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son, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 13.11 
(1992); Mountain States Casing Servs. v. McKean, 
706 P.2d 601, 602 (Utah 1985) (adopting Larson's § 
13.11 as proper legal standard for determining com-
pensability of injury occurring subsequent to com-
pensable industrial injury); Perchelli v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 475 P.2d 835 (Utah 1970) (cited by Lar-
son in § 13.11(a)). IHC contends that under Per-
chelli, the legal standard for causation is essentially 
a "but for" test. See 475 P.2d at 837. IHC argues 
that rather than incorporating the allegedly correct 
"but for" test, the question submitted to the medical 
panel by the ALJ constitutes a standard for causa-
tion that would impose responsibility on an em-
ployer upon a finding of even the slightest relation-
ship between the industrial accident and the injury 
in question. To properly dispose of this claim, it is 
necessary to analyze the contrasting functions of 
the medical panel and ALJ, as well as the proper 
causation standard. 
A. Function of Medical Panel 
Referring to the Perchelli case, and other cases 
involving further medical complications flowing 
from a compensable injury, Professor Larson notes 
that "[t]he issue in all of these cases is exclusively 
the medical issue of causal connection between the 
primary*845 injury and the subsequent medical 
complications." 1 Larson, § 13.11(a) at 3-517. Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-l-77(lXa) (1991) provides for per-
missive referral of the medical causation issue to a 
medical panel by the ALJ: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for 
injury by accident, or for death, arising out of and 
in the course of employment, and if the employer 
or its insurance carrier denies liability, the com-
mission may refer the medical aspects of the case 
to a medical panel appointed by the commission. 
See also Workers' Comp. Fund v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572,576 (Utah App.1988). 
The function of the medical panel is to give the 
Commission "the benefit of its diagnosis relating to 
those matters that are particularly within the scope 
of its expertise." IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 
P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). ™4 However, "the fi-
nal responsibility of making the decision as to the 
issues in such a proceeding is given to the Commis-
sion," id, and the medical panel may not take over 
this responsibility of the Commission. Id at 830 n. 
4. Accord Jensen v. United States Fuel Co., 424 
P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1967).™5 Thus, the role of 
the medical panel is only "to assist the administrat-
ive law judge in deciding whether medical cause 
has been proven." Price River Coal Co. v. Industri-
al Comm'n, 731 P. 2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 1986) 
(emphasis added).™6 
FN4. "The medical panel ... shall make 
such study, take such X-rays, and perform 
such tests ... as it may determine to be ne-
cessary or desirable." Utah Code Ann. § 
35-l-77(2Xa)(1991). 
FN5. In Jensen, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that 
[i]t is not the panel's prerogative to en-
croach upon the authority vested in the 
Commission to make the findings of fact 
and render the decision upon the applica-
tion. Its proper purpose is limited to 
medical examination and diagnosis, the 
evidence of which is to be considered by 
the Commission in arriving at its de- cision. 
424P.2dat442. 
FN6. "It is through the expertise of the 
medical panel that the Commission should 
be able to make the determination of 
whether the injury sustained by a claimant 
is causally connected or contributed to by 
the claimant's employment." Schmidt v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 617 P.2d 693, 697 (Utah 
1980) (Wilkins, J., concurring). 
B. Propriety of ALJ's Approach 
In the instant case, the question submitted by 
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the ALJ to the medical panel constituted a broad re-
quest for information in the form of a medical opin-
ion on the relationship, if any, between Taylor's 
disc fusion surgery and the prior industrial injury. 
In a sense, then, whether the question, as phrased, 
incorporated the correct legal standard for causation 
is inconsequential because the ALJ, not the medical 
panel, is responsible for making the actual decision 
regarding medical causation. Id See also Jensen, 
424P.2dat442. 
[3] We do not agree with IHC that the correct 
standard for determining employer liability for sub-
sequent injuries occurring after an industrial injury 
essentially amounts to a "but for" analysis. In 
Mountain States Casing Servs. v. McKean, 706 
P.2d 601 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that a[a] subsequent injury is compensable if 
it is found to be a natural result of a compensable 
primary injury." Id at 602 (emphasis added). A 
claimant "is not required to show that his original 
tragedy was the sole cause of a subsequent injury, 
but only that the initial work-related accident was a 
contributing cause " of the subsequent injury. Id 
(emphasis added). McKean and Perchelli both draw 
from Larson's statement of the general rule regard-
ing workers' compensation, which provides in per-
tinent part: 
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, 
whether an aggravation of the original injury or a 
new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is the 
direct and natural result of a compensable 
primary injury. 
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 
13.11 (1992). In discussing the Perchelli case, Pro-
fessor Larson observed that the result in that case 
was correct: "The presence of the sneezing incid-
ent, which triggered pain and then disc surgery,] 
should not obscure the true nature of the case, 
which is nothing more than a further medical*846 
complication flowing from a compensable injury." 
1 Larson, § 13.11(a) at 3-516. 
[4] While the applicable test is not "but for," as 
IHC argues, McKean requires more of a causal con-
nection than the phraseology of the inquiry to the 
medical panel may suggest. The record reveals that 
despite the imprecise phrasing of the causation 
question submitted to the medical panel, the ALJ, 
after examining the panel's report, applied the cor-
rect legal standard in determining causation. In its 
report submitted to the Industrial Commission, the 
medical panel arrived at a conclusion, based on its 
medical expertise, that Taylor's September 1989 
surgery was 70% the result of the March 1987 in-
dustrial injury and 30% the result of the April 15, 
1989, incident in lifting the baby. This is hardly the 
immaterial causal link IHC fears the ALJs question 
might have elicited. Such a conclusion was entirely 
within the authority of the medical panel. Relying 
upon this medical conclusion, the ALJ then went on 
to apply the compensability test as described by 
Larson. See 1 Larson, § 13.11(a) at 3-517. The ap-
plicable test includes an analysis of the facts sur-
rounding the subsequent injury and analysis of the 
connection between the subsequent injury and the 
original compensable industrial injury. Determina-
tions regarding factual circumstances surrounding 
an industrial injury must be ruled on by the ALJ. 
Cf. Price River Coal Co.t 731 P.2d at 1084 ("It is 
not the role of the medical panel to resolve conflicts 
in the factual evidence regarding the injured party's 
activities."). 
In submitting to the medical panel a broad re-
quest for medical information and opinion on the 
issue of medical causation, while reserving for her-
self the ultimate determination on the narrower is-
sue of legal causation, the ALJ acted in accordance 
with the rules enunciated in Price River Coal Co. 
and McKean. We therefore see no prejudicial error 
in the submission of the question, as phrased, to the 
medical panel. 
MEDICAL PANEL'S ALLEGED IMPROPER AS-
SUMPTION OF FACTS 
Lastly, IHC claims the medical panel acted 
beyond its authority in assuming facts not in evid-
ence, weighing facts, and acting as factfinder. Spe-
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cifically, IHC claims that, contrary to fee evidence 
and Taylor's own testimony, the medical panel de-
termined that Taylor did not actually pick up the 
child in the April 15,1989, lifting incident. 
[5] As discussed previously, the role of the 
medical panel is controlled by statute and adminis-
trative rule. The Industrial Commission "may refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel 
appointed by fee commission." Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-77 (1990). While the medical panel is 
"responsible to make findings regarding disputed 
medical aspects of a compensation claim," Utah 
AdmiitCode R490-1-1(F) (1991), the role of the 
medical panel is limited. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 
584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). In no sense may fee 
medical panel act as "factfinder" in fee same way 
fee ALJ ultimately finds facts. Price River Coal Co. 
v. Industrial Comm% 731 P. 2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 
1986).FN7 *847 Nor may fee panel base its conclu-
sions on fee assumption of facts not in evidence. 
See Utah Packers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 24 
Utah 2d 230, 469 P.2d 500, 503 (1970). Finally, fee 
medical panel may not, except in limited circum-
stances, assess the credibility of fee claimant's testi-
mony. See Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 785 
P.2d 1127,1133 (Utah App.1989). 
FN7. Section 35-1-77, rule 490-l-l(F), and 
some reported decisions refer to fee medic-
al panel making "findings" about fee med-
ical aspects of a case. See, e.g.t Anderson 
v. Dominic Elec, 660 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 
1983) (commission adopted panel's 
"findings" as its own). However, fee term, 
as employed in those authorities, must be 
distinguished from "findings" in its term-
of-art sense, which refers to fee 
nondelegable duty of fee ALJ and Com-
mission to "find fee facts" or make 
"findings of fact" Section 35-l-77(2Xd) 
illustrates this distinction: 
The commission may base its finding 
and decision on the report of fee panel, 
medical director, or medical consultants, 
but is not bound by the report if other 
substantial conflicting evidence in the 
case supports a contrary finding. 
See also Pittsburgh Testing Lab. v. 
Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1371-72 (Utah 
1983) (decision and findings of Commis-
sion upheld where, despite contrary 
"findings" of fee medical panel, compet-
ent and comprehensive medical evidence 
in record supported Commission's find-
ing feat there was causal connection 
between distress at place of work and 
worker's heart attack four days later); 
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wallace, 728 
P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1986) 
(notwithstanding medical panel finding 
that worker's condition needed medical 
treatment for three months after acci-
dent, Industrial Commission's finding 
feat woikefs condition stabilized 23 
months after accident and feat worker 
was feus eligible for temporary total dis-
ability benefits during feat period was 
supported by evidence). 
[6] IHC points to fee medical panel's statement 
in its report feat on April 15, 1989, Taylor did not 
actually pick up fee child, claiming fee panel's 
statement directly contradicts Taylor's testimony at 
fee hearing. IHC further argues feat fee medical 
panel's statement indicates fee panel questioned 
Taylors credibility in determining which version of 
her story is valid. Thus, IHC argues, fee panel, con-
trary to Taylor's testimony, minimized fee amount 
of exertion by Taylor on April 15, 1989, thereby 
improperly limiting fee contribution of feat incident" 
to Taylors need for surgery. 
We agree wife fee Industrial Commission's 
conclusion feat this argument appears to be one of 
semantics. Taylor testified at fee hearing, feat on 
April 15, 1989, she bent over to pick up fee grand-
child, lifted him partially out of a walker, but was 
unable to lift him further or place him back in fee 
walker. In a bent over position, Taylor held fee 
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child until his mother relieved her. The medical 
panel report states: 
It is noted that the records have indicated she 
picked up the grandchild, but no details as to the 
weight or size appearing in the record, so that the 
applicants current interpretation of the 4 month-
old child that she reached out to pick up but did 
not pick up is probably valid. 
However, in its report, the medical panel also 
stated that "[a]gain on 15 April 1989, she was noted 
to have turned the wrong way and picked up a 
grandchild with sudden onset of pain in the lower 
back radiating again to the right leg." It is clear 
from the report that the medical panel considered 
fee physician's notes detailing the event as well as 
Taylor's testimonial version of the event. Appar-
ently, whether Taylor actually picked up the child 
seems to have played no part in the panel's ultimate 
conclusion. The panel stated, with our emphasis: 
It would appear that the intention to lift a 
13-pound child is well within the limits of lifting 
allowed by her treating physician ... so that this 
probably should not be considered a breach of 
treatment recommendations. 
The panel clearly considered other evidence in 
reaching its conclusion, such as Taylor's continuing 
treatment for back discomfort from the time of the 
industrial accident in 1987 up to April of 1989, and 
a similar incident resulting in identical symptoms in 
October of 1987.*** The medical panel acted 
within its authority in considering all evidence per-
taining to die April 1989 lifting incident and form-
ing a medical conclusion based on that evidence. In 
forming its conclusion, die medical panel made no 
inappropriate credibility determinations, nor did it 
engage in factfinding beyond its authority. Rather, 
it is clear from the record that the medical panel 
based its determination on medical evidence in the 
record: Even if the child was actually lifted, 
Taylor's act of lifting the child was not outside the 
range of activity allowed by her treating physician. 
Thus, the question whether Taylor actually lifted 
the child became essentially irrelevant, and the 
medical panel could properly conclude that the pri-
or industrial injury, and not any actual lifting of the 
child-much less a mere bending incident to an at-
tempted lifting-was the primary cause of the second 
injury. ?• 
, FN8. The medical panel's review of 
Taylor's file revealed that "the pattern of 
her difficulty has been well confirmed, 
with low back pain radiating to the right 
leg, particularly to the small toes on the 
right" The panel noted that an incident 
similar to die April 15, 1989, lifting incid-
ent occurred in October of 1987 when she 
" 'moved wrong/ and had extreme back 
pain." Apparently Taylor was at work, and, 
turning to get out of a chair, she "felt acute 
onset of lumbosacral back pain with radiat-
ing pain into die foot and leg." 
*848 CONCLUSION 
Because IHC failed to properly marshal the 
evidence in support of the ALTs findings, we de-
cline to disturb tiiose findings as ratified by the In-
dustrial Commission. The question submitted by 
the ALJ to the medical panel concerning medical 
causation constituted a broad request for informa-
tion in die form of a medical opinion. Relying upon 
die medical panel's more focused and well-
supported conclusion, die ALJ applied the correct 
standard in making die ultimate determination con-
cerning medical and legal causation. Finally, IHCs 
arguments concerning the medical panel's alleged 
inappropriate assumption of facts not in evidence, 
weighing of facts, and finding of facts are without 
merit. The medical panel acted well within its au-
diority in formulating its opinion regarding medical 
causation. For the foregoing reasons, the order of 
the Industrial Commission denying IHCs motion 
for review is affirmed. 
BILLINGS and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
UtahApp.,1992. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Kurtis LUND dba Kurt Lund Construction and B & 
B Drywall, Inc., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Fon Ray BROWN, III, Sally Brown, and John Does 
and Jane Does 1-10, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 981778. 
Sept. 22,2000. 
General contractor and drywall subcontractor 
en home construction project brought action against 
homeowner to foreclose mechanic's liens, and 
homeowner filed counterclaims. After contractor 
filed bankruptcy petition, and contractor and sub-
contractor did not file answers to counterclaims 
based on belief that bankruptcy stay applied to 
counterclaims, default judgment was entered. Con-
tractor and subcontractor moved to vacate judg-
ment, and the District Court, Cache County, Gor-
don J. Low, J., denied motion. Contractor and sub-
contractor appealed. The Supreme Court, Durrant, 
J., held that: (1) belief that stay applied to counter-
claims provided a reasonable justification or excuse 
for failure to answer, and could provide basis for 
relief from judgment; (2) contractor and subcon-
tractor, whose default was not based on a failure to 
appear, were entitled to notice of request for default 
judgment; and (3) allegations in original complaints 
were sufficient to show a meritorious defense. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Bankruptcy Code forbids prosecution of an ac-
tion against a non-debtor where the claim is one 
which could also be asserted by the bankruptcy 
trustee. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 362. 
[11] Judgment 228 €=^123(1) 
228 Judgment 
228IV By Default 
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity 
228kl21 Application for Judgment 
228kl23 Proceedings in General 
228kl23(l) k. In general. Most 
Cited Cases 
General contractor and subcontractor who had 
brought action against homeowner to foreclose 
mechanic's liens, and who were in default with re-
spect to homeowner's counterclaims for breach of 
contract due to reasonable belief that bankruptcy 
stay applied to counterclaims, were entitled to no-
tice of homeowner's motion for entry of default 
judgment. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 5(a), 55. 
[12J Judgment 228 €=^123(1) 
228 Judgment 
228IV By Default 
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity 
228kl21 Application for Judgment 
228kl23 Proceedings in General 
228kl23(l) k. In general. Most 
Cited Cases 
Rule creating exception to general principle 
that it is unnecessary to give a party in default any 
notice of any action taken applies to parties who 
have appeared, but who are in default for other 
reasons. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 5(a), 55. 
[13] Statutes 361 €=>206 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361k206 k. Giving effect to entire stat-
ute. Most Cited Cases 
Where possible, court must give meaning to all 
provisions of a statute. 
[14] Statutes 361 €=^206 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361k206 k. Giving effect to entire stat-
ute. Most Cited Cases 
Any interpretation which renders parts or 
words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to 
be avoided. 
[15] Judgment 228 €^>145(1) 
228 Judgment 
228IV By Default 
2281V(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default 
228kl45 Meritorious Cause of Action or 
Defense 
228kl45(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Purpose of rule that relief from default judg-
ment requires a showing of a meritorious defense is 
to prevent the necessity of judicial review of ques-
tions which, on the face of the pleadings, are frivol-
ous. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b). 
[16] Judgment 228 0^145(1) 
228 Judgment 
228IV By Default 
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default 
228kl45 Meritorious Cause of Action or 
Defense 
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228kl45(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Party need not actually prove its proposed de-
fense in order to establish a meritorious defense 
sufficient to allow grant of relief from default judg-
ment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b). 
[17J Judgment 228 €>^145(4) 
228 Judgment 
228IV By Default 
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default 
228k 145 Meritorious Cause of Action or 
Defense 
228kl45(4) k. Sufficiency of defense. 
Most Cited Cases 
Fundamental policy underlying rule that relief 
from default judgment requires a showing of a mer-
itorious defense is simply to prevent the necessity 
of treating defenses that are frivolous on their face, 
and thus, where a party presents a clear and specific 
proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude 
total or partial recovery by die claimant or counter-
claimant, it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous 
and meritorious defense, for purposes of motion to 
set aside a default judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
60(b). 
[18] Judgment 228 €=^145(4) 
228 Judgment 
228IV By Default 
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default 
228kl45 Meritorious Cause of Action or 
Defense 
228kl45(4) k. Sufficiency of defense. 
Most Cited Cases 
Allegations by general contractor and drywall 
subcontractor in their actions to foreclose mechan-
ic's liens against homeowner that they had entered 
into contract to build a house, and that homeowner 
had failed to pay for work done, were sufficient to 
establish meritorious defense to homeowner's 
breach of contract counterclaims, as required to al-
low grant of relief from default judgment entered 
after contractor and subcontractor failed to answer 
counterclaims based on their reasonable belief that 
stay resulting from contractor's bankruptcy petition 
applied to counterclaims. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 362; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b). 
*278 Diane H. Banks, Robert A. Garda, Jr., Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
Christopher L. Daines, Logan, for defendants. 
DURRANT, Justice: 
% 1 Plaintiffs below, Kurtis Lund (Lund) and B 
& B Drywall (B & B) appeal the trial court's denial 
of their motion to vacate an entry of default judg-
ment. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
J 2 In September 1996, Fon and Sally Brown 
(the Browns) hired Lund to construct a house. Lund 
hired B & B as a subcontractor to install drywall 
Lund worked on the house between October 1996 
and May 1997. *279 B & B worked on the house in 
April and May 1997. When the Browns refused to 
pay them for their work, Lund and B & B filed 
mechanic's liens. 
% 3 In November 1997, Lund and B & B filed 
an action in district court seeking to foreclose on 
their liens. Specifically, they both sought reim-
bursement for their own work and Lund also sought 
reimbursement for its work and the work performed 
by the subcontractors, including B & B. The 
Browns filed an answer and counterclaim on 
December 15, 1997, alleging that Lund had 
breached the construction contract. In addition, the 
Browns alleged that B & B had breached its con-
tract with Lund, thereby causing damages to the 
Browns as the intended third party beneficiaries. 
The Browns sought money damages and an order 
releasing the liens. 
K 4 On December 29, 1997, before replies to 
the Browns' counterclaim were due, Lund filed for 
bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of Utah. Lund's claim against the 
Browns therefore became an asset of his bank-
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ruptcy estate. Lund notified both the trial court and 
the Browns of the bankruptcy proceedings. Because 
Lund and B & B believed that bankruptcy code sec-
tion 362(a) automatically stayed any actions in-
volving property of the bankruptcy estate, neither 
Lund nor B & B filed a reply to the Browns1 coun-
terclaim. 
K 5 Without providing notice, the Browns* 
counsel, Mr. Garda, sought a default judgment 
against Lund and B & B for failing to reply to the 
counterclaim. On May 21, 1998, the trial court 
entered defaults against Lund and B & B. On May 
28, the trial court entered default judgments, declar-
ing Lund's and B & B's liens invalid and requiring 
B & B to pay specified damages and attorney fees. 
The Browns1 counsel notified Lund and B & B by 
mail of the default judgments on June 17,1998. 
\ 6 Shortly thereafter, Lund and B & B filed a 
motion to set aside the default judgments pursuant 
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Lund and B 
& B argued that the judgments should be vacated 
under the "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect" prong of rule 60 because they had 
believed the bankruptcy case stayed any further ac-
tions regarding their complaint or the counterclaim. 
Lund and B & B asserted several other reasons why 
the judgments should be set aside, including that 
the Browns did not provide them required notice of 
the default actions. 
1 7 The Browns countered that they complied 
with all notice requirements, that the bankruptcy 
stay did not apply to B & B, and that the stay did 
not prohibit a declaratory judgment, such as one in-
validating the mechanic's lien, against Lund. The 
Browns claimed that neither Lund nor B & B had 
any justifiable reason for failing to respond to the 
counterclaim. The Browns argued in the alternative 
that even if Lund or B & B could satisfy rule 60(b), 
the default judgments should not be vacated be-
cause neither of them had demonstrated the exist-
ence of a "meritorious defense" to the counter- claim. 
% 8 The trial court denied Lund's and B & B's 
motion to vacate "[f]or reasons stated" by the 
Browns. Lund and B & B now appeal. On appeal 
we must decide whether the trial court correctly de-
termined that (1) neither Lund nor B & B had a 
reasonable excuse for failing to respond to the 
counterclaim and that (2) Lund and B & B did not 
have a "meritorious defense" to the counterclaim. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3] % 9 As to the first issue, a trial court 
has broad discretion in deciding whether to set 
aside a default judgment. See Katz v. Fierce, 732 
P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Though 
broad, the court's discretion is not unlimited. As a 
threshold matter, a court's ruling must be "based on 
adequate findings of fact" and "on the law." May v. 
Thompson, 611 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per 
curiam). A decision premised on flawed legal con-
clusions, for instance, constitutes an abuse of dis-
cretion. 
[4][5] % 10 Moreover, the nature of a default 
judgment and the equitable nature of rule 60 
provide further limits. See id; see also Schwab v. 
Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir.1974) 
(explaining limits to trial court's discretion under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (which is virtu-
ally identical to *280 Utah's rule 60)); 11 Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R, Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857, at 257-58 
(2d ed.1995) (stating that "[bjased on the remedial 
nature of Rule 60(b), the discretion of the district 
court to deny a motion for relief is limited"). For 
example, we have stated that a trial court's 
"discretion should be exercised in furtherance of 
justice and should incline towards granting relief in 
a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a 
hearing." Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 
1081 (Utah 1981) (citing Warren v. Dixon Ranch 
Co., 123 Utah 416, 420, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953)); 
see also Katz, 732 P.2d at 93 (stating that courts 
should be indulgent toward vacating default judg-
ments where the defaulted party demonstrates a 
reasonable justification or excuse for failing to an-
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swer). Likewise, we have stated that "if default is 
issued when a party genuinely is mistaken to a 
point where, absent such mistake, default would not 
have occurred, the equity side of the court ... 
[should] grant relief." May, 611 P.2d at 1110. 
[6] % 11 Based on these principles, this court 
has stated that " 'it is quite uniformly regarded as 
an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default 
judgment where there is reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendants failure to appear, and 
timely application is made to set it aside.' " Hel-
gesen, 636 P.2d at 1081 (quoting Mayhew v. Stand-
ard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 54, 376 P.2d 951, 
952 (1962)). Thus, while we review the trial court's 
decision in the instant case for abuse of discretion, 
we emphasize that the court's discretion is not un-
limited. 
[7] \ 12 As to the second issue on appeal, we 
review for correctness the trial court's determina-
tion of whether a defense is meritorious. See Erick-
son v. Schenkers Ml Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 
1147,1148 (Utah 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
I. RULE 60(b) 
% 13 Rule 60(b) provides that a "court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, in-
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(bXl). 
% 14 Lund and B & B offer two grounds for 
their argument that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in failing to set aside the default judgment. 
First, they argue that they were reasonably justified, 
for rule 60(b) purposes, in not replying to the 
Browns' counterclaim because of the bankruptcy 
stay. Second, they assert that the Browns' failure to 
notify them of the default motion justifies their fail-
ure to respond. 
K 15 With respect to the first contention, the 
Browns countered, and the trial court agreed, that 
the bankruptcy stay did not prohibit actions against 
a nondebtor like B & B nor did it prohibit a declar-
atory judgment against the debtor, Lund, and, there-
fore, neither Lund nor B & B had a justifiable reas-
on for not responding. 
[8] % 16 We need not decide the exact scope of 
the bankruptcy stay in order to find that Lund's and 
B & B's reliance on the stay merits relief from the 
default judgment. For rule 60(b) purposes, it is 
enough to state that there is substantial support for 
Lund's and B & B's interpretation of bankruptcy 
law. In other words, under rule 60(b), Lund and B 
& B need not show that their interpretation of bank-
ruptcy law is legally correct, but merely that they 
possessed a reasonable, good faith belief that the 
bankruptcy stay was effective against the Browns' 
counterclaim. In this regard, it is worth noting that 
the bankruptcy stay provision "is drafted so broadly 
that it encompasses all types of legal proceedings," 
including "actions seeking injunctive or similar re-
lief as well as actions seeking money judgments." 1 
Collier Bankruptcy Manual % 362.03[1] (Lawrence 
P. King ed., 3d ed.1999). For this reason, any party 
"seeking to take action against the debtor or its 
property is well advised to assume that the stay ap-
plies and seek relief by appropriate proceedings in 
the bankruptcy court." Id 1362.03[4][b]. 
[9] % 17 Pertinent to the instant case, the bank-
ruptcy code imposes an automatic stay on. any ac-
tion against the debtor that was or could have been 
commenced prior to the *281 bankruptcy, and on 
any act to obtain, or exercise control over, property 
of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 
362(aXl), (3) (1993). Lund's mechanic's lien con-
stituted a legal interest in the Browns' home, see, 
e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1997), which be-
came protected property of the bankruptcy estate. 
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (1993). Therefore, 
Lund and B & B were reasonably justified in not 
responding to the assertion in the counterclaim that 
the liens should be released because any attempt to 
do so could potentially violate the stay as an act "to 
exercise control over property of the [bankruptcy] 
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estate." W.§362(aX3). 
[10] J 18 Further, B & B justifiably believed 
that a bankruptcy stay prohibits actions against 
nondebtors in some situations. For instance, the 
bankruptcy code forbids "prosecution of an action 
against a non-debtor where the claim is one which 
could also be asserted by the bankruptcy trustee." 
In re US. Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 113 B.R. 487, 490 
(Bankr.N.Dind.1990); see also 1 Collier Bank-
ruptcy Manual % 362.03[3]. In the instant case, the 
Browns1 damages claim against B & B is premised 
on B & B!s alleged breach of contract with Lund. 
Certainly, Lund possessed the right to pursue such a 
claim against B & B. Hence, the Browns were argu-
ably barred from doing so under the stay. There-
fore, B & B reasonably believed that it did not need 
to reply to the Browns' counterclaim. 
f 19 Under the circumstances of this case, 
Lund's and B & B's good faith, legitimate belief 
that no action would or could be taken against them 
due to the bankruptcy stay constitutes a "reasonable 
justification or excuse" for their failure to reply to 
(he counterclaim. 
[11] <| 20 We therefore conclude that, standing 
alone, the arguable applicability of the bankruptcy 
stay provides sufficient justification to excuse 
Lund's and B & B's failure to reply under rule 60(b) 
.We nonetheless address the second argument be-
cause we deem it important to clarify the require-
ments of the procedural rules relating to provision 
of notice of motions for default judgment. We also 
conclude that the Browns' failure to provide notice 
of the default judgment proceedings provides addi-
tional justification for granting Lund and B & B re-
lief from the judgments. 
% 21 The Browns' attorney argues that he had 
no obligation to notify Lund and B & B of the de-
fault judgment proceedings and that the lack of no-
tice cannot therefore furnish a basis for setting the 
defaults aside.™1 Because (he Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are not a model of clarity in explaining 
(he notice requirements to parties in default, we 
take this opportunity to elucidate the rules in ques-
tion. 
FN 1. In the alternative, the Browns' attor-
ney argues that he did in fact notify Lund 
and B & B of the default judgment pro-
ceedings by sending them a copy of an af-
fidavit of attorney fees in support of de-
fault judgment. The Browns' attorney did 
not make this argument to the trial court in 
response to the motion to vacate the judg-
ment even though Lund's and B & B's 
counsel submitted an affidavit to the trial 
court in support of the motion that categor-
ically denied receiving "any papers in con-
junction with the default judgment, or be-
forehand." Instead, the Browns' attorney 
simply argued that no notice was required. 
We decline to address counsel's new argu-
ment raised for the first time on appeal. 
[12] % 22 Our inquiry begins with Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 5, which expresses the general 
principle that notice of all proceedings must be 
provided to all parties. Rule 55 provides an excep-
tion to (he general notice rule. Subpart (aX2) of rule 
55, subtitled "[n]otice to party in default," states in 
pertinent part that it is unnecessary to give a party 
in default "any notice" of any action taken "except 
as provided in Rule 5(a) " Thus, rule 55(aX2) estab-
lishes that there is a limitation to the scope of rule 
55's notice exception (hat parties in default are not 
entitled to further notice, and that the limitation is 
found somewhere in rule 5(a). 
[13][14] % 23 Rule 5(a) contains two subparts. 
Subpart (1) requires that "every written motion oth-
er than one which may be heard ex parte ... shall be 
served upon each of the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 
5(aXl). Subpart (1) cannot logically be read as the 
limitation referenced by rule 55(aX2). If so read, 
rule 55(aX2) and rule 5(a)(1) taken together would 
provide, in effect, that notice to a party in default is 
not required where *282 notice is not required. Un-
der this reading, rule 55(aX2)'s reference to a rule 
(5)(a) limitation is wholly superfluous and leaves 
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the question begging as to just what the limitation 
is. We will not adopt such a reading in light of the 
well-established principle of statutory construction 
requiring us to give meaning, where possible, to all 
provisions of a statute. See A.C. Fin. Inc. v. Salt 
Lake County, 948 P.2d 771, 779 (Utah 1997). As 
we have previously noted, " '[A]ny interpretation 
which renders parts or words in a statute inoperat-
ive or superfluous is to be avoided.' " State v. Hunt, 
906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (quoting United 
States v. Rowlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th 
Cir.1987)). 
\ 24 Subpart (2) of rule 5(a) seems the more lo-
gical candidate to provide the limitation referenced 
in rule 55(a). First, it explicitly references notice re-
quirements with respect to parties in default. 
Second, while it includes no express, affirmative 
limitation on the scope of rule 55's default party ex-
ception to the general notice requirements, it does 
provide a limitation by implication. Subpart (2) 
provides that "[n]o service need be made on parties 
in default for failure to appear except as provided in 
Rule 55(aX2)." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(aXl) & (2). Thus, 
subpart (2) impliedly creates two classes of default-
ing parties, those in default for failure to appear and 
those in default for other reasons. The negative 
pregnant of subpart (2)'s provision that notice need 
not be given to parties in default for failure to ap-
pear is that notice should be given to parties in de-
fault who have made an appearance. There is an ob-
vious policy justification for distinguishing 
between these two classes of defaulting parties. A 
much more compelling case can be made for requir-
ing notice to a party who is in default but has non-
etheless elected to participate at some level in an 
action than for requiring notice to a party who has 
declined to participate in any regard by simply ig-
noring previous notice given in the form of the 
complaint. 
H 25 Two additional considerations confirm the 
validity of subpart (2)'s implication that notice must 
be given to a party in default who has appeared. 
First, interpreted this way, rule 5(a)(2) provides the 
required limitation on the scope of the default party 
exception referred to in rule 55(aX2). As noted 
above, no other section of rule 5(a) can be legitim-
ately read as providing the limitation. Only this in-
terpretation gives meaning to what would otherwise 
be a superfluous reference to a limitation in rule 
55(a). 
% 26 Second, this interpretation of rule 5 mir-
rors the interpretation that has been made of its fed-
eral counterpart. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a) 
requires service of papers and pleadings on each 
party not in default for failure to appear. Thus, by 
appearing at any time in the action, a party be-
comes entitled to have his attorney notified of all 
subsequent proceedings and receive copies of all 
papers, even if he later chooses to default. 
Wright et al., supra K 11, § 1144, at 416 
(footnotes omitted); see also New York Life Ins. Co. 
v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating 
that defendant's appearance entitled him to service 
of all papers, including the summary judgment mo-
tion made and granted after defendant had been de-
faulted). The federal interpretation is persuasive in 
light of the fact that our rule 5 is "substantially sim-
ilar" to federal rule 5. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5 com-
piler's notes. 
<[ 27 The Browns1 attorney argues that this 
court has previously held that rule 5 does not re-
quire notice be given to parties in default He mis-
reads our precedent. In Central Bank & Trust v. 
Jensen, the case upon which he relies, we held that 
rule 5(a) excludes "parties in default from those en-
titled to notice." 656 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah 1982). 
In that case, however, we did not address the cir-
cumstance where a party having already made a 
formal appearance in a case is subjected to a motion 
for default judgment on a counterclaim. In Central 
Bank & Trust, the defaulting party never made an 
appearance prior to having default judgment 
entered against him. Moreover, were we to apply 
Central Bank & Trust's holding to all motions for 
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default, we would render meaningless the provi-
sions in rules 55 and 5 requiring notice of a motion 
for default in particular categories of cases. Accord-
ingly, we distinguish Central Bank & Trust's hold-
ing from *283 the instant case wherein Lund and B 
& B made an appearance. 
II. MERITORIOUS DEFENSE 
[15] % 28 We have held that relief from judg-
ment requires a showing of a meritorious defense to 
a claim. The purpose of the meritorious defense 
rule is " 'to prevent the necessity of judicial review 
of questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are 
frivolous.' " Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149 (quoting 
State ex rel Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Musselman, 667 
P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1983) (Durham, J., dissent-
ing)). The rule requires the party seeking to set 
aside a judgment to " 'show' " that he or she " 'has 
a meritorious defense to the action.' " Id. at 1148 
(quoting Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56 (plurality 
opinion) (footnote omitted)). Thus, in the instant 
case, our central inquiries are whether Lund and B 
& B (1) adequately "showed" the trial court a (2) 
proposed defense containing allegations, facts, or 
claims that, if proven at trial, would preclude total 
or partial recovery by the Browns. See, e.g., id at 
1149. We address each issue in turn. 
[16][17] % 29 Although we have never ex-
plained precisely what a party must do to ad-
equately "show" a meritorious defense, we have 
made it clear that a party need not actually prove its 
proposed defenses to meet this standard. See id at 
1148 (rejecting a standard essentially requiring that 
the defaulted party prove its proposed defense be-
fore it is eligible to have a judgment vacated). 
Moreover, we have clearly articulated the funda-
mental policy underlying the meritorious defense 
rule. That policy is simply to prevent the necessity 
of treating defenses that are frivolous on their face. 
Thus, where a party presents a clear and specific 
proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude 
total or partial recovery by the claimant or counter-
claimant, it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous 
and meritorious defense for the purposes of its mo-
tion to set aside a default judgment. In their memor-
andum in support of the motion to set aside the de-
fault judgments, Lund and B & B argued the fol-
lowing to the trial court: 
The Complaint alleges the Browns breached their 
contract. The Counterclaim alleges the plaintiffs 
[Lund & B & B] breached their contract. The 
Complaint seeks enforcement of the mechanics 
liens. The Counterclaim asserts the liens are in-
valid. 
Plaintiffs [Lund and B & B] have already al-
leged meritorious defenses to the Counterclaim. 
The defenses to the Counterclaim are readily ap-
parent in the original Complaint. 
[18] ^ 30 The complaint alleges that Lund 
entered into a contract with the Browns to build a 
house, that Lund contracted with B & B to install 
drywall, and that the Browns failed to pay Lund 
and B & B for work done. In particular, the com-
plaint states that "Lund performed the various items 
of labor and work, and furnished the materials ne-
cessary for the construction of the House in accord-
ance with Lund's agreement with the Browns, in-
cluding subcontracting with B & B and others." 
(Emphasis added.) Claims one and two of the coun-
terclaim essentially allege that Lund and B & B 
breached their respective contracts by failing to 
perform, or negligently performing, numerous con-
tractual obligations. Claim three alleges that Lund 
and B & B maliciously filed mechanics liens con-
taining erroneous amounts owed and incorrect com-
pletion dates. 
\ 31 Obviously, the complaint and counter-
claim are based on the same disputed facts sur-
rounding the performance of the same contract. The 
respective allegations present genuine issues of ma-
terial fact, the resolution of which, one way or the 
other, will necessarily affect each party's ability to 
recover for its own claims. For example, Lund spe-
cifically alleged that he performed "in accordance" 
with the contract, while the Browns allege the op-
posite. It makes no difference for our purposes that 
© 2011 Tliomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 10 
11 P.3d 277,404 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,2000 UT 75 
(Citeas:llP.3d277) 
the counterclaim is more specific than Lund's and B 
& B's complaint. The critical fact remains that both 
positions cannot be correct. In short, if Lund and B 
& B prove their claims at trial, the Browns cannot 
recover on their counterclaims. 
% 32 This is in essence a simple contract claim. 
Both the complaint and the counterclaim*284 turn 
upon the essential question of whether the contract 
was breached. In light of the fact that the trial court 
already had possession of Lund's and B & B's com-
plaint, there appears little more Lund and B & B 
realistically could have done, short of proving their 
claims in an evidentiary hearing, to "show" the trial 
court their meritorious defense. Thus, we hold that 
Lund and B & B adequately showed the trial court 
their proposed meritorious defense. The trial court 
erred in ruling otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
^ 33 We reverse the trial court's denial of 
Lund's and B & B's motion to vacate the default 
judgments. The arguable applicability of the bank-
ruptcy stay sufficiently excused them from replying 
to the Browns' counterclaim under rule 60(b). In 
addition, Lund and B & B have shown a meritori-
ous defense to the counterclaim. 
% 34 REVERSED and REMANDED. 
K 35 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Justice 
WILKINS concur in Justice DURRANTs opinion. 
Utah,2000. 
Lundv. Brown 
11 P.3d 277,404 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,2000 UT 75 
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MEDIA-PAYMASTER PLUS/CHURCH OF JE-
SUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, and 
Labor Commission of Utah, Petitioners. 
Nos. 20050745,20050750. 
May 18,2007. 
Background: Workers* compensation claimant 
sought writ of review from an order of the Labor 
Commission that denied claimant's claim for per-
manent total disability benefits. The Court of Ap-
peals, 117 P.3d 1074, reversed and remanded. 
Holdings: After granting certiorari, the Supreme 
Court, Parrish, J., held that: 
(1) Commission's factual findings were not inad-
equate as a matter of law so as to relieve claimant 
of his obligation to marshal the evidence; 
(2) when a party failed to marshal the evidence, the 
reviewing court still retained discretion to determ-
ine if the appealed decision had adequate factual 
support; 
(3) determinations by the Commission, regarding 
the "essential functions" of prior employment and 
whether other work was Reasonably available," 
were factual findings reviewable under a substan-
tial evidence standard of review, rather than an ab-
use of discretion; and 
(4) claimant had the burden of proof to establish the 
elements of permanent total disability. 
Court of Appeals reversed. 
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413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
413XVI(L)2 Particular Matters 
4l3kl373 Amount and Period of Com-
pensation 
413kl375 k. Extent and Duration of 
Injury or Disability. Most Cited Cases 
An employee has the burden of proof to estab-
lish the elements of permanent total disability in a 
workers' compensation proceeding. U.CA.1953, 
34A-2-4l3(lXc)(2005). 
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Aids to Construction 
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*387 Richard R Buike, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondent 
Merrill F. Nelson, Christian S. Collins, Salt Lake 
City, for Media-Paymaster Plus. 
p i ] Statutes 361 €>^190 Alan L. Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Labor 
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Commission. 
Floyd W Holm, Murray, for amicus Workers1 Com-
pensation Fund. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
PARRISH, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
\ 1 Enrique Martinez petitioned the Utah 
Labor Commission (the "Commission") for an 
award of permanent total disability compensation 
against his former employer, Media-Paymaster Pius 
("Media"). After an administrative law judge (the 
"ALJ") denied his claim and the Commission con-
firmed die decision, Martinez sought a writ of re-
view from the Utah Court of Appeals. The court of 
appeals reversed the Commission's order and re-
manded the matter to the Commission to award 
Martinez benefits. We granted certiorari to determ-
ine (1) whether the court of appeals applied the cor-
rect standard of review, and (2) whether the em-
ployee or the employer bears (he burden of proof 
when an employee seeks compensation under Utah 
Code section 34A-2-413(lXc). 
t 2 Regarding the first issue, the court of ap-
peals reviewed under an abuse of discretion stand-
ard the Commission's determination that Martinez 
could perform die "essential functions" of his prior 
employment, as well as its determination that other 
work was "reasonably available" to him. Because 
we conclude that the court of appeals should have 
reviewed these determinations under a substantial 
evidence standard, we remand them to die court of 
appeals for consideration under die appropriate 
standard of review. With regard to the second issue, 
we conclude that an employee seeking an award of 
permanent total disability bears the burden of prov-
ing each of the four elements specified under sec-
tion 34A-2-4l3(lXc). 
BACKGROUND 
H 3 On October 28, 1996, while performing 
temporary work as a movie extra for Media, Mar-
tinez slipped and fell on a wet floor, suffering in-
jury to his cervical spine and right shoulder. Mar-
tinez had retired from state employment in 1995 
after working for 28 years as a maintenance spe-
cialist At the time of the accident, he was working 
part-time at a McDonald's restaurant He continued 
to work there until December 1996. In September 
1997, Martinez tried to return to work at Media, but 
no work was available. At that time, Martinez also 
tried to return to light-duty work at McDonald's but 
was told no such work was available. Martinez has 
not worked since leaving McDonalds in December 
1996. 
f 4 On July 31, 2000, Martinez filed an action 
with the Commission to compel Media to pay him 
permanent total disability compensation for his in-
juries. Section 34A-2-413 of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act (die "Act") governs permanent total 
disability determinations. The relevant portions of 
the Act are as follows: 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total 
disability compensation, die employee has the 
burden of proof to show by a preponderance of 
evidence drat 
0) die employee sustained a significant 
impairment... as a result of die industrial acci-
dent or occupational disease that gives rise to 
die permanent total disability cntidement; 
(ii) die employee is permanently totally dis-
abled; and 
(iii) die industrial accident or occupational 
disease was die direct cause of the employee's 
permanent total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally dis-
abled, the commission shall conclude that: 
(i) die employee is not gainfully employed; 
*388 (ii) the employee has an impairment ... 
that limit[s] the employee's ability to do basic 
work activities; 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
164 P.3d 384, 578 Utah Adv. Rep. 20,2007 UT 42 
(Cite as: 164 P.3d 384) 
Page 9 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused 
impairment ... prevents] the employee from 
performing the essential functions of the work 
activities for which the employee has been 
qualified until the time of the industrial acci-
dent or occupational disease that is the basis 
for the employee's permanent total disability 
claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work 
reasonably available, taking into consideration 
the employee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; and 
(E) residual functional capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(bMc) (2005) 
(amended 2006). 
1 5 The ALJ denied Martinets claim, finding 
feat Martinez "failed to prove that he cannot per-
form the essential functions of work he was quali-
fied to perform, and ... failed to prove that there is 
no other work reasonably available." Following the 
denial of his claim by fee ALJ, Martinez appealed 
to the Commission. The Commission confirmed fee 
ALTs decision feat Martinez had failed to satisfy 
two of fee elements required to establish permanent 
total disability under section 34A-2-413. First, us-
ing Martinez's work at McDonald's as a benchmark, 
fee Commission concluded that Martinez had failed 
to show feat his impairments prevented him from 
performing the essential functions of his position at 
McDonald's. Second, fee Commission concluded 
feat Martinez had failed to prove that he was unable 
to perform other reasonably available work. 
% 6 The court of appeals reversed fee Commis-
sion's order, holding that (1) fee Commission ab-
used its discretion in concluding that Martinez was 
capable of performing his prior job and other reas-
onably available work, and (2) fee Commission in-
correctly allocated fee burden of proof. Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App 308, %% 9, 13, 
16,117 P.3d 1074. 
\ 7 In reversing fee Commission on fee first is-
sue, fee court of appeals reviewed for abuse of dis-
cretion fee Commission's application of its findings 
of fact to the law. The court held feat fee Commis-
sion had abused its discretion in concluding feat 
Martinez could perform fee essential functions of a 
fast-food worker, id ffi 10-13, and in concluding 
feat other work was reasonably available to Mar-
tinez, idLtl 14-15. 
\ 8 In reversing fee Commission on fee second 
issue, the court of appeals focused on fee differ-
ences in language between Utah Code section 
34A-2-4l3(lXc) ("subsection (c)") and Utah Code 
section 34A-2-413(l)(b) ( "subsection (h)")™ 
Subsection (b) delineates three elements for which 
an "employee has the burden of proof in order to 
establish entitlement to benefits for permanent total 
disability. Subsection (c) sets out four additional 
items feat fee "Commission shall conclude" before 
finding an employee permanently totally disabled. 
After determining feat fee statute was ambiguous 
wife respect to which party bears fee burden of 
proof under subsection (c), fee court analyzed 
punctuation rules, canons of statutory construction, 
and public policy. It then determined feat fee em-
ployer bore fee burden of proof under subsection 
(c)./dLT|7-9. 
FN1. In 2006, fee legislature amended sub-
section (c) to clarify feat fee burden of 
proof under subsection (c) was intended to 
fall on fee employee. Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-413(lXc) (Supp.2006). Because we 
find feat fee language of fee 1995 version 
of fee statute was unambiguous, we refrain 
from considering fee statutory amendment. 
See Olsen v. Samuel McTntyre /«v. Co., 
956 P.2d 257, 259, 261 (Utah 1998) 
(holding feat the court does not look bey-
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ond an unambiguous statute and that retro-
active legislative enactments are not ap-
plied in pending cases except in a few nar-
row circumstances not applicable here). 
1 9 We granted certiorari on two issues: (1) 
whether the court of appeals applied the correct 
standard in reviewing the Commission's order, and 
(2) whether the employee or the employer bears the 
burden of proof under Utah Code section 
34A-2-413(lXc). 
ANALYSIS 
f 10 Regarding die first issue, we conclude that 
the court of appeals should have reviewed*389 the 
Commission's findings that Martinez could perform 
the essential functions of his prior employment and 
that other work was reasonably available to him un-
der a substantial evidence standard but, in fact, im-
properly reweighed the Commission's factual de-
terminations under the guise of reviewing the ap-
plication of facts to law. Because the court of ap-
peals should have considered these issues under a 
substantial evidence standard, we reverse and re-
mand for consideration under the appropriate stand-
ard of review. 
J 11 We similarly reverse the court of appeals' 
holding on the second issue. As a threshold matter, 
we find that the court of appeals correctly reviewed 
the Commission's statutory interpretation of Utah 
Code section 34A-2-413(lXc) for correctness. We 
find, however, that the employee bears the burden 
of proof under section 34A-2-413(lXc) because, 
when subsections (b) and (c) are read in context, it 
is clear that subsection (c) delineates the elements 
an employee must prove to meet his subsection 
(bXii) burden of establishing that he is permanently 
totally disabled. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
% 12 We first consider Martinez's argument that 
the Commission's factual findings are inadequate 
as a matter of law. We then turn to Media's conten-
tion that the court of appeals erred by reviewing the 
Commission's factual findings despite Martinez's 
failure to marshal the evidence. Having disposed of 
these two threshold matters, we then consider the 
appropriate standard of review. 
A. The Commission's Factual Findings Are Not In-
adequate as a Matter of Law 
[1] J 13 Martinez argues that if the essential 
functions of his prior work and the reasonable 
availability of other work are factual issues, the 
Commission's factual findings on these issues are 
so inadequate as to require their reversal as a matter 
of law. In essence, Martinez argues thatt there is no 
"logical and legal basis for the [Commission's] ulti-
mate conclusions," see Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 
1986), and that consequently, this court has no prin-
cipled basis on which to sustain its factual findings, 
see Mountain States Legal Found v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 636 P2d 1047, 1051-52 (Utah 1981). In 
such an instance, marshaling is not required be-
cause "the findings are so inadequate that they can-
not be meaningfully challenged as factual determin-
ations." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 
(UtahCt.App.1991). 
[2] f 14 Martinez contends that it was irrational 
for the Commission to conclude that other work 
was reasonably available in the face of testimony 
by a vocational expert that Martinez could not per-
form any currently available jobs without some task 
modification. Martinez further points to the Com-
mission's failure to mention Martinez's sitting and 
standing limitations in concluding that Martinez 
could perform the essential functions of his prior 
work. We disagree. 
^ 1 5 The Commission's conclusion that avail-
able fast-food positions could be modified to ac-
commodate Martinez's limitations is a logical find-
ing based on the presented evidence. Further, des-
pite the Commission's failure to mention the sitting 
and standing requirement, its order did carefully 
consider Martinezfs weight limitations on lifting 
and pushing, evidence of symptom magnification, 
and the fast-food industry's practice of assigning 
tasks according to the respective abilities of each 
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individual employee. On the basis of this evidence, 
the Commission compared Martinets abilities with 
the essential functions of fast-food work and con-
cluded that "Mr. Martinez's work-related impair-
ments do not prevent him from performing such 
functions." Thus, the Commission's failure to dir-
ectly address Martinez's sitting and standing limita-
tions or to allow for some task modification in 
reaching its conclusion that other work was reason-
ably available does not warrant reversal as a matter 
of law. 
B. Clarification of the Marshaling Requirement 
K 16 During oral argument, Media argued that 
the court of appeals was required to dismiss Mar-
tinez's factual challenge to the *390 Commission's 
order because Martinez failed to properly marshal 
the evidence. Media further argued that this failure 
alone constitutes reversible error.™2 Media's argu-
ment is not well-taken and, in fact, evinces a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the marshaling obliga-
tion. We accordingly pause to clarify it. 
FN2. Although we address the implications 
of this argument, we do not concede the 
accuracy of its premise. Martinez did chal-
lenge the Commission's factual findings 
before the court of appeals, but did so un-
der the theory that the factual findings 
were inadequate as a matter of law. See 
Martinez, 2005 UT App 308, J 3, 117 P.3d 
1074. Under such a theory, marshaling is 
not required. Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477. 
Further, the court of appeals did not pur-
port to consider the sufficiency of the 
facts. Martinez, 2005 UT App 308, \ 3, 
117 P.3d 1074. However, because we ulti-
mately agree with Media's contention that 
"essential functions" and "reasonably 
available" are factual issues, we consider 
the implications of the argument. 
[3][4][5][6] \ 17 To successfully challenge an 
agency's factual findings, the party "must marshall 
[sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and 
show that despite the supporting facts, and in light 
of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial evid-
ence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of In-
dus. Comm'n, 116 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App.1989); 
accord Utah R.App. P. 24(aX9) ("A party challen-
ging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding."). 
FN3
 This requires counsel to construct the evidence 
supporting the adversary's position, and then "ferret 
out a fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City 
v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). Compliance with this undertaking 
helps ensure that the factual findings of the agency 
are overturned only when lacking in substantial 
evidence. 
FN3. The marshaling requirement applies 
when a party challenges a court's or an 
agency's factual findings, regardless of the 
standard of review at issue. See, e.g., 
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 
2002 UT 94, J 21, 54 P.3d 1177 (holding 
that to correctly dispute the lower court's 
factual findings as clearly erroneous, "an 
appellant must first marshal all the evid-
ence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally in-
sufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the 
court below"); United Park City Mines Co. 
v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 
2006 UT 35, ffl 37-38, 140 P.3d 1200 
("[P]arties who ask this court to consider 
fact-sensitive questions-including those 
questions reviewed under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard-have a duty to marshal all 
the evidence that formed die basis for the 
trial court's ruling.") Consequently, this 
discussion applies to the marshaling re-
quirement generally, not just in the context 
of a challenge to an agency's factual find-
ings. 
% 18 In our zeal to emphasize the importance of 
die marshaling requirement to parties, we have used 
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language implying that appellate courts are strictly 
bound to affirm the accuracy of the agency's or trial 
court's factual findings in the absence of marshal-
ing. See, e.g, United Park City Mines Co., 2006 
UT 35, % 32, 140 P.3d 1200 ("Because [the defend-
ant] has failed to marshal the evidence supporting 
the ... award, ... we cannot conclude that the trial 
court abused its discretion."); Eggett v. Wasatch 
Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, % 10, 94 P.3d 193 ("The 
court of appeals does not review the trial court's 
factual findings where the party challenging those 
findings fails to marshal the evidence. Instead, the 
court of appeals must assume that the record sup-
ports the findings of the trial court." (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted)). 
[7][8] 1 19 Despite this language, the marshal-
ing requirement is not a limitation on the power of 
the appellate courts. Rather, it is a tool pursuant to 
which die appellate courts impose on the parties an 
obligation to assist them in conducting a whole re-
cord review. It is not, itself, a rule of substantive 
law. Consequently, parties that fail to marshal the 
evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court 
will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial 
court's factual findings. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 
UT 82, % 82 n. 16, 100 P.3d 1177 (explaining that 
the marshaling requirement is critical because in its 
absence the appellate court "must go behind the tri-
al court's factual findings," which often requires a 
"colossal commitment of time and resources"). 
[9] \ 20 The reviewing court, however, retains 
discretion to consider independently the whole re-
cord and determine if the decision*391 below has 
adequate factual support. While parties have a duty 
to marshal the evidence when challenging the factu-
al basis for a lower body's decision, we refrain, 
consistent with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
from dictating the remedy the court of appeals must 
impose when parties fail to meet this requirement. 
Utah KApp. P. 24(b)(k) ("Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on mo-
tion or sua sponte by the court ...." (emphasis ad-
ded)). 
% 21 In short, parties remain obligated by our 
rules to marshal the evidence when challenging the 
factual findings of a lower court. We refrain, 
however, from limiting the appellate courts' discre-
tion by mandating a particular remedy when parties 
fail to meet this requirement. Having determined 
that the court of appeals retained the discretion to 
review Martinez's challenge to the Commission's 
factual findings, we turn to the standard of review 
question on which we granted certiorari. 
C. Whether Martinez Could Perform the "Essential 
Functions" of Fast-Food Work and Whether Other 
Work Was "Reasonably Available" to Him Are 
Factual Questions We Review for Substantial Evid-
ence 
% 22 The court of appeals applied an abuse of 
discretion standard in reviewing the Commission's 
conclusions that Martinez "could perform the 
'essential functions' of a fast food worker and that 
other work was 'reasonably available' for him." 
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App 
308, % 10, 117 P.3d 1074 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-413(lXcXi»)> (iv) (2005) (amended 
2006)). The court of appeals appears to have based 
its selection of this standard of review on its con-
clusion that (1) the Act impliedly grants discretion 
to the Commission to apply "the facte to the Act"; 
and (2) it would consequently review only the 
Commission's application of the "facte that it found 
to the law." Id%% 10-11. 
[10] K 23 We conclude that the court of appeals 
erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard of 
review because the provisions of Utah Code section 
34A-2-413 call for a factual determination. As a 
result, the court of appeals actually reweighed the 
Commission's factual determinations under the 
guise of applying the undisputed facte to the law. 
Because determining the "essential functions" of 
prior employment and ascertaining whether other 
work is "reasonably available" are factual issues, 
we remand the matter to the court of appeals for 
consideration under a substantial evidence standard 
of review. 
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K 24 Although we reverse the court of appeals 
with respect to the standard of review, we acknow-
ledge the difficult issue it presents. Judicial review 
of Commission decisions is governed by both Utah 
Code section 34A-2-801 and Utah's Administrative 
Procedures Act (the "UAPA"). Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-801(7M8) (2005). Section 63-46b-16(4Xd) 
of the UAPA allows relief when "the agency has er-
roneously interpreted or applied the law." Id § 
63-46b-16(4Xd) (2004). Subsection (4Xg) allows 
relief when "the agency action is based on a de-
termination of fact ... that is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court." Id § 63-46b-16(4)(g). Fi-
nally, subsection (4)(hXi) allows relief when an 
agency action is "an abuse of the discretion deleg-
ated to the agency by statute." Id § 
63-46b-16(4XhX0; see also Ameritemps, Inc. v. 
Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, \ 8, 128 P.3d 31 
(finding that an abuse of discretion standard should 
be used "when an agency has discretion to apply its 
factual findings to die law" (citation omitted)). 
[11][12] ^ 25 The court of appeals is correct 
that agency actions are reviewed for abuse of dis-
cretion when there is an express or implied delega-
tion within the statute. That truism, however, does 
not dictate the appropriate standard of review be-
cause codifying a factual issue does not transform 
an issue from one of fact to a mixed question of law 
and fact for purposes of determining the appropriate 
standard of review. Our task, therefore, is to de-
termine, first, whether "essential functions" and 
"reasonably available" are factual, legal, or mixed 
issues and, second, the appropriate standard of re-
view. 
*392 % 26 We discussed the distinctions 
between legal, factual, and mixed questions and 
their relationship to the appropriate standard of re-
view in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-37 (Utah 
1994). There, we defined factual questions as 
"entailing the empirical, such as things, events, ac-
tions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking 
place, as well as the subjective, such as state of 
mind." Id at 935. In contrast, we defined legal de-
terminations as "rules or principles uniformly ap-
plied to persons of similar qualities and status in 
similar circumstances." Id We also recognized a 
third category, "the application of law to fact," 
which asks "whether a given set of facts comes 
within the reach of a given rule of law." Id at 936. 
[13][14] % 27 Because the court of appeals ana-
lyzed whether the undisputed facts adequately met 
the statutory requirements of "essential functions" 
and "reasonably available," ™* we give this third 
category close consideration. See Martinez, 2005 
UT App 308,1 11, 117 P.3d 1074. We begin with 
the proposition that the existence of an articulable 
legal issue is a necessary element of a mixed ques-
tion. Pena, 869 P.2d at 937; see, e.g., Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 n. 19, 102 
S.Ct 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (defining a mixed 
question of law and fact as occurring when 
"historical facts are admitted or established, die 
rule of law is undisputed, and die issue is whether 
the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or ... wheth-
er the rule of law as applied to the established facts 
is or is not violated"). In other words, a mixed 
question is one in which we must 
FN4. Mixed questions are generally 
defined as the application of law to fact, 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 936, but the court of ap-
peals transposed the standard and asked 
whether the Commission abused its discre-
tion in "applying die facts that it found to 
the law." Martinez, 2005 UT App 308, 1 
11, 117 P.3d 1074. Because it appears diat 
the court of appeals intended to treat 
"essential functions" and "reasonably 
available" as mixed questions of law and 
fact, we proceed from that premise. 
determine when the articulated legal rule to be 
applied to a set of facts-a rule that we establish 
without deference to the trial courts-embodies a 
de facto grant of discretion which permits the tri-
al court to reach one of several possible conclu-
sions about the legal effect of a particular set of 
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facts without risking reversal. 
Pewi, 869P.2dat937. 
[15] ^ 28 Therefore, when determining whether 
an issue presents a mixed question, we must first 
identify the legal principle at issue. Our decision in 
Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 
(Utah 1997), is illustrative. There, we were asked 
whether the court of appeals appropriately reviewed 
for legal correctness die issue of whether the peti-
tioner was injured in the scope of her employment. 
Id at 180. The Labor Commission, along with the 
employee's insurer, argued that scope of employ-
ment determinations were factual and consequently 
subject to a substantial evidence standard of review. 
Id at 181 & n. 7. We rejected this argument, hold-
ing that whether facts fall under the "legal rule 
termed "special errands/ ... requires some legal 
analysis." Id Prior precedent and persuasive au-
thority had established a legal, albeit highly fact de-
pendent, rule for determining when a "special er-
rand" fell within an employee's scope of employ-
ment Id at 183. Given the fact-dependent nature of 
the inquiry, however, we found that we could not 
"spell out in detail a legal rule that will adequately 
anticipate the facts that should be outcome determ-
inative" for the policy behind the legal rule to be 
served. Id at 182 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Consequently, we determined that whether a 
"special errand" is within an employee's scope of 
employment is a mixed question of law and fact re-
quiring some deference. Id We further explained 
that when considering " "whether a given set of 
facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law,' 
" id at 181 (quoting Pena, 869 P2d at 936), defer-
ence to the lower court is created when a legal 
standard is defined " 'so that it actually grants some 
operational discretion to the trial courts applying 
it/ " id (quoting State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 
282 (Utah 1994)). 
[16] % 29 In summary, factual issues are gener-
ally empirical, legal issues apply an abstract rule re-
gardless of the specific facts, and mixed questions 
generally arise when the applicability of the legal 
rule turns on the combination of present facts. Hav-
ing undertaken*393 this attempt to flesh out the 
distinctions between questions of law, questions of 
fact, and mixed questions of law and fact, we turn 
to the issues presented here. 
1. Essential Functions 
\ 30 Whether certain tasks are "essential func-
tions" varies from job to job and industry to in-
dustry. A judge is ill-equipped to determine, with 
his or her legal expertise, the essential elements of 
a fast-food job. Rather, that determination must be 
based on factual evidence and testimony from those 
with experience in die industry. Additionally, there 
is no legal rule that could create the basis for a 
mixed question of fact and law. While the adjective 
"essential" does introduce a level of abstraction in-
to the fact-finder's determination, it does not create 
a mixed question any more than the modifier 
"reasonable" changes the reasonable man standard 
into a legal determination. Cf. Benson v. Ames, 604 
P2d 927, 929 (Utah 1979) (finding that negligence 
under a reasonable man standard is a factual de-
termination disrupted on appeal only if substantial 
evidence fails to support the trial court's ruling). 
We consequently hold that the question of whether 
an employee can perform the "essential functions" 
of prior employment is a factual determination that 
should be overturned on appeal only if substantial 
evidence fails to support it. 
2. Reasonably Available 
J 31 The second issue, whether other work was 
"reasonably available" to Martinez:, is a closer 
question. In different contexts, reasonableness has 
been considered both a legal and a factual question. 
See, e.g„ Benson, 604 P.2d at 929 (finding that 
whether a defendant acted as a "reasonable man" in 
a negligence case is an issue for the trier of fact that 
should not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported 
by substantial evidence). But see, e.g., Evans v. 
State, 963 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1998) (finding that 
"reasonable cause" was primarily a legal question 
in the antitrust arena, but that appellate courts 
should grant the fact-finder a "measure of discre-
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
164 P.3d 384,578 Utah Adv. Rep. 20,2007 UT 42 
(Cite as: 164 P.3d 384) 
Page 15 
tion"); Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 892 
(Utah 1996) ("[T]he reasonableness of an award of 
attorney fees ordinarily presents a question of law 
with some measure of discretion given to the trial 
court.")- Additionally, the Labor Commission has 
defined "reasonably available" as "regular, steady, 
and readily available" work, Utah Admin. Code r. 
612-l-10(DXlXb), a definition that reads like a leg-
al rule to be applied to a factual situation. 
K 32 Despite these countervailing examples, we 
conclude that the question of whether other work is 
"reasonably available" is a factual determination. 
The statute asks the Commission to determine if 
other work is reasonably available, "taking into 
consideration the employeefs[ ] . . . age; ... education; 
... past work experience; ... medical capacity; and ... 
residual functional capacity." Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-413(lXcX*v)- These factual considerations 
inform what is reasonable; its parameters are not 
further defined by an overarching legal principle, as 
in the case of reasonable suspicion, for example. 
See Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. 
% 33 Our conclusion that "essential functions" 
and "reasonably available" are factual determina-
tions is consistent with both our prior precedent and 
the applicable statutory language. First, we have 
traditionally viewed permanent total disability de-
terminations as factual. Hodges v. W. Piling & 
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718, 721 (Utah 1986); Ker-
ans v. Indus. Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1986); 
Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790, 792 
(Utah 1980); Utah State Rd Comm'n v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319, 322 (Utah 
1946). Second, as discussed herein, the language of 
subsection (b) requires the employee to prove per-
manent total disability by a " preponderance of the 
evidence, " using the elements of subsection (c) to 
meet that evidentiary burden (emphasis added). 
% 34 In sum, we conclude that the court of ap-
peals erroneously applied an abuse of discretion 
standard when reviewing the Commission's factual 
findings that Martinez was capable of performing 
(he "essential functions" of his prior job and that he 
was capable of performing other work "reasonably 
available" to him. 
*394 D. The Correct Standard of Review Is Sub-
stantial Evidence 
[17][18] K 35 Having determined that the cor-
rect standard of review is substantial evidence, we 
pause to consider its requirements. Substantial 
evidence exists when the factual findings support 
"more than a mere scintilla of evidence ... though 
something less than the weight of the evidence." 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. 
Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted, al-
teration in original). An administrative law decision 
meets the substantial evidence test when "a reason-
able mind might accept as adequate" the evidence 
supporting the decision. Id (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
[19][20][21] % 36 In order to determine wheth-
er a decision is supported by substantial evidence, 
the reviewing court must consider the whole record 
before the lower court. Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 
973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4Xg) (1997)). Whole re-
cord review considers the evidence in support of 
the administrative finding, as well as evidence that 
detracts from the finding. Id To aid the appellate 
court in conducting a whole record review, the 
party challenging the factual findings must marshal 
all of the evidence and demonstrate that, despite the 
facts supporting the decision, the " findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling 
Co., 776P.2dat68. 
K 37 When we consider the actual substance of 
the court of appeals1 ruling that Martinez could not 
perform the "essential functions" of his past em-
ployment, the effect of a different standard of re-
view becomes clear. For instance, it does appear, as 
the court of appeals stated, that the "Commission 
simply ignored the impact of the sitting and stand-
ing limitation." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 
2005 UT App 308, % 13, 117 P.3d 1074. However, 
with the statement "The Commission ignored a sig-
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nificant portion of an evaluation that it explicitly 
accepted," id (emphasis added), the court of ap-
peals implicitly acknowledged that some of the 
Commission's factual flndings were supportive of 
its ultimate conclusion. This acknowledgment has 
different implications under a substantial evidence 
standard; if more than a scintilla of the evidence 
supports the conclusion, then the Commission's rul-
ing should remain intact. 
% 38 As a natural consequence of selecting the 
wrong standard of review, the court of appeals re-
weighed the facts that formed the basis of the Com-
mission's conclusion that other work was 
"reasonably available" under the guise of applying 
the facts to the law. For example, the court of ap-
peals stated that the Labor Commission ignored 
Dr. Bertsch's cross-examination testimony that no 
jobs in the current market could accommodate Mr. 
Martinez's limitations. Id % \5. The Commission's 
order, however, merely gave more weight to the 
portion of her testimony that was more favorable to 
its factual findings. In fact, Dr. Bertsch testified 
that she had contacted many local fast-food restaur-
ants with open positions and their managers ex-
pressed a willingness to hire someone with Mar-
tinez's limitations. Although recognizing that some 
task modification would be required, the Commis-
sion found that fast-food work requires the comple-
tion of a "variety of tasks ... performed by a crew of 
several employees." It further found that Martinez's 
education, work experience, and language ability 
would increase his employability. This evidence 
supports the Commission's conclusion that "Media 
[had] presented persuasive evidence that many em-
ployers in the fast-food business have work imme-
diately available for someone with Mr. Martinez' 
background and abilities." 
^ 39 In sum, we find that the court of appeals 
should have applied a substantial evidence standard 
of review to the questions of whether Martinez 
could perform the "essential functions" of his prior 
employment and whether other jobs were 
"reasonably available" to him. Because it applied 
the incorrect standard of review, the court of ap-
peals inappropriately reweighed the Commission's 
factual findings under the guise of reviewing mixed 
questions of law and fact Consequently, we re-
mand for a determination under the correct standard 
of review. 
*395 II. THE EMPLOYEE BEARS THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 
34A-2-4130XC) 
K 40 The parties and the amicus disagree on the 
standard of review applicable to the Commission's 
ruling on the burden of proof issue, so we consider 
this threshold matter first. 
A. We Afford No Deference to the Commission on 
Matters of Statutory Construction 
[22] ^ 41 Burden of proof questions typically 
present issues of law that an appellate court reviews 
for correctness. Beaver County v. State Tax 
Comm% 916 P.2d 344, 357 (Utah 1996). Amicus 
Workers' Compensation Fund ("WCF')> however, 
contends that we should defer to the Commission's 
conclusion regarding the burden of j>roof because 
the legislature impliedly granted the Commission 
discretion to decide the issue under Utah Code sec-
tion 34A-2-413(lXc). WCF reasons that "where the 
legislature either expressly or implicitly grants [an] 
agency discretion to interpret or apply a statutory 
term," appellate courts should defer to the agency's 
interpretation unless it constitutes an abuse of dis-
cretion. Luckau v. Bd of Review of Indus. Comm% 
840 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah Ct.App.1992); accord 
Morton Int% Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax 
Comm% 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991) 
(superseded by Utah Code section 59-1-610(1 Xb) 
for the specific instance of administrative decisions 
by the Utah State Tax Commission as stated in 49th 
St. Galleria v. Tax Comm'n, Auditing Div., 860 
P.2d 996 (Utah Ct.App.1993)). WCF contends that 
subsection (c) impliedly grants such discretion to 
the Commission because the listed requirements for 
a permanent total disability determination are pre-
faced with the clause "the commission shall con-
clude." 
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[23] % 42 We disagree and hold that the lan-
guage of subsection (c) grants the Commission au-
thority to determine only whether die facts presen-
ted meet the statute's requirements for a finding of 
permanent total disability. It does not bestow on die 
Commission the authority to allocate die burden of 
proof 
^ 43 Our conclusion in this regard is consistent 
with the legislature's more general delegation of au-
thority to the Commission found in Utah Code sec-
tion 34A-1-301, which bestows on the Commission 
"die duty and die full power, jurisdiction, and au-
thority to determine the facts and apply die law in 
this chapter or any other title or chapter it adminis-
ters." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (2005). We 
previously have held that section 34A-1-301 does 
not grant the Commission discretion for statutory 
interpretation. Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT 
66,^18,7P.3d777. 
\ 44 It is also consistent with our case law on 
implied agency delegation. In Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Department of Employment Security, 657 P2d 
1312, 1315-17 (Utah 1982), we acknowledged the 
Commission's latitude in affirming its award of un-
employment benefits to a state employee who had 
voluntarily left her job. The statute at issue in that 
case provided that unemployment benefits were 
generally unavailable when employees voluntarily 
quit, but allowed die Commission to award benefits 
when required by uequity and good conscience." Id 
at 1317. We conclude that this language implicitly 
c<bespeak[s] a legislative intent to delegate ... inter-
pretation to die responsible agency." Morton, 814 
P.2d at 588 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). In contrast, however, subsection (c) only 
gives die Commission discretion to "find" die facts 
required to establish die elements of permanent 
total disability. 
[24] % 45 Our conclusion is also consistent with 
die principle tiiat grants of discretion to adminis-
trative agencies should be limited to diose issues on 
which the agencies have "special experience or ex-
pertise placing [them] in a better position than the 
courts to construe the law." King v. Indus. Comm'n, 
850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah CtApp.1993). Here, 
however, there is notiiing to suggest that the Com-
mission is in a better position than this court to con-
strue the statutory allocation of the burden of proof 
We consequently hold that the court of appeals ap-
propriately applied a correctness standard when as-
sessing which party bore die burden of proof under 
subsection (c). 
*396 B. The Employee Bears the Burden of Proving 
the Elements of Permanent Total Disability 
[25][26][27][28] t 46 We review the court of 
appeals' statutory interpretation of section 
34A-2-413(lXc) for correctness. See State v. Ire-
land, 2006 UT 82, % 6, 150 P.3d 532. When inter-
preting statutes, we look first to die statute's plain 
language vridi the primary objective of giving effect 
to die legislature's intent Savage v. Utah Youth 
VilL, 2004 UT 102, \ 18,104 P3d 1242. "We pre-
sume diat the legislature used each word advisedly" 
and read "each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning." State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, \ 
29, 127 P.3d 682 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Statutes should be read as a 
whole and dieir provisions interpreted in harmony 
widi related provisions and statutes. Miller v. 
Weaver, 2003 UT 12, \ 17,66 P3d 592. 
[29][30][31] \ 47 When die language of the 
statute is plain, odier interpretive tools are not 
needed. Adams v. Swensen, 2005 UT 8, ^ 8, 108 
P.3d 725. However, if the language is ambiguous, 
die court may look beyond die statute to legislative 
history and public policy to ascertain die statute's 
intent Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 2006 
UT 9, \ 59, 131 P.3d 208 (Parrish, J., concurring). 
When viewed holistically, a statute is ambiguous if 
duplicative, yet plausible meanings are not elimin-
ated from possibility. Id \ 60. 
% 48 Having acknowledged these rules, we con-
sider the plain language of section 34A-2-413(l) of 
the Act, which oudines (he threshold requirements 
an employee must meet to receive compensation for 
permanent total disability. Subsection (b) states that 
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the employee has the burden of proving three sub-
parts: (i) that the employee was significantly im-
paired as a result of an industrial accident or occu-
pational disease; (ii) that "the employee is perman-
ently totally disabled"; and (iii) that "the industrial 
accident or occupational disease was the direct 
cause of the employee's permanent total disability." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(lXbXiMi") (2005). 
% 49 We next turn to subsection (c), which 
states that "[t]o find an employee permanently 
totally disabled, the commission shair reach four 
necessary conclusions: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; (ii) 
the employee has an impairment or combination 
of impairments that limit the employee's ability 
to do basic wotk activities; (iii) the ... impair-
ments prevent the employee from performing the 
essential functions of the wotk activities for 
which the employee has been qualified until the 
time of the industrial accident... and (iv) the em-
ployee cannot perform other woik reasonably 
available, taking into consideration the employ-
ee's age; education; past woik experience; medic-
al capacity; and residual functional capacity. 
Id § 34A-2-413(lXc) (amended 2006). 
[32] \ 50 Although subsection (c) does not ex-
plicitly allocate die burden of proof, a reading of 
the statute as a whole makes clear that it falls to the 
employee. Both subsections (b) and (c) include the 
same critical phrase: "permanently totally dis-
abled" Subsection (bXii) cursorily states that "the 
employee has the burden of proof to show by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that" he or she "is perman-
ently totally disabled." It is unclear, however, from 
the wording of subsection (bXii) what is required 
for the employee to prove permanent total disabil-
ity. Subsection (c) simply enumerates those require-
ments. In short, subsection (c) imbues subsection 
(bXii) with meaning. 
[33] \ 51 The court of appeals' interpretation, 
allocating subsection (c)'s burden of proof to the 
employer, renders meaningless the employee's re-
sponsibility to prove permanent total disability un-
der (bXii). We avoid construing "a particular provi-
sion of a statute so as to neutralize ... other provi-
sions if any other construction of the particular pro-
vision is at all tenable." Chris & Dick's Lumber & 
Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 516 (Utah 
1990) (Howe, J., dissenting). 
\ 52 The plain language of subsection (c) fur-
ther bolsters our interpretation that the employee 
bears the burden of proof. In each of subsection 
(c)'s four subparts, "the employee" must be in a 
particular posture in order to be found permanently 
totally disabled. These elements of proof turn on 
*397 intimate facts about the employee's circum-
stances-his unemployment or how his; medical ca-
pacity or age affects his ability to do reasonably 
available work, for example. The fact that the em-
ployee is in the best position to proffer evidence 
relevant to these factual determinations further sup-
ports our interpretation that the employee bears the 
burden of proof under subsection (c). 
\ 53 The court of appeals* interpretation, on the 
other hand, mandates that the employer disprove 
the elements of subsection (c), which would require 
judicially created additions to and subtractions from 
the statute's plain language. For example, subsec-
tion (cXO requires proof that "die employee is not 
gainfully employed " Under the court of appeals' 
reading, the employer would have to prove that the 
employee is gainfully employed. See Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App 308, \ 9, 117 
P.3d 1074. Although we concede that section 
34A-2-413(lXc) was not artfully drafted, we refrain 
from creating clarity by reading additional terms in-
to the statute. 
\ 54 In conclusion, we reverse the court of ap-
peals because we can find only one plausible read-
ing of the statute based on its plain language-
namely, that the employee has die burden of prov-
ing the elements of subsection (c).1^ 
FN5. Having reached this legal conclusion, 
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we remain mystified about its effect on the 
outcome of this case. Usually, burden of 
proof questions are outcome determinative 
only in the case of an evidentiary draw. 
And in their briefs to us, neither party as-
serts that was the case here. Thus, even 
had we upheld the court of appeals* de-
cision on the burden of proof issue, it is 
unclear whether that conclusion would 
have required the Commission to reverse 
its initial denial of permanent total disabil-
ity. We encourage parties to consider and 
brief the effect of their legal challenges on 
a casefs outcome so that we can better ad-
vise lower courts about the ramifications 
of our rulings. 
CONCLUSION 
% 55 The court of appeals should have applied a 
substantial evidence standard of review to the Com-
mission's conclusions that other work was 
"reasonably available" to Martinez and that he 
could have performed the "essential functions" of a 
fast-food employee. Consequently, we reverse the 
court of appeals and remand for a determination un-
der the appropriate standard of review. We also re-
verse the court of appeals1 allocation of the burden 
of proof. We hold that under the plain language of 
Utah Code section 34A-2-413(l), the employee 
bears the burden of proving the four elements of 
subsection (c). 
% 56 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice 
NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISHPS opinion. 
Utah,2007. 
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
164 P.3d 384,578 Utah Adv. Rep. 20,2007 UT 42 
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George M. OLSEN, Petitioner, 
v. 
LABOR COMMISSION, Employers1 Reinsurance 
Fund, Utah Concrete Pipe Co., and Continental In-
surance Co., Respondents. 
No.20100163-CA. 
March 10,2011. 
Background: Workers' compensation claimant 
sought permanent total disability benefits related to 
an accident that occurred in 1963. The Labor Com-
mission denied permanent total disability benefits. 
Claimant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Davis, PJ., held 
that: 
(1) the Commission's finding that claimant decided 
to retire as a result of several factors was supported 
by substantial evidence in the record, and 
(2) evidence was insufficient to establish that 
claimant was entitled to permanent and total disab-
ility benefits under die odd-lot doctrine. 
Affirmed. 
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Before Judges DAVIS, McHUGH, and VOROS. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Presiding Judge: 
1 1 George M. Olsen challenges the Utah Labor 
Commission's (die Commission) denial of perman-
ent total disability benefits relating to his 1963 in-
dustrial injury. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
% 2 On November 6, 1963, while working as a 
supervisor at Utah Concrete Pipe Co. (Utah Con-
crete), Olsen's arm was caught in the mechanism of 
a conveyor belt while he was attempting to clear 
away some debris caught in one of the rollers. 
Olsen's right arm was amputated below the elbow 
in the accident, but he returned to work seven days 
later. Olsen continued to work for Utah Concrete 
until 1969. He then accepted a job in California do-
ing the same type of woik. After six-and-one-half 
years in California, Olsen was induced to return to 
Utah Concrete, where he remained until his retire-
ment in 1986 at the age of sixty-two. 
% 3 In 2006, nearly twenty years after his retire-
ment and forty-three years after the accident, Olsen 
filed an application for hearing requesting perman-
ent total disability benefits, claiming that his 1963 
industrial injury had caused him to be unable to 
work since the time of his retirement. Utah Con-
crete contested this claim, arguing that any disabil-
ity Olsen may have had was not the result of his in-
dustrial accident, as evidenced by the fact that he 
had continued to woik until retirement age follow-
ing the accident. 
^ 4 A hearing was held before an administrat-
ive law judge on September 15, 2006. Olsen testi-
fied that although he continued to work, his job was 
more difficult after his accident. In particular, be-
cause he was right-handed and now had to write 
with his left hand, it took him an additional two or 
three hours each day to complete his production re-
ports, increasing his work day from nine or ten 
hours before the accident to twelve hours after the 
accident. Additionally, although his supervisory job 
did not regularly involve manual labor, he was re-
sponsible for training new employees, which re-
quired him to demonstrate a variety of physical 
tasks and "had an impact on [his] arm." Olsen testi-
fied that he has a "constant pain in [his] right arm," 
which he rated as five on a scale from zero to ten, 
and that his pain increases with activity. Olsen test-
ified that the pain in his arm did not increase 
between the time of the accident and the time he re-
tired, stating that "ifs been a fairly constant tiling 
from day one." He has also had periodic infections 
in his arm that have cleared up with antibiotics. He 
takes only Tylenol for pain, electing not to take the 
more potent pain killers he has been prescribed be-
cause they have an "adverse effect" on him. 
% 5 When Olsen took early retirement at age 
sixty-two, he accepted lower Social Security and 
company retirement benefits. He testified that his 
reason for retiring was that he "was having a lot of 
difficulty with [his right arm], with the stress, [and] 
with the pain" and that he "was going downhill 
physically." He also testified that it had been his 
goal to make it to age sixty-two before retiring. 
Two years prior to his retirement, Olsen discussed 
his intention to retire with his manager, telling him 
that he "was having constant problems with ... in-
fection, right arm infection, and constant pain* con-
stant frustrations" and that he "wanted to get away 
from it ... [and] couldnt deal with it" Six months 
prior to his retirement, Olsen sent a letter to his 
manager, formally giving *589 notice that he inten-
ded to take early retirement "due to some health 
problems that were not responding to medical treat-
ment." The letter did not specifically mention any 
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problems with Olsen's arm. 
% 6 Olsen testified that as he got older, it was 
more difficult to work the high number of hours re-
quired of him. He also indicated that when Utah 
Concrete began acquiring other companies, he was 
required to travel throughout the country to evalu-
ate the target businesses and that his work would 
pile up while he was away because there was no 
one else assigned to take care of it. He testified that 
the supervisory job he held was so stressful that 
<cmany superintendents [keeled] over with heart at-
tacks and died" and that at the time of his retire-
ment, he "was having to go to the doctor about a lot 
of problems." Olsen had part of his thyroid re-
moved in 1956, was diagnosed with a heart ar-
rhythmia in 1981, and suffers from hypertension. In 
the years following his retirement, Olsen was im-
planted with a pacemaker and was diagnosed with 
prostate and colon cancer. 
\ 7 Olsen testified that he was still capable of 
doing his job at Utah Concrete at the time of his re-
tirement, that he was never made aware of any 
problems wfth his performance, and that Utah Con-
crete wanted him to come back to work for them. 
However, he testified that he could not do his job 
without pain. Following his retirement, Olsen was 
hired as a consultant for Utah Concrete on two dif-
ferent occasions, once for six weeks and once for 
three weeks. He has not had any other employment 
since his retirement Olsen testified that after his re-
tirement, he continued to do household chores and 
served a one-year church mission with his wife. He 
also traveled to Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, 
Mexico, Germany, Belgium, Holland, France, and 
Switzerland between 1983 and 1988. 
t 8 In 2006, Olsen asked two doctors who 
treated him in the years following his amputation, 
Dr. Lewis and Dr. Hunter, to prepare "Summary of 
Medical Record" forms indicating their opinion re-
garding the effect of his amputation on his ability to 
work. Both doctors indicated that they believed 
Olsen was permanently and totally disabled as a 
result of the amputation. 
K 9 The administrative law judge denied 
Olsen's claim, and Olsen thereafter filed a motion 
for review with the Commission. The Commission 
found that despite Olsen's injury, he had achieved a 
long and successful career and his skills continued 
to be in demand following his retirement. The 
Commission also found that the pain in Olsen's arm 
was only one of a variety of factors influencing his 
decision to retire. The Commission thus concluded 
that Olsen failed to establish that there was no regu-
lar, dependable work available to him as a result of 
his industrial accident Olsen now seeks review of 
the Commission's decision. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] f 10 Olsen first challenges the factual find-
ings of the Commission. "Whether die findings [of 
fact] are adequate is ... a legal determination that 
requires no deference to die Commission." Adams 
v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 
1, 4 (Utah CtApp.1991). However, "we will 
change a factual finding only if it is not supported 
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of die 
whole record before die court" King v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah Ct.App.1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah 
Code Ann. §63G-4-403(4)(g) (2008). 
[2][3] J 11 Second, Olsen argues that the Com-
mission erred in interpreting and applying the 
"odd-lot" m i doctrine to the facts; of this case. 
"The standard we apply when reviewing an 
agency's interpretation of general law *590 includ-
ing case law ... is a correction of error standard, 
giving no deference to the agency's decision." Ex-
xon Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2010 UT 16, 
\ 6, 228 P.3d 1246 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). "When an agency has discretion to apply its 
factual findings to the law, we will not disturb the 
agency's application unless its determination ex-
ceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rational-
ity." Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
FN1. This somewhat " 'undignified 
phrase,' " coined by Judge Moulton in the 
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English case of Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, 
(1911) 1 K.B. 1009, refers to the circum-
stance where, as a result of a worker's in-
dustrial accident, " 'the capacities for work 
left to him fit him only for special uses and 
do not, so to speak, make his powers of la-
bour a merchantable article in some of the 
well known lines of the labour market' " 
Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n, 918 ?2A 
150, 154 n. 3 (Utah CtApp.1996) (quoting 
Cardiff 1 K.B. at 1020-21). As such, his « 
'labour [is] in the position of an *odd lot' 
in the labour market, [and] the employer 
must show that a customer can be found 
who will take i f " Id (quoting Cardiff 1 
K.B. at 1020-21). 
% 12 Finally, Olsen argues that his due process 
rights were violated when the Commission took 
over thirty-eight months to issue a decision in his 
case, despite language in the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act requiring agencies to issue de-
cisions M[w]ithin a reasonable time after die hear-
ing," Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-208(I) (2008). 
Olsen is entitled to relief if the Commission "failed 
to follow prescribed procedure" and he was 
"substantially prejudiced" by that failure. Id § 
63G-4-403(4),(4Xe). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Commission's Factual Findings 
[4][S][6] \ 13 Olsen argues that die Commis-
;
 siotfs factual findings were inadequate to support 
its conclusions. "The question of whether the Com-
mission's action constitutes arbitrary action for 
want of adequate findings is governed by our de-
: termination of whether this court is able to conduct 
! a meaningful review." Adams, 821 P.2d at 4. In or-
: der to be adequate, the findings must therefore be 
"sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Id 
; (internal quotation marks omitted). An inquiry into 
the adequacy of the factual findings may be con-
ducted by looking at the Commission's findings and 
conclusions on their face and determining whether 
the conclusions logically follow from the factual 
findings or whether additional findings are needed. 
t 14 Olsen does not actually make any argu-
ment to support his assertion that the findings are 
inadequate. Rather, he argues that the findings 
ignored relevant and critical factual information" 
regarding the difficulty he encountered in continu-
ing to work and in accomplishing daily activities, 
the reasons for his retirement, and the determina-
tions of his physicians. This argument constitutes a 
challenge to the accuracy of the factual findings 
themselves, not the ability of the findings to ad-
equately support the Commission's conclusion. The 
Commission's factual findings, derived from its 
weighing of the evidence, are entitled to some de-
ference. We therefore consider these challenges by 
determining whether the factual findings are 
"supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court" King, 
850 ?M at 1285 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
\ 15 While the Commission may have emphas-
ized some facts in the record over others, its factual 
findings were supported by substantial evidence. In 
fact, the evidence Olsen claims the Commission 
"ignored" was largely incorporated into the find-
ings. The Commission specifically found, 
The loss of his dominant lower right arm caused 
Mr. Olsen difficulty in some aspects of his per-
sonal and work life. It was more difficult for Mr. 
Olsen to attend to personal matters such as dress-
ing, grooming, and the like. At work, it was time 
consuming for Mr. Olsen to fill out required re-
ports with his left hand. 
However, the Commission found that these dif-
ficulties were mitigated by Olsen's development of 
"adaptive techniques." The Commission found that 
although "Olsen experienced chronic moderate pain 
in his arm after his accident, the arm's condition has 
been essentially stable and he has experienced rel-
atively few medical complications from the injury." 
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All of these findings are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
[7] \ 16 As to the reasons for Olserfs retire-
ment, the Commission found, 
Mr. Olserfs decision to retire on December 31, 
1986, stemmed from several factors. He knew of 
others his age with similar work responsibilities 
who he believed had died due to stress. He found 
it difficult to hire and train new workers. Further-
more, at fee time [Utah Concrete] was acquiring 
other operations throughout *591 the United 
States and Mr. Olsen was required to travel to 
those sites as well as perform his regular work 
duties. He believed his health was declining. The 
pain and functional limitations from his work in-
jury added additional burdens. Although Mr. 
Olsen continued to successfully perform his work 
duties, over a period of several years he came to 
the conclusion feat it would be prudent for him to 
retire when he qualified for his company pension 
and social security retirement benefits. 
Mr. Olserfs non-work medical problems in-
clude the removal of his thyroid in 1956, several 
years prior to his woik accident After his retire-
ment at fee end of 1986, Mr. Olsen experienced 
heart arrhythmia[ ^ and implantation of a 
pacemaker, prostate cancer, left carpal tunnel 
syndrome and ganglion cyst, arthritis, depression, 
and colon polyps. 
FN2. Olsen testified feat his heart ar-
rhythmia was diagnosed in 1981, prior to 
his retirement 
Although fee Commission did not give as much 
; weight to Olserfs assertion feat he retired due to 
i pain in his arm as Olsen might have liked, fee Com-
i mission clearly did not ignore fee evidence that the 
i pain was a factor in Olserfs decision to retire, ob-
. serving that a[t]he pain and functional limitations 
from his work injury added additional burdens." 
Although fee Commission explicitly acknowledged 
fee difficulties faced by Olsen as a result of his in-
dustrial injury, it ultimately concluded that it was 
"not persuaded" that the pain and challenges from 
fee injury "motivated his decision to retire" The 
Commission's findings regarding fee various reas-
ons for Olserfs retirement are also supported by 
substantial evidence in fee record. 
J 17 Although Olsen is correct feat fee Com-
mission did not refer to fee statements of Dr. Lewis 
and Dr. Hunter in its findings, fee value of these 
statements in evaluating Olserfs ability to work at 
fee time of his retirement was questionable, as 
neither of these physicians had treated Olsen for 
quite some time prior to his retirement Dr. Lewis 
had not examined Olsen since 1972 or 1973, and 
Dr. Hunter had not examined Olsen since 1964, six 
months after fee amputation.00 
FN3. To fee extent feat these doctors' 
statements might have been relevant to de-
termining whether Olserfs continued em-
ployment was fee result of superhuman ef-
forts on his part, their exclusion from fee 
Commission's factual findings was harm-
less. See infra f | 23-25. 
II. Applicability of fee Odd-Lot Doctrine 
[8][9] \ 18 Olsen next argues that he is entitled, 
under fee facts of this case, to permanent total dis-
ability benefits by virtue of fee odd-lot doctrine, 
which classifies employees as totally and perman-
ently disabled when they "cannot be rehabilitated 
and even though not in a state of abject helpless-
ness can no longer perform fee duties ... required in 
[their] occupation[s].w Marshall v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 681 P2d 208, 212 (Utah 1984) 
(alterations and omission in original) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). In applying fee odd-lot doc-
trine, it is not fee extent of fee employee's physical 
impairment feat is at issue, but fee extent to which 
feat impairment affects fee employee's ability to re-
turn to full employment See Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 
P.2d 684,688 (Utah Ct.App.1997). 
[10][111 % 19 In attempting to demonstrate that 
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he falls into the odd-lot category, it is the burden of 
the claimant to "present a prima facie case that no 
regular, dependable work is available to him ... [by] 
presenting] evidence that he can no longer perform 
the duties required in his occupation and that he 
cannot be rehabilitated to perform some other type 
of employment" Peck v. Eimco Process Equip. 
Co., 748 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1987) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). "Once the employee has 
presented a prima facie case, the burden shifts to 
the employer to prove the existence of regular, 
steady work that the employee can perform" given 
the employee's individual circumstances. Id This is 
a fact-dependent inquiry that "must be assessed in 
terms of the specific individual who has suffered a 
work-related injury, taking into account such 
factors as age, education, training, and mental capa-
city." Id at 574; see also Norton v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam) (listing "age, sex, education, economic and 
*592 social environment, ... [and] permanent 
, impairment" as factors to be weighed (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
[12][13][14] \ 20 The fact that an employee re-
turned to work for some period of time following 
his industrial injury does not automatically preclude 
him from claiming permanent total disability bene-
fits at a later date if he continues to suffer substan-
tial pain throughout the period of his continued em-
ployment or if his industrial injury worsens to die 
point that he is no longer able to maintain regular 
i employment See Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027-28 
I (holding that an employee who returned to work for 
I six years following his work-related injury could 
! nevertheless obtain permanent total disability bene-
; fits and observing that "[i]t may be years before the 
| effect [of an injury] is felt*'). See generally Hosk-
I ings v. Industrial Comm'n, 918 V2d 150, 156 n. 7 
; (Utah Ct.App.1996) ("[CJourts are careful to avoid 
penalizing or discouraging a claimant from attempt-
ing to rehabilitate himself...."). Under Utah law, a 
claimant is not required to continue working merely 
because someone is willing to hire him if he must 
exert "superhuman efforts ... to rise above his crip-
pling handicaps" in order to do so. Norton, 728 
P.2d at 1028. Thus, while a claimant's return to 
work is "one factor to be weighed in determining 
his disability," it must be considered in concert 
with "the condition under which [the claimant] con-
tinued his employment" Id. at 1027-28. 
[15][16] \ 21 Furthermore, the fact that an em-
ployee continues working until he is eligible to re-
tire "will not adversely affect a determination of 
permanent total disability when the employee has 
demonstrated that his disability from the industrial 
injury significantly influenced his decision to re-
tire." Peck, 748 P.2d at 578. However, we will up-
hold a denial of benefits based on voluntary retire-
ment "when a finding is made and supported by 
evidence that die employee's retirement is not sub-
stantially motivated by his industrial injury, but is 
due primarily to personal or other reasons." Id 
\ 22 Olsen argues that the Commission misap-
plied the odd-lot doctrine (1) by failing to consider 
die physical difficulties he faced in his job and the 
pain he suffered in fulfilling his work duties after 
losing his arm in evaluating whedier his injury pre-
cluded him from continuing to work; (2) by determ-
ining that he voluntarily retired due to factors apart 
from his industrial injury; and (3) by failing to con-
sider his disability in the context of "his age, men-
tal capacity, social environment, and medical 
impairment" 
\ 23 We agree that in evaluating Olserfs ability 
to continue in his employment die Commission 
should have considered not only the success and 
longevity of Olsetfs career following his industrial 
accident, but also "the condition under which 
[Olsen] continued his employment" "^ See 
Norton, 728 P2d at 1028 (emphasis omitted). The 
fact that Olsen "rose to die challenge" presented by 
his industrial injury does not automatically preclude 
him from seeking permanent total disability bene-
fits, particularly if doing so required "superhuman 
efforts" on his part.™5 See id at 1028 ("[The 
claimant's] decision to return to work did not auto-
matically disqualify him from receiving permanent 
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total disability benefits, where the facts indicate 
that throughout the remainder of his employ he was 
not restored to health."). However, the Commis-
sion's failure to folly evaluate this factor was harm-
less because Olsen's claim was properly denied 
based on his voluntary retirement. Additionally, 
Olsen failed to make out a prima facie case that he 
fell into the odd-lot category because he presented 
no evidence that he could not be rehabilitated to 
perform other work. 
FN4. It is particularly necessary to con-
sider the conditions of employment where 
an employee's condition worsens over the 
course of his continued employment Cf 
Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 
1025, 1026 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) 
(reciting facts showing that employee's 
symptoms worsened over the course of the 
six years he continued to woik prior to his 
retirement). 
FN5. Nevertheless; the fact that Olsen con-
tinued to work in die same occupation for 
twenty-three years following his industrial 
accident may be weighed in evaluating 
whether his injury was so crippling that he 
could continue working only by exerting 
superhuman efforts. 
*593 \ 24 While there was certainly evidence 
indicating that Olsen's pain was a major factor in 
his decision to retire, there was also substantial 
evidence, accurately recited in the Commission's 
findings, supporting alternative motivations. The 
factual findings made by the Commission are suffi-
ciently detailed to provide "a logical and legal basis 
for the ultimate conclusion^ ]" that Olsen's decision 
to retire was not substantially motivated by his in-
; dustrial injury. See Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pub-
: lie Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986) 
. The Commission's detailed findings discussing nu-
merous factors affecting Olsen's decision to retire 
; make it clear that the Commission's decision was 
. not based merely on the fact that Olsen waited to 
quit working until he was eligible to retire. Cf. Peck 
v. Eimco Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 579 
(Utah 1987) (rejecting the Commission's denial of 
permanent total disability benefits because it was 
based solely on the Commission's finding that the 
claimant was able to work effectively for a year fol-
lowing his accident and "just plain retired" after 
turning sixty-five (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Given the various factors listed in the Com-
mission's findings, the Commission's conclusion 
that it was "not persuaded" that Olsen's industrialk 
injury "motivated his decision to retire" was not 
beyond the realm of reasonableness and rationality. 
The Commission's finding of voluntary retirement 
motivated "primarily [by] personal or other reas-
ons" is a sufficient basis for denying benefits under 
the odd-lot doctrine. See id. at 578. 
1 25 Additionally, although Olsen presented at 
least some evidence that his injury kept him from 
continuing with his job at Utah Concrete, he 
presented no evidence indicating that he could not 
be rehabilitated to perform a different job. See id. at 
575 (stating the nile that it is the claimant's burden 
to "present a prima facie case that no regular, de-
pendable woik is available to him ... [by] 
presenting] evidence that he can no longer perform 
the duties required in his occupation and that he 
cannot be rehabilitated to perform some other type 
of employment" (emphasis added)); cf id at 574 
(noting that the Division of Rehabilitation Services 
had made a determination that claimant was not a 
good candidate for rehabilitation); Norton v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986) 
(per curiam) (accepting an evaluation by the Divi-
sion of Vocational Rehabilitation as prima facie 
evidence that the claimant could not obtain other 
employment). Olsen completed approximately three 
years of college, and his position at Utah Concrete 
was supervisory. The tasks he cited as causing him 
pain or difficulty included filling out reports and 
training new employees. However, it is conceivable 
that Olsen could have been hired for a different job 
that did not require him to fulfill such tasks. In fact, 
Olsen testified that when he worked in California, 
he had a secretary who filled out the reports for him 
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and that he was not required to put in as many 
hours at that job as he was at Utah Concrete. He 
also testified that he was hired by Utah Concrete 
for short periods after his retirement as a consult-
ant, which included work designing a piece of 
equipment. The Commission's finding that "Olsen 
was a competent and sought-after management em-
ployee throughout the period of his active employ-
ment and afterwards during his retirement" is sup-
ported by the record and suggests that Olsen may 
have been able to find less demanding employment. 
In any case, because Olsen has presented no evid-
ence to the contrary, he has not met his burden to 
prove that he could not be rehabilitated. Having 
failed to meet his burden of proof, Olsen could not 
obtain permanent total disability benefits under the 
odd-lot doctrine. This failure also obviated die need 
for the Commission to consider additional contex-
tual factors such as Olsen's "age, education, train-
ing, and mental capacity" affecting his ability to 
continue woriring or to be rehabilitated, see Peck, 
748P.2dat574. 
III. Delay in Issuing Opinion 
[17] 1 26 Finally, Olsen argues that the thirty-
eight months it took for his appeal to be processed 
by the Commission violated his due process rights. 
Tlie Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires 
that administrative agencies issue signed orders 
"[w]ithin a reasonable time after the hearing." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-4-208(l) (2008). This court has 
previously upheld the grant of a petition for ex-
traordinary relief compelling *594 the issuance of 
an administrative decision following a seventeen-
month delay. See Rice v. Utah Sec, D/v., 2004 UT 
App 215, W 2, 10, 95 P.3d 1169. While we agree 
that a delay of thirty-eight months in issuing an ad-
ministrative decision is unreasonable under the 
facts of this case, Olsen never brought this issue to 
the Commission's attention. Where he permitted the 
Commission to delay its decision, without objec-
tion, for thirty-eight months, Olsen cannot now 
claim on appeal that his due process rights were vi-
olated. See generally In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, % 62, 
201 P.3d 985 ("P]n order to preserve an issue for 
appeal [,] the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an op-
portunity to rule on that issue." (second alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marics omitted)); Ne-
beker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, \ 20, 
34 P.3d 180 ("[P]arties must raise constitutional 
claims in the first instance before the agency."). 
Furthermore, Olsen was not prejudiced by die delay 
because the Commission's decision appropriately 
affirmed the decision of the administrative law 
judge. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-4-403(4) (2008) ("The appellate court shall 
grant relief [for an agency's failure to follow pre-
scribed procedure] only if, on die basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced 
...." (emphasis added)). 
\ 27 Notwithstanding our conclusion that Olsen 
is not entitled to relief due to agency delay, we are 
concerned about the impact such an extensive time 
for making a decision may have on a claimant who 
has been erroneously denied benefits. The Workers* 
Compensation Acf s purpose of providing a speedy 
and inexpensive way for employees to be com-
pensated for job-related injuries, offered in ex-
change for the forfeiture of the right to seek tort 
damages, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l) 
(Supp.2010) (making recovery under die Workers' 
Compensation Act the exclusive remedy for work-
related injuries), is not met in such circumstances. 
See generally Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2009 
UT 26, % 24, 223 P.3d 1089 ("The Workers' Com-
pensation Act was enacted to assure the injured em-
ployee and his family an income during die period 
of his total disability as well as compensation for 
any resulting permanent disability, to eliminate die 
expenses, delay, and uncertainty of the employee 
having to prove the employees negligence, and to 
place the burden of industrial injuries on die in-
dustry." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wold-
berg v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 309, 279 P. 
609, 611 (1929) ("The whole purpose, plan and in-
tent of the [Workers' Compensation] Act is to 
provide a simple, adequate and speedy means to all 
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applicants for compensation to have their applica-
tions heard and determined upon the merits, and to 
have die acts of the Commission as speedily re-
viewed by this court by any interested party if he 
thinks that the Commission has exceeded its powers 
or has disregarded some provision of the statute." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather, unless 
individually motivated to make pre-decision pay-
ments, see, eg., Larsen Beverage v. Labor Comm'n, 
2011 UT App 69, % 11 n. 4 (commending employer 
for entering into a stipulation that permitted the em-
ployee to receive benefits while litigation was 
pending), die employer can pay nothing for years 
despite the employee's legally compensable claim 
and current economic need. 
CONCLUSION 
% 28 The Commission's findings were adequate 
to support its decision and were supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Because the Commission made a 
specific finding that Olsen's retirement was primar-
ily motivated by factors apart from his industrial in-
jury and because Olsen failed to present a prima 
facie case that he was unable to be rehabilitated for 
alternative employment, the Commission did not 
err in determining that he does not qualify for per-
manent total disability benefits under the odd-lot 
doctrine. Finally, Olsen did not preserve his claim 
that his due process lights were violated by the 
Commission's delay in issuing a decision, and he 
was not prejudiced by the delay. We therefore af-
firm. 
% 29 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH, As-
sociate Presiding Judge and J. FREDERIC VOROS 
JR., Judge. 
UtahApp.,2011. 
Olsen v. Labor Com'n 
249 P.3d 586, 677 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 2011 UT 
App 70 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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- Supreme Court of Utah. 
PRICE RIVER COAL CO. and Insurance Co. of 
North America, Employer-Carrier, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH and 
Marie T. Mabbutt, widow of Fred C. Mabbutt, de-
ceased, Defendants. 
No. 20473. 
Dec. 31,1986. 
Industrial Commission allowed death benefits 
for surviving spouse of employee, who died of 
heart attack while working as miner. Employer 
filed action for review. The Supreme Court, Zim-
merman, J., held that: (1) employee's heart attack 
was "unexpected or unintended evenf' that caused 
his death and, therefore, was "accident" within 
meaning of statute, which allows compensation for 
dependents of employee killed by accident arising 
out of or in the course of employment; (2) estab-
lishing that employee's heart attack arose out of or 
in the course of employment, rather than as result 
of preexisting heart disease, required finding that 
employment activities involved exertion or stress in 
excess of normally expected level of nonemploy-
ment activity for persons in latter half of twentieth 
century; and (3) remand was required for adminis-
trative law judge to make additional findings of fact 
as to what employee was doing on day of heart at-
tack. 
Remanded. 
Stewart, J., dissented and filed opinion joined 
by Hall, CJ. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>571 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VII1(A)5 Particular Injuries and Con-
sequences 
413k571 k. Injuries to heart. Most 
Cited Cases 
Employee's heart attack while working as belt 
attendant in underground coal mine was 
"unexpected or unintended evenf that caused his 
death and, therefore, was "accident" within mean-
ing of statute, which allows compensation for de-
pendents of employee killed by accident arising out 
of or in the course of employment U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-1 etseq., 35-1-45. 
[2] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>571 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)5 Particular Injuries and Con-
sequences 
413k571 k. Injuries to heart. Most 
Cited Cases 
Establishing that employee's heart attack arose 
"out of or in the course of employment", rather than 
as result of preexisting heart disease, required find-
ing that employment activities involved exertion or 
stress in excess of normally expected level of 
nonemployment activity for persons in latter half of 
twentieth century. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 
35-1-45. 
[3] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1949 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)13 Determination and Disposi-
tion of Proceeding 
413kl949 k. Remand in general. Most 
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Cited Cases 
Inadequacy of administrative law judge's find-
ings as to what employee's activities were on day of 
death while working alone justified remand for 
more detailed, resolution of conflicting testimony, 
findings and determination whether activities 
amounted to unusual or extraordinary exertion 
causing heart attack that arose out of or in course of 
employment U.C.A.1953,35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45. 
[4] Workers1 Compensation 413 €^1531.9(2) 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evid-
ence 
413XVI(N)7 Accident or Injury and Con-
sequences Thereof 
413kl531.1 Particular Injuries and 
Consequences 
413kl531.9 Injuries to Heart 
413kl531.9(2) k. Physical exer-
tion or strain. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 413kl536) 
Evidence that belt attendant job was sometimes 
performed by women did not establish that job re-
quired less than extraordinary effort or strain and 
that male employee's heart attack was caused by 
preexisting heart disease, rather than course of em-
ployment. 
[5] Workers' Compensation 413 C=*1949 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)13 Determination and Disposi-
tion of Proceeding 
413kl949 k. Remand in general. Most 
Cited Cases 
Uncertainty as to whether administrative law 
judge intended to apply correct legal standard when 
it used words, "unusual exertion," in concluding 
that employee's heart attack arose out of or in 
course of employment justified remand for applica-
tion of proper standard to determine legal cause. 
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Page 2 
U.C.A.1953,35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45. 
[6] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1730 
413 Workers'Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)5 Reference 
413kl730 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Medical panel, which served purpose of taking 
facts as found by administrative law judge and as-
sisting administrative law judge to decide whether 
medical cause has been proven, does not serve role 
of resolving conflicts in factual evidence with re-
gard to injured party's activities. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45,35-1-85. 
[71 Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1730 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)5 Reference 
413kl730 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Administrative law judge permitting medical 
panel to resolve factual disputes improperly abdic-
ates function. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45, 
35-1-85. 
*1080 James M. Elegante, Erie V. Boorman, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Virginius Dabney, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
On December 20, 1984, the Industrial Commis-
sion through its administrative law judge issued 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order 
allowing death benefits for applicant Marie J. Mab-
butt, the widow of Fred C. Mabbutt, who died of a 
heart attack while working as a miner for plaintiff 
Price River Coal Co. ("PRC")- Mrs. Mabbutt's 
claim for compensation was based upon the Work-
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ers1 Compensation Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 
(1974 ed., Supp.1986), which allows compensation 
to "the dependents of every such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of or in the course of 
his employment." PRCs motion for reconsideration 
or review was denied by the Industrial Commission. 
PRC *1081 thereupon filed this action for review. 
We remand for additional findings of fact. 
Fred C. Mabbutt was found dead on October 
23, 1981, at the end of his eight-hour shift as a belt 
attendant in PRCs underground coal mine in Help-
er, Utah. Mabbutt's job consisted of keeping certain 
underground conveyor belts working and of keep-
ing the belt rollers and the area surrounding these 
belts free of coal dust and other materials which fall 
from the belts or collect around them in the normal 
course of their operation. 
According to both parties, the crux of this case 
is the question of whether there is substantial evid-
ence to support the decision of the administrative 
law judge that Fred Mabbutt's heart attack and sub-
sequent death satisfies the requirement of section 
35-1-45 that the death be "by accident arising out 
of or in the course of his employment." However, 
both sides disagree about the appropriate legal 
standard to be applied in evaluating the evidence. 
Therefore, we have two questions on appeal. The 
first is, What constitutes a compensable "accident"? 
The second question is whether the evidence of Mr. 
Mabbutfs activities on the day of his death satisfies 
the element of causation such that the accident, if 
one did occur, was in fact related to his employ-
ment. 
There is no need to dwell at length on the ques-
tion of the appropriate legal standard. This issue 
has just been dealt with extensively in Allen v. In-
dustrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
There we attempted to settle the meaning of the 
term "by accident," which had become confused by 
varying and inconsistent statements from this Court 
over a long period of time. The Allen definition is 
as follows: "Where either the cause of the injury or 
the result of an exertion was different from what 
would normally be expected to occur, the occur-
rence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and 
therefore 'by accident.' " Id at 22 (emphasis in ori-
ginal). This definition follows the standard articu-
lated in Carting v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 
2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), and in earlier de-
cisions of this Court that can be traced back to 
1922, including most notably Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 
(1949). This standard has been followed most re-
cently in Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980), and Kaiser Steel Corp. 
v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890-91 (Utah 1981). 
[1] Under the Allen standard, it is fairly easy to 
determine that Mr. Mabbutt did die "by accident" 
on October 23, 1981. His heart attack was certainly 
an "unexpected or unintended" event that resulted 
in his death. Allen v. Industrial Commission, at 22. 
However, the finding that the death was "by acci-
dent" does not complete the analysis of whether the 
resulting injury is compensable. Under Allen, the 
more difficult question involves the determination 
of whether the injury had the requisite connection 
with the employment duties-whether it arose "out 
of or in the course of ... employment." U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-45 (1974 ed., Supp.1986); see Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, at — . 
Prior to Allen, the obvious need for a test to as-
sure that there was a causal connection between the 
injury and the employment duties of the injured 
party was sometimes dealt with in our cases by re-
quiring that the occurrence resulting in the injury be 
shown to have involved "unusual exertion." Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, at 23. This is the standard 
apparently applied by the Commission in this case 
and found to have been met. 
However, Allen discarded the usual/unusual ex-
ertion distinction as a means for determining 
whether the injury was the result of an "accident." 
Instead, the Court dealt with the causation require-
ment in more candid terms that focus frankly on the 
questions of legal and medical causation. It delin-
eated the analysis as follows: 
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Under the legal test, the law must define what 
kind of exertion satisfies the test of "arising out 
of the employment" ... [then] the doctors must 
say whether die exertion (having been held leg-
ally sufficient* 1082 to support compensation) in 
fact caused this [injury]. 
Id. at 25, citing Larson, Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277 (1986). 
In applying the Allen analysis to the present 
case, then, the first question is whether legal cause 
has been shown. Under Allen, a usual or ordinary 
exertion, so long as it is an activity connected with 
the employee's duties, will suffice to show legal 
cause. However, if the claimant suffers from a pre-
existing condition, then he or she must show that 
the employment activity involved some unusual or 
extraordinary exertion over and above the "usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment 
life." Allen v. Industrial Commission, at 26. In ap-
praising whether the employee's exertion would be 
usual or ordinary in nonemployment life, an object-
ive standard is to be applied that is based on the 
nonemployment life of the average person, not the 
nonemployment life of a particular worker. Id The 
requirement of "unusual or extraordinary exertion" 
is designed to screen out those injuries that result 
from a personal condition which the worker brings 
to the job, rather than from exertions required of the 
employee in the workplace. Id. at 25.FNI 
FN 1. As a practical matter, when the Allen 
standard is being applied to cases which 
may involve preexisting conditions, before 
evidence is taken on the issue of legal 
cause, the Commission would be well-
advised to first make a determination of 
whether or not the preexisting condition 
does in fact exist. If a preexisting condition 
exists, then the parties and the hearing of-
ficer will know that the "extraordinary ex-
ertion" test will be applied to the facts as 
they are developed, and the evidence can 
be appropriately prepared and marshalled 
for presentation to the fact finder. If a 
preexisting condition does not exist, the 
hearing may be expedited because there 
will be no need to show how hard the em-
ployee was or was not working, only that 
the employment activity led to the injury. 
Of course, even if a preexisting condition 
is involved, if the Commission finds that 
legal cause does exist, then it is still appro-
priate to refer the matter to a medical panel 
to determine whether the facts, as determ-
ined at the legal cause hearing, are suffi-
cient to establish medical causation. 
In the present case, Mabbutt was suffering 
from a preexisting condition which contributed 
greatly to his heart attack. The evidence is uncon-
troverted that he had hypertensive cardiovascular 
disease, atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, and 
possibly diabetic cardiomyopathy. His hypertension 
was exacerbated by his obesity and possibly a high 
salt diet. He was a diabetic and had gout. The doc-
tor on the medical panel to which this case was re-
ferred by the administrative law judge concluded 
that there was no evidence that Mabbutt's work 
"had any relationship to [his] development of 
coronary artery disease." 
[2] Since Mabbutt brought heart disease to the 
workplace, before legal causation can be estab-
lished, the Commission must find that his employ-
ment activities involved exertion or stress in excess 
of the normally expected level of nonemployment 
activity for men and women in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. If such a finding is made, then 
the requirement of legal cause is satisfied because it 
is presumed that the employment increased the risk 
of injury to which that worker was otherwise sub-
ject in his nonemployment life. At that point, the 
inquiry shifts to medical cause, Le., whether the in-
jured party's work-related activities were, in fact, 
causally linked to the injury. Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, at 26. 
The question of whether the employment activ-
ities of a given employee are sufficient to satisfy 
the legal standard of unusual or extraordinary effort 
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involves two steps. First, the agency must determ-
ine as a matter of fact exactly what were the em-
ployment-related activities of the injured employee. 
Second, the agency must decide whether those 
activities amounted to unusual or extraordinary ex-
ertion. This second determination is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact. 
[3] Because die whole legal cause determina-
tion hinges upon die agency's findings as to what 
the injured worker's job-related activities were, our 
review of die Commission's decision must begin 
with those findings. In the present case, we are 
*1083 unable to affirm the Commission's ruling be-
cause of the inadequacy of these findings. In his 
job, Mabbutt worked alone in die mine, and he en-
countered only one person while working on the 
day of his death. For that reason, it was necessary 
to infer what Mabbutt*s activities were from die 
conflicting evidence adduced at die hearing before 
die administrative law judge. The company brought 
in an expert to describe his understanding of die ex-
ertion required to perform that particular job. His 
testimony would support a conclusion (hat no un-
usual or extraordinary effort was required On die 
other hand, Mabbutt's widow introduced testimony 
from a fellow worker who described how she had 
seen Mabbutt perform die work, testimony that 
might support a conclusion that the effort required 
was unusual. This testimony was disputed by the 
company. 
Unfortunately, die administrative law judge's 
findings do not resolve die conflicts in die testi-
mony and do not indicate tiiat he made a finding as 
to exactly what Mabbutt's activities were on the day 
of his death. Absent such findings, it is impossible 
for us to take die next step and determine whether 
Mabbutt's work-related activities, as found by the 
Commission, rose to die level necessary to satisfy 
the "unusual or extraordinary" exertion threshold 
established by Allen for injured employees with 
preexisting problems. 
The administrative law judge found that 
"Mabbutt died as the result of an accident in the 
course of his employment... resulting from unusual 
exertion and stress connected with his employ-
ment" It may be argued that this is a sufficient 
finding of legal cause to warrant our affirming die 
Commission on this point However, die "finding" 
of unusual exertion and stress is notiiing more than 
a conclusion. It is not supported by anytiiing that 
could be construed as a finding as to precisely what 
Mabbutt was doing on the day of his death. We 
cannot affirm such a mixed conclusion of fact and 
law when its necessary premises are not evident 
[4][5] There is an added problem here. The 
Commission decided this case under prv-Allen law. 
We cannot determine whedier the administrative 
law judge used die words "unusual exertion" in die 
same sense as diey have been defined by Allen. A 
talismanic incantation of "unusual or extraordinary 
exertion" is not a substitute for careful analysis by 
die Commission of whedier the actual job-related 
activities in question exceed die normally expected 
level of activity for men and women in die latter 
half of die twentietfi century.1*2 In die present 
case, we are uncertain of die standard applied by 
die Commission and cannot tell how die stated con-
clusion was reached. For that reason, we must re-
verse and remand die matter to die Commission so 
that proper findings of fact can be entered and die 
Allen standard can be applied to diem to determine 
legal cause. 
FN2. We reject, categorically, die sugges-
tion advanced by the company that because 
the belt-attendant job is sometimes per-
formed by women, it must necessarily^ in-
volve less than extraordinary efifort or 
strain. We take judicial notice of the fact 
that women, as a group, tend to be smaller 
in size and have less physical strength than 
do men, as a group. However, with respect 
to size and strength, individual men and 
women are arrayed over a continuum from 
one extreme to the other. No generalization 
can be made tiiat because a woman per-
forms a certain job it necessarily involves 
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strength and exertion requirements at the 
lower end of the spectrum, and the con-
trary is, of course, true of a job performed 
by a man. Each jobs demands must be 
evaluated on their own; they cannot be cat-
egorized as requiring "usual" or "unusual" 
exertion simply because they are normally 
done by women or men, respectively. 
A word about the issue of medical cause. As 
noted, the administrative law judge did not resolve 
conflicts in the testimony about Mabbutfs work 
activities. However, he did adopt the findings of the 
medical panel, which contained a doctor's assump-
tions about what Mabbutt was actually doing on the 
day in question, and which then relied on those fac-
tual assumptions in finding a causal link between 
fiie work and his death. The factual recitation in the 
panel report was derived from the conflicting evid-
ence presented at die hearing and inferences drawn 
from that evidence. In a number of *1084 respects, 
as fiie company demonstrated at the hearing on its 
objections to the medical panel report and in its 
brief on appeal, the panel was confrised as to some 
of fiie basic duties of Mabbutfs job and made as-
sumptions about his actual activities which are un-
supported by the evidence. 
[6][7] It is not the role of the medical panel to 
resolve conflicts in the factual evidence regarding 
fiie injured party's activities. Section 35-1-85 of the 
Code places that responsibility solely on fiie Com-
mission. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-85 (1974 ed.). Under 
Allen, as before, the medical panel is only to take 
fiie facts as found by fiie administrative law judge 
and consider them in light of its medical expertise 
to assist fiie administrative law judge in deciding 
whether medical cause has been proven. The med-
ical panel strays beyond its province when it at-
tempts to resolve factual disputes, and the adminis-
trative law judge improperly abdicates his function 
if he permits the panel to so act. IGA Food Fair v. 
Martin, 584 P.2d 828,830 (Utah 1978). 
We acknowledge that during the adjudication 
of this matter, the Commission was laboring under 
the confusing and conflicting state of the law as it 
had developed prior to Allen, The issues presented 
by this and similar cases should be easier to resolve 
in the future. However, questions of some subtlety 
will remain in cases involving claims for internal 
failure where the worker has a preexisting condition 
that contributes to the injury and where a determin-
ation must be made as to whether a specific work 
activity amounts to "unusual or extraordinary" ex-
ertion. The concept of "unusual or extraordinary" 
exertion remains to be fleshed out over time. Of ne-
cessity, fiie process of pouring specific content into 
that concept will rely heavily upon the Commis-
sion's expertise in and familiarity with the woik en-
vironment 
This case is remanded to fiie Industrial Com-
mission for findings of fact as to what Mabbutfs 
activities actually were on the day of his death* 
Based upon those findings and upon a review of Al-
len, the Commission may then adhere to or abandon 
its conclusion that those activities amounted to ex-
traordinary exertion. Because the determination of 
medical cause must be based upon die Commis-
sion's findings as to fiie actual activities of the 
woiker, and because fiie panel's report in the 
present case rested upon fiie medical panel's im-
proper assumptions as to fiie facts, fiie Commission 
should resubmit the question of medical causation 
to fiie panel after it has made the appropriate factual 
findings. 
HOWE and DURHAM, JL, concur. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent In one of the first important tests of 
the rules laid down in Allen v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the majority re-
verses and remands to "resubmit the question of 
medical causations to the panel." But the medical 
panel has already addressed that exact question, and 
the administrative law judge found that the de-
cedent's death was caused by his job-related activit-
ies on the day that the fatal accident occurred. What 
more the court expects than has been done by the 
Commission is not explained by the majority. The 
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administrative law judge was correct in his ruling, 
the Commission so found, and I agree. 
It is precisely this kind of case that demon-
strates that our newly formulated methods of ana-
lysis will inevitably draw the Commission off into 
pathways that are bound, I believe, to lead to error. 
The Court's unfortunate requirement that, since 
Mabbutt had a preexisting condition, the Commis-
sion must find "that his employment activities in-
volved exertion or stress in excess of the normally 
expected level of activity for men and women in the 
latter of the twentieth century," is precisely the dis-
criminatory application of workers' compensation 
laws to workers with a preexisting condition, which 
I referred to in my dissent in Allen. 
I would affirm on the authority of Pittsburgh 
Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 
1983), and *\0S5Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). Like Pittsburgh Testing 
and Monfredi, the decedent's preexisting coronary 
condition was clearly aggravated in this case. The 
administrative law judge made that clear in his 
findings: 
[T]here is no way of knowing exactly how long 
before the hour of 4:20 p.m. the applicant first 
felt the effects of that stress or at what time he 
actually died but it could have been some hours 
before 4:20 p.m. We are not called upon to spec-
ulate as to those times or as to the excessive 
stress or exertion later in the afternoon in view of 
the fact that two fine cardiologists have agreed 
that the evidence is sufficient to convince them 
that the death was industrially related. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds that Mr. 
Mabbutt died as the result of an accident in the 
course of his employment on October 23, 1981 
resulting from unusual exertion and stress con-
nected with his employment on that fateful after-
noon. 
I would affirm. The Commission has found the 
necessary facts, and it is not for us to ignore them. 
HALL, C.J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of 
STEWART, Associate C J. 
Utah,1986. 
Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Com'n of Utah 
731 P.2d 1079 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, Petitioner, 
v. 
LABOR COMMISSION and John Wisner, Re-
spondents. 
No. 20080265-CA. 
April 30,2009. 
Background: County petitioned for judicial review 
of a determination by the Labor Commission that 
county was not entitled to a 15 percent reduction in 
the workers' compensation benefits owed to injured 
county employee. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that 
Labor Commission's determination that employee 
did not willfully violate a lifting restriction was 
reasonable. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C^> 
754.1 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General 
15Ak754 Discretion of Administrative 
Agency 
15Ak754.1 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
The applicable standard of review for agency 
decisions turns on whether the legislature has stat-
utorily granted the agency discretion. 
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A £^> 
754.1 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General 
15Ak754 Discretion of Administrative 
Agency 
15Ak754.1 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A €=^763 
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General 
15Ak763 k. Arbitrary, unreasonable or ca-
pricious action; illegality. Most Cited Cases 
Statutes 361 €=^219(4) 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
361k219 Executive Construction 
361k219(4) k. Erroneous construc-
tion; conflict with statute. Most Cited Cases 
When the legislature has granted an agency dis-
cretion to determine an issue, Court of Appeals re-
views the agency's action for reasonableness; ab-
sent a grant of discretion, Court of Appeals uses a 
correction-of-error standard in reviewing an 
agency's interpretation or application of a stat-
utory term. 
[3] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1939.11(9) 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
or 
413kl939.11 Particular Findings 
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413kl939.11(9) k. Amount and 
period of compensation. Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals would review Labor Com-
mission's determination that injured county em-
ployee's violation of a lifting restriction was not 
willful, such that county was not entitled to a 15 
percent reduction in the amount of workers1 com-
pensation benefits owed to employee, for reason-
ableness, where legislature granted Commission de-
cisional discretion. West's U.CA. §§ 34A-1-301, 
34A-2-302(3XaXii). 
[4] Workers' Compensation 413 0 ^ 9 4 5 
413 Workers' Compensation 
4 BIX Amount and Period of Compensation 
413IX(G) Increase or Reduction of Com-
pensation 
413DC(G)1 Misconduct in General (Prior 
to Injury) 
413k945 k. Employee's misconduct. 
Most Cited Cases 
The term "willful," in statute entitling an em-
ployer to a 15 percent reduction in workers' com-
pensation benefits owed to a worker whose injury is 
caused by the willful failure to use a safety device 
or obey a safety rule, implies something in addition 
to mere negligence; accordingly, negligence alone 
or even gross negligence is not sufficient to consti-
tute "willful failure." West's U.CA. § 34A-2-302 
OXa). 
[5] Workers1 Compensation 413 C=*945 
413 Workers' Compensation 
4 BIX Amount and Period of Compensation 
413EX(G) Increase or Reduction of Com-
pensation 
4131X(G)1 Misconduct in General (Prior 
to Injury) 
413k945 k. Employee's misconduct. 
Most Cited Cases 
Labor Commission's determination that 
county employee who reinjured his back while at-
tempting to physically maneuver into place a heavy 
pump he was installing did not willftilly violate a 
doctor-imposed restriction on the amount of weight 
he could lift was reasonable, and thus county was 
not entitled to a 15 percent reduction in the amount 
of workers' compensation benefits owed to employ-
ee; employee did not subjectively consider his ac-
tions to constitute "lifting," and employee thought 
he could install the pump without violating his lift-
ing restriction because he did not have to physically 
lift the pump. West's U.CA. § 34A-2-302(3XaXii). 
*1088 David H.T. Wayment, Salt Lake City, for 
Petitioner. 
Gary E. Atkin, Marsha Atkin, and Alan L. Hen-
nebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondents. 
Before Judges THORNE, ORME, and McHUGH. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
% 1 Salt Lake County challenges the Utah 
Labor Commission's determination that the 
County was not entitled to a 15% reduction in com-
pensation benefits it owed to John Wisner 
(Employee). As we determine that the Commission 
did not exceed its discretion in concluding that Em-
ployee did not willfully disobey any lifting restric-
tion put in place by the County, we conclude that 
the County was not entitled to the 15% reduction. 
BACKGROUND™ 
FN1. Unless otherwise noted, our recita-
tion of the facts is based on the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's findings of fact in her 
August 27, 2007 order, which were adop-
ted by the Commission in its March 4, 
2008 order, and on the Commission's dis-
cussion of the relevant facts in its March 4, 
2008 order. 
% 2 On July 2, 2002, while working as a swim-
ming pool maintenance specialist for the County, 
Employee was injured "by accident," Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-401(l) (2005), when he was recon-
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necting a chlorine line. To perform this task, Em-
ployee had to crawl into a pit that contained a 1500 
gallon chlorine tank and move it When 
"[Employee] put his back against the wall for lever-
age and shoved and twisted the tank with his arms," 
u[he] felt pain in the middle of his back at waist 
height and an immediate shock through his back 
down his right leg which went dead." 
% 3 The July 2002 injury was determined to 
have arisen during the course of Employee's em-
ployment with the County, see id, even though 
Employee had previously undergone a L4-5 mi-
crodiscectomy during August of 1995, "because 
[Employee had] engaged in [an] unusual exertion 
greater than average non-industrial life." Employ-
ee's doctor determined that the July 2002 accident 
"caused a recurrent disc herniation," which was "a 
new injury ... requiring surgery." Following surgery 
in November 2002, Employee's doctor placed Em-
ployee on "permanent work restrictions ... [with] no 
lifting over 50 pounds." Further, Employee "was 
assigned a 12% whole person impairment rating un-
der the Commission's impairment guides," with 
10% of his impairment attributed to his 1995 injury 
and 2% of his impairment attributed to his 2002 in-
jury. As a result of the July 2002 injury, Employee 
was entitled to compensation benefits at a maxim-
um rate of $478 per week. 
% 4 When Petitioner returned to work as a 
swimming pool maintenance specialist with the 
County, he was able to perform the required work, 
occasionally taking pain medication. However, on 
May 6, 2005, Employee suffered another workplace 
injury while installing a 250 to 300 pound circula-
tion pump. During the installation, Employee first 
used a crane to remove the pump from the truck and 
then used a dolly to transport the pump to the pool. 
At the pool, "[Employee] had to manually manipu-
late the pump into place," which "required [him] to 
straddle the pump and bend over [to] jerk it up-
wards to line it up for the installation." When Em-
ployee jerked up on the pump, "[he] felt immediate 
pain in the middle of his back at waist level." 
^ 5 Employee specifically testified: 
I didn't have to lift it at all. I took it off the truck 
with a crane, put it on the dolly, rolled it in there, 
and then pried it up on the stand. 
But I had to jump it to line it up with the coup-
ling on the thing. It's a 15-horsepower motor, 
probably weighed, I don't know, 250, 300 
pounds. But it wasn't, you know, you weren't lift-
ing it, you were just jockeying it around. And I... 
straddled it..., and I just jerked up on it to line it 
up. And, you know, once you've done that to your 
back.... 
Employee emphasized that "[he] didn't lift a 
200- or 300-pound pump." Instead, "[he] grabbed it 
and ... jerked it around." When asked at the hearing, 
Employee was unable to estimate how much weight 
he effectively *1089 lifted while maneuvering and 
jerking up on the pump. He testified that he made 
an effort to comply with the work restrictions im-
posed by his doctor and that, "[t]o the best of [his] 
knowledge," he did comply with those restrictions. 
J 6 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) de-
termined that the May 2005 injury arose during the 
course of his employment with the County; that the 
injury was accidental; and that, because the injury 
was "a subsequent injury with the same employer," 
Employee only needed to prove ordinary exertion 
although "his injury would meet either a usual or 
unusual exertion." Employee's doctor "opined [that 
he] suffered an aggravation of his chronic low back 
pain" as a result of the May 2005 accident but that 
"[he] was medically stable." The doctor placed Em-
ployee on "new, permanent work restrictions of no 
prolonged walking or standing[;] no prolonged sit-
ting[;] no repeated bending, stooping, lifting or 
twisting[;] ... lifting restrictions of 10-25 pounds 
maximum[;] no divingf;] and no driving while tak-
ing narcotic medications." Employee was not as-
signed a different impairment rating as a result of 
the May 2005 injury. At the time the ALJ's order 
was issued, Employee had not worked since 
September 2005. His job with the County required 
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lifting more than 25 pounds, and although he 
sought other employment, he was not hired. 
% 7 While indicating that Employee exceeded 
the lifting restrictions imposed by his doctor after 
the July 2002 injury, the ALJ determined that 
"there is no evidence that such activity was a fail-
ure to obey an order or a written safety policy of 
the [County]." The ALJ further determined that im-
posing a 15% penalty on Employee was not re-
quired because Employee's conduct had not been in 
willful disobedience of any safety order of the 
County. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-302(3XaXii) 
(2005). The ALJ concluded that Employee sus-
tained a permanent, total disability "as the result of 
the May 6, 2005 industrial injury" and that Employ-
ee was "entitled to ... compensation at the rate of 
$501 per week." 
% 8 The County appealed the ALTs decision to 
the Labor Commission, arguing, inter alia, that the 
County was entitled to a 15% reduction in the rate 
of compensation owed to Employee because Em-
ployee willfully disobeyed a safety order from the 
County when he was maneuvering the pump. Ac-
cording to the County, the work restrictions recom-
mended by Employee's doctor constituted a safety 
rule or order imposed by the County. The Commis-
sion adopted the ALTs findings of facts and af-
firmed the ALTs decision. The Commission spe-
cifically determined that "[Employee]^ efforts to 
perform his work duties [could not] be fairly char-
acterized as a 'willful' failure to comply with his 
lifting restrictions." The Commission "d[id] not 
view the physician's restrictions as having been 
'adopted' by [the County]." The County then 
sought judicial review of the Commission's final or-
der. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DIP] ^ 9 The pivotal issue before the court is 
whether the Commission properly determined that 
Employee's actions were not willful under Utah 
Code section 34A-2-302(3)(aXii), and that the 
County is therefore not entitled to a 15% reduction 
in the compensation benefits it owed Employee. 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
FN2
 The applicable standard of review for agency 
decisions turns on whether the Legislature has stat-
utorily granted the agency discretion. See AE Clev-
ite, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App 35, % 6, 
996 P.2d 1072, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 
2000). "When the Legislature has granted an 
agency discretion to determine an issue, we review 
the agency's action for reasonableness. Absent a 
grant of discretion, we use a correction-of-error 
standard in reviewing an agency's interpretation or 
application of a statutory term." Id. (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
FN2. The County also raises the issue of 
whether it adopted as a safety policy the 
work restrictions imposed by Employee's 
doctor. We need not reach this issue as we 
determine that Employee's actions were 
not willful. 
[3] % 10 The Legislature has statutorily granted 
the Commission decisional discretion. See *1090 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (2005) ("The 
[Commission has the duty and the full power, jur-
isdiction, and authority to determine the facts and 
apply the law in this chapter or any other title or 
chapter it administers."). Thus, we review the Com-
mission's decision that Employee's conduct was not 
willful, for purposes of section 34A-2-302(3XaXiO> 
for reasonableness and will only overturn the Com-
mission if its "determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an 
abuse of discretion under section 
63-46b-16[(4)](hXi) of the [Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act]." AE Clevite, Inc.f 2000 UT App 
35, % 7, 996 P.2d 1072. See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(hXi) (2004) (current version at Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(hXi) (2008)). 
ANALYSIS 
[4] % 11 Under the Utah Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, an employer is entitled to a 15% reduction 
in the compensation it owes to an employee when 
the employee's injury does not "resultf ] in death" 
and the "injury is caused by the willful failure of 
the employee: (i) to use safety devices when 
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provided by the employer or (ii) to obey any order 
or reasonable rule adopted by the employer for the 
safety of the employee." Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-302(3)(a) (2005). The term " 'willful' im-
plied] something in addition to mere negligence." 
Van Waters & Rogers v. Workman, 700 P.2d 1096, 
1098 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, "negligence alone 
or even gross negligence is not sufficient to consti-
tute 'willful failure.' " Id In Van Waters & Rogers 
v. Workman, 700 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined a "workable formula" for 
"distinguishing willful failure from less culpable 
conduct," stating: 
"[T]he general rule [is] that the deliberate defi-
ance of a reasonable rule laid down to prevent 
serious bodily harm to the employee will usually 
be held to constitute willful misconduct, in the 
absence of a showing of... specific excuses[.] 
If the employee had some plausible purpose to 
explain his violation of a rule, the defenses of vi-
olation of safety rules or willful misconduct are 
inapplicable, even though the judgment of the 
employee might have been faulty or his conduct 
rash[.]" 
Id at 1099 (quoting 1A A. Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation §§ 32.30, 33.40 (1982)) (omissions 
in original). 
% 12 In Van Waters, the Supreme Court held 
that the employee's conduct in failing to wear safety 
goggles as required by the employer was not willful 
because the employee did not act in total disregard 
of the requirement but instead tried to complete the 
required work wearing goggles, only removing 
them after they kept fogging up and preventing him 
from safely completing his task. See id at 1097, 
1099. See also City of Las Animas v. Maupin, 804 
P.2d 285, 286 (Colo.Ct.App. 1990) (determining, 
under a similar Colorado statute, that the "evidence 
could support a finding that" the employee's action 
in removing a safety glove was not willfiil when the 
employee removed the glove so he could "push a 
lever that would not stay down" and "believed that 
he could not operate certain equipment with the 
glove on and that pushing the lever with his bare 
hand would, under normal conditions, pose no 
safety threat"); Smit v. Geyer Detective Agency, 
Inc., 130 So.2d 882, 884 (Fla.1961) (concluding 
that the commission erred in determining that the 
employee's action in crossing the double line while 
driving was willful because "[rjather than in-
fer[ring] willfulness from this fact, it [wa]s equally 
as reasonable to conclude that the [employee] may 
have seen the truck ahead of him just prior to the 
accident, and that he instinctively swerved to the 
left in a vain attempt to avoid the collision"). But 
see McCulloch v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Colo. 
123, 123 P.2d 414, 415-16 (1942) (determining that 
an employee willfiilly failed to follow safety rule 
when employee, who was apprised of rule to wear 
goggles, intentionally chose not to wear goggles 
until he "deemed [it] necessary," and therefore 
"acted upon his own judgment ... about the use of 
goggles") (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted) (omission in original). 
% 13 In this case, the evidence shows that Em-
ployee, while in the course of his work duties, tried 
to install a very heavy pump by physically maneuv-
ering it into place. This task did not require that 
Employee physically*1091 lift the pump but re-
quired that he use a certain amount of force to man-
euver it and jockey it into place. Employee testified 
that he could not "lift 250, 300 pounds" and stated 
that he tried to comply with his doctor's lifting re-
strictions while carrying out his work duties.. 
[5] ^ 14 The County argues that "[b]ecause 
[Employee] should have recognized the probable 
consequences of lifting outside his restriction, his 
violation was willful." It further asserts that be-
cause both the ALJ and the Commission found that 
Employee violated his doctor's restriction when he 
jerked up on the pump, and because Employee 
denied "lifting" outside his restrictions, he provided 
no reasonable explanation for violating his doctor's 
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restrictions as required under Van Waters. See 700 
P.2d at 1098-99. We disagree. 
K 15 Even though Employee did not specific-
ally address why he violated his doctor's restriction, 
Employee's testimony as a whole explains his ac-
tions. He stated that he did not think he would viol-
ate the lifting restriction while maneuvering the 
pump because he never had to "physically ... lift 
that pump." Moreover, his testimony indicates that 
he tried to comply with his doctor's restrictions. 
Based on Employee's testimony and the other evid-
ence of record, the ALJ and the Commission de-
termined that although, technically speaking, Em-
ployee's jerking up on the pump violated his doc-
tor's lifting restriction, Employee did not subject-
ively consider his actions as "lifting" and his at-
tempt to maneuver and install the pump was not in 
willful disregard of his lifting restriction. While in 
hindsight Employee's decision to maneuver the 250 
to 300 pound pump without assistance may well 
have been careless, we conclude that the determina-
tion his conduct was not willful under Utah Code 
section 34A-2-302(3XaXii) does not "exceed[ ] the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion." AE Clevite, Inc. 
v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App 35, \ 7, 996 P.2d 
1072, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). As 
correctly argued by the Commission in the case be-
fore us, if Employee's conduct was negligent or 
even grossly negligent, it does not necessarily fol-
low that he acted in willful disregard of any safety 
rule or policy adopted or set forth by the County. 
™ See Van Waters, 700 P.2d at 1098-99. 
FN3. The County also discusses a state-
ment Employee made, citing to Employee's 
medical records, which indicated that Em-
ployee did not seek help when maneuver-
ing the pump because he does not like to 
ask for help. Even if Employee does not 
like to ask for help, Employee's decision to 
move the pump by himself can still be con-
sidered negligent rather than willful when 
the evidence shows that Employee thought 
he was complying with his doctor's lifting 
restrictions and thought he could maneuver 
the pump without assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
% 16 The Commission's determination that Em-
ployee did not willfully disregard his doctor's lift-
ing restriction is reasonable because Employee's at-
tempt to move the pump by himself appears to have 
been a negligent act rather than a willfol act. We 
accordingly affirm the Commission's decision to 
not offset, by 15%, the compensation owed to Em-
ployee. 
1 17 WE CONCUR: WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., 
Associate Presiding Judge, CAROLYN B. 
McHUGH, Judge. 
UtahApp.,2009. 
Salt Lake County v. Labor Com'n 
208 P.3d 1087, 629 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2009 UT 
App 112 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Linda C. SPEIRS, Petitioner, 
v. 
SOUTHERN UTAH UNIVERSITY and/or Work-
ers Compensation Fund of Utah, Respondents. 
No.20010374-CA. 
Nov. 21,2002. 
Workers' compensation claimant appealed from 
order of the Labor Commission denying in part 
and granting in part her request for benefits based 
on knee and ankle injuries. The Court of Appeals, 
Thorne, J., held that administrative law judge (ALJ) 
properly discharged his duty to make findings of 
fact and did not abdicate his responsibility to med-
ical panel. 
Affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
West Headnotes 
[11 Workers1 Compensation 413 €=^>19393 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413k 1939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
or 
413kl939.3 k. Conclusiveness of 
Administrative Findings in General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Court of Appeals must uphold Labor Commis-
sion's determination in workers' compensation pro-
ceeding unless that determination exceeds bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality. 
[2] Workers1 Compensation 413 €=>1691 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)1 In General 
413kl691 k. Scope and Extent; Mat-
ters and Evidence Considered. Most Cited Cases 
Workers' Compensation 413 €>^>1733 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court 
413kl732 Necessity 
413kl733 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Administrative law judge (ALJ) properly dis-
charged his duty to make findings of fact and did 
not abdicate his responsibility to medical panel; 
ALJ provided medical panel with set of stipulated 
facts and questions, medical panel conducted exam-
ination of claimant and her medical history and 
used this information to answer questions, and ALJ 
reviewed medical panel's report and other medical 
opinions in record and issued findings. 
[3] Workers* Compensation 413 ©=^515 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413 VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)1 In General 
413k515 k. What Are Accidental Injur-
ies in General. Most Cited Cases 
To award workers' compensation benefits, 
Labor Commission must determine that accident 
has occurred and that there is causal connection 
between accident and injury claimed; this requires 
that Commission make findings of fact and draw 
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conclusions of law. 
[4J Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1416 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evid-
ence 
413XVI(N)1 In General 
413kl415 Opinion Evidence 
413kl416 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In difficult workers' compensation cases, opin-
ions of medical panel may be of assistance to 
Labor Commission in determining whether bene-
fits should be awarded because medical panel 
provides Commission with benefit of its medical 
expertise. 
[51 Workers' Compensation 413 €^=>1704 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)3 Questions of Law and Fact 
413kl704 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Even when medical panel is convened, admin-
istrative law judge (ALJ)/ Labor Commission is 
always ultimate fact finder in workers' compensa-
tion proceeding. 
16] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1847 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)5 Presentation and Reservation 
Below of Grounds of Review 
413kl845 Necessity 
413kl847 k. Theory of Claim or 
Defense. Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals was precluded from address-
ing workers' compensation claimant's due process 
claim, where claimant failed to raise claim before 
Labor Commission. 
[71 Administrative Law and Procedure 15A € = ? 
669.1 
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(A) In General 
15Ak669 Preservation of Questions Be-
fore Administrative Agency 
15Ak669.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Issues not raised in proceedings before admin-
istrative agencies are not subject to judicial review 
except under exceptional circumstances. 
[8J Workers1 Compensation 413 €=^>1939.6 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
or 
413kl939.6 k. Weight of Evidence 
and Credibility of Witnesses. Most Cited Cases 
Workers' Compensation 413 C^>1939.7 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
or 
413kl939.7 k. Inferences or Con-
clusions from Facts Proved. Most Cited Cases 
It is not role of Court of Appeals to reweigh 
evidence in workers' compensation proceeding and 
substitute its conclusion for that of Labor Com-
mission; instead, Court defers to Commission's 
findings because, when reasonably conflicting 
views arise, it is Commission's province to draw in-
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ferences and resolve these conflicts. 
*42 Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Petitioner. 
James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for Respondents. 
Before BILLINGS, Associate P.J., ORME, and 
THORNE,JJ. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge. 
% 1 Linda C. Speirs appeals from an order of 
the Utah Labor Commission (Commission),*43 
denying in part and granting in part her request for 
workers' compensation. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
% 2 On April 30, 1998, Speirs slipped and fell 
fracturing her nose and injuring her right ankle and 
left knee while waitressing on the Southern Utah 
University campus in Cedar City, Utah. Initially, 
Speirs received workers' compensation benefits. 
However, after paying Speirs's medical costs re-
lated to the accident, her employer, through its 
workers' compensation insurer, denied Speirs's re-
quest for permanent partial disability benefits or fu-
ture medical benefits. Speirs appealed to the Com-
mission. An administrative law judge (ALT) con-
vened a medical panel to render a medical opinion 
in Speirs's case prior to making any finding or 
drawing any conclusions. The parties submitted 
stipulated facts to the medical panel and the ALJ 
asked the medical panel to opine on the following 
questions: 
(1) What is [Speirs's] total physical impairment, 
if any, for injuries sustained to her knee, ankle, 
nose and face, respectively? Please explain as ne-
cessary. 
(2) What future medical treatment will be re-
quired as a result of the April 30, 1998, accident 
described above? 
(3) Please address the following medical treat-
ment for [Speirs's] nose and face, ankle, and knee 
and specifically Dr. Marsden's request for a neur-
ological consultation and whether the current pre-
scription for Guaifenesin [is] necessary as a res-
ult of the industrial accident. 
K 3 The medical panel examined Speirs, re-
viewed Speirs's medical records, and then issued a 
one-hundred page detailed report that contained 
both the panel's medical opinion and the material to 
support that opinion. In this report, the medical 
panel opined that: (1) based upon a reasonable 
medical probability, Speirs's total permanent phys-
ical impairment attributable to her knee injury was 
zero percent; (2) the total permanent physical 
impairment attributable to her face and nose injury 
was zero percent; and (3) Speirs suffered a four 
percent permanent physical impairment attributable 
to her ankle injury. The medical panel further 
opined that Speirs's injuries required no future med-
ical treatment. 
% 4 Speirs objected to the medical panel's re-
port and asked the ALJ to strike the report, or, in 
the alternative, provide Speirs with the opportunity 
to cross-examine the medical panel. The AU 
denied both of Speirs's requests. 
% 5 The ALJ then found, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that Speirs suffered no permanent 
partial impairment from her left knee, headaches, 
nasal problems, or other facial injuries. The ALJ 
further found a four percent whole body impair-
ment attributable to Speirs's ankle injury, and awar-
ded Speirs a total of $915.16 in permanent partial 
disability compensation. The ALJ also denied 
Speirs any compensation for future medical treat-
ment for her knee, headaches, nasal problems, or 
other facial injuries. The ALJ supported his conclu-
sion by reference to both the medical panel's report 
and other evidence in the record. 
\ 6 Speirs appealed the ALJ's decision to the 
Commission arguing that (1) the medical panel had 
usurped the ALJ's authority, (2) the medical panel 
was biased against her, and (3) the medical panel's 
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conclusions lacked analysis and foundation. The 
Commission affirmed the ALJ and further found 
that the medical panel had properly performed the 
purposes assigned it pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-601 (2002) ™, in that the underlying evid-
ence sufficiently supported the medical panel's re-
port, and that the medical panel's report was con-
sistent with other medical opinions in the record. 
Speirs appeals. 
FN1. We refer to the most recent version 
of the statute because, excepted as spe-
cifically noted herein, any changes are not 
material. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] ^ 7 Speirs argues that the medical panel 
usurped the Commission's authority by making 
findings of fact.™ " '[T]he Legislature*44 has 
granted the Commission discretion to determine the 
facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases com-
ing before it.' " McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 
2002 UT App 10,K 11, 41 P.3d 468 (quoting Ae 
Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App 35,K 
7, 996 P.2d 1072Xalteration original). " 'As such, 
we must uphold the Commission's determination ... 
unless the determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality....' " Id. (alterations 
original). 
FN2. Speirs presented fee following argu-
ments on appeal: (1) Did the medical panel 
usurp the authority of the Administrative 
Law Judge by disregarding the stipulation 
that was submitted to the panel?; (2) was 
the medical panel biased?; and (3) was 
there competent evidence to support the 
medical panel's determination? We have 
summarized and restated Speirs's argu-
ments to more concisely address them. 
ANALYSIS 
[2] \ 8 Speirs challenges the Commission's 
denial of her claim for additional workers' com-
pensation benefits. Speirs asserts that the medical 
panel usurped the authority of the ALJ and made 
findings of fact relating to Speirs's medical history. 
[3][4] \ 9 "[T]o award compensation, the Com-
mission must determine that an accident has oc-
curred and that there is a causal connection between 
the accident and the injury claimed." Pittsburgh 
Testing Lab. v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 
1983). This requires that the Commission make 
findings of fact and draw conclusions of law. See, 
e.g., id In difficult cases, the opinions of a medical 
panel may be of assistance to the Commission in 
determining whether benefits should be awarded 
because the medical panel provides the Commis-
sion with the benefit of its medical expertise. See 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 839 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah CtApp.1992); 
Keller, 657 P.2d at 1370; IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 
584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). The medical panel 
is empowered to study, take X-rays, and perform 
tests as it may determine necessary or desirable in 
rendering its opinion. See Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-601(2Xa) (Supp.2002). 
[5] % 10 However, even when a medical panel 
is convened, the ALJ/Commission is always the ul-
timate fact finder. See Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 
973 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah Ct.App.1998); accord IGA 
Food Fair, 584 P.2d at 830. Thus, while fee ALJ/ 
Commission may convene a medical panel to re-
view applicants' medical condition, fee ALJ/ 
Commission may not abdicate its fact-finding re-
sponsibility to fee medical panel. See Price River 
Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 VIA 1079, 
1084 (Utah 1986). 
% 11 Here, after reviewing fee proffered con-
flicting medical opinions, the ALJ convened fee 
medical panel to examine Speirs's medical condi-
tion. The ALJ provided the panel wife a set of stip-
ulated facts and three questions feat fee ALJ de-
sired fee panel to answer. The medical panel accep-
ted the stipulated facts,™3 however, after determ-
ining that the stipulated facts were insufficient to 
properly answer fee proffered questions, fee medic-
al panel conducted a thorough examination of 
Speirs, and a thorough review of her medical his-
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tory. The medical panel then used this information 
to answer each of the ALJ's proffered questions. 
The ALJ, after receiving the medical panel's opin-
ion, then examined the record as a whole and issued 
findings and conclusions awarding Speirs a four 
percent permanent partial impairment. 
FN3. Speirs also argues that the medical 
panel ignored the stipulated findings of 
fact, but this claim is unpersuasive because 
the medical panel incorporated the stipu-
lated facts into its report. 
[6][7] % 12 We have examined the record and 
conclude that the ALJ's finding can be supported 
without reference to the medical panel's opinion. 
FN4
 We further conclude that the ALJ properly dis-
charged his duty to make findings of fact and noth-
ing in the record supports Speirs's claim that the 
ALJ abdicated this responsibility. Thus, any error 
*45 Speirs attributes to the medical panel's conduct 
has no bearing on the benefits awarded her.™5 
FN4. For example, Dr. Knoebel opined 
that he saw no objective evidence of any 
permanent impairment or problems sec-
ondary to the industrial accident. He 
opined that Speirs needed no further med-
ical treatment. Dr. Marsden noted that 
Speirs had minimal nasal obstruction and 
normal sinuses. Dr. Kumar also provided a 
comprehensive medical history and opined 
that Speirs's headaches were caused by 
"mixed vascular tension." Other medical 
records contained information about her 
shoulder injury, a car accident, and her 
lower back pain, each of which either pred-
ated the industrial accident or exacerbated 
Speirs's existing medical ailments. 
FN5. Speirs also argues that the ALJ/ 
Commission should not have relied upon 
the medical panel's findings of fact, for 
they were not supported by sufficient evid-
ence, and that her due process rights were 
violated because the medical panel was 
biased against her. Here, the ALJ/ 
Commission, not the medical panel, made 
the findings of fact, thus, a sufficiency of 
the evidence argument does not apply to 
the medical panel. Furthermore, even if 
relevant, we are precluded from addressing 
Speirs's due process claim because she 
failed to raise this issue before the Com-
mission. Issues not raised in proceedings 
before administrative agencies are not sub-
ject to judicial review except under excep-
tional circumstances. See, e.g., Brown & 
Root Indus, Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997) (refusing to 
address issues not raised before the Com-
mission). 
[8] % 13 The ALJ reviewed the medical panel's 
report and other medical opinions contained in the 
record and concluded that Speirs suffered a four 
percent permanent partial impairment. The Com-
mission affirmed the ALJ's findings on appeal. It is 
not the role of this court to reweigh the evidence 
and substitute our conclusion for that of the Com-
mission. See VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm% 
901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct.App.1995). " 'Instead, 
we defer to the Commission's findings because, 
when reasonably conflicting views arise, it is the 
Commission's province to draw inferences and re-
solve these conflicts/ " Id. (citations omitted). Un-
der the circumstances presented here, the Commis-
sion did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness or 
rationality in affirming the ALJ's decision. See 
McKesson, 2002 UT App lOat^ 11,41 P.3d468. 
CONCLUSION 
\ 14 We conclude that the medical panel prop-
erly performed its function and did not usurp die 
Commission's authority. Furthermore, we conclude 
that there is sufficient evidence in the record, inde-
pendent of the medical panel's report, to support the 
Commission's award. We therefore affirm. 
K 15 I CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Asso-
ciate Presiding Judge. 
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ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
% 16 I respectfully disagree with my colleagues. 
The medical panel was provided with seventeen 
stipulated facts, and three specific questions were 
put to it. Four months after receiving its relatively 
simple charge, the medical panel submitted its 100 
page report, which amounts to a life history of peti-
tioner laden with irrelevant personal details. 
% 17 The articulated basis for this peculiar for-
ay is that the medical panel determined the stipu-
lated facts were insufficient to properly answer the 
questions posed. Given the intention of the parties 
to have the matter resolved on stipulated facts, in 
conjunction only with 'the deposition of Petitioner 
herein" and a medical record and report attached to 
the stipulation, once the medical panel ascertained 
it could not answer the three questions on the basis 
of the stipulated information, it should simply have 
so reported to the administrative law judge. 
% 18 Once the judge informed the parties of this 
turn of events, they could then have considered sup-
plementing the stipulation, undertaking additional 
discovery, proceeding to adjudication, etc. But for 
the medical panel to simply go its merry way-and 
for the administrative law judge to endorse this 
self-authorized adventure-was at odds with the ex-
pectation of the parties, as reflected in their stipula-
tion. 
T[ 19 I would remand the case to the Industrial 
Commission, with instructions to set aside the inef-
fectual stipulation and give petitioner an opportun-
ity to pursue her claim in any alternative way prop-
erly available to her. 
Utah App.,2002. 
Speirs v. Southern Utah University 
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U.CA. 1953§34A-2-601 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 34A. Utah Labor Code (Refs & Annos) 
*g Chapter 2. Workers' Compensation Act (Refs & Annos) 
*g Part 6. Medical Evaluations 
_•§ 34A-2-601. Medical panel, director, or consultant—Findings and reports 
— Objections to report—Hearing—Expenses 
(1) (a) The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical aspects of a case de-
scribed in this Subsection (1) (a) to a medical panel appointed by an administrat-
ive law judge: 
(i) upon the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of and in the 
course of employment for: 
(A) disability by accident; or 
(B) death by accident; and 
(ii) if the employer or the employer's insurance carrier denies liability. 
(b) An administrative law judge may appoint a medical panel upon the filing of a 
claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to an occupational 
disease. 
(c) A medical panel appointed under this section shall consist of one or more 
physicians specializing in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in 
the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the 
medical aspects of a controverted case, the division may employ a medical dir-
ector or one or more medical consultants: 
(i) on a full-time or part-time basis; and 
(ii) for the purpose of: 
(A) evaluating medical evidence; and 
(B) advising an administrative law judge with respect to the administrative 
law judge's ultimate fact-finding responsibility. 
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or one or more medical 
consultants, the medical director or one or more medical consultants is allowed 
to function in the same manner and under the same procedures as required of a 
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medical panel. 
(2) (a) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant may do the follow-
ing to the extent the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant de-
termines that it is necessary or desirable: 
(i) conduct a study; 
(ii) take an x-ray; 
(iii) perform a test; or 
(iv) if authorized by an administrative law judge, conduct a post-mortem exam-
ination. 
(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall make: 
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed by 
the Division of Adjudication; and 
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require. 
(c) In an occupational disease case, in addition to the requirements of Subsec-
tion (2)(b), a medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall cer-
tify to the administrative law judge: 
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work 
for remuneration or profit; 
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the 
medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant results from the occupa-
tional disease; and 
(iii) (A) whether any other cause aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any 
way contributed to the disability or death; and 
(B) if another cause contributed to the disability or death, the extent in 
percentage to which the other cause contributed to the disability or death. 
(d) (i) An administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a 
report submitted to the administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by 
mail to: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier ; and 
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(D) an attorney employed by a person listed in Subsections (2) (d) (i) (A) 
through (C) . 
(ii) Within 20 days after the report described in Subsection (2) (d) (i) is de-
posited in the United States post office, the following may file with the ad-
ministrative law judge a written objection to the report: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; or 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(iii) If no written objection is filed within the period described in Subsec-
tion (2) (d) (ii), the report is considered admitted in evidence. 
(e) (i) An administrative law judge may base the administrative law judge's find-
ing and decision on the report of: 
(A) a medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) one or more medical consultants. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2) (e) (i) , an administrative law judge is not 
bound by a report described in Subsection (2) (e) (i) if other substantial con-
flicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding. 
(f) (i) If a written objection to a report is filed under Subsection (2) (d), the 
administrative law judge may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and 
issues involved. 
(ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection (2) (f), any party may re-
quest the administrative law judge to have any of the following present at the 
hearing for examination and cross-examination: 
(A) the chair of the medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) the one or more medical consultants. 
(iii) For good cause shown, an administrative law judge may order the following 
to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination: 
(A) a member of a medical panel, with or without the chair of the medical panel; 
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(B) the medical director; or 
(C) a medical consultant. 
(g) (i) A written report of a medical panel, medical director, or one or more 
medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at a hearing described in Sub-
section (2)(f) . 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2) (g)(i), a report received as an exhibit un-
der Subsection (2) (g) (i) may not be considered as evidence in the case except 
as far as the report is sustained by the testimony admitted. 
(h) For a claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical dir-
ector, or medical consultant before July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out 
of the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund established in Section 34A-2-702: 
(i) expenses of a study or report of the medical panel, medical director, or 
medical consultant; and 
(ii) the expenses of the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical con-
sultant's appearance before an administrative law judge. 
(i) (i) For a claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultant on or after July 1, 1997, the commission shall 
pay out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund established in Section 34A-2-704 the 
expenses of: 
(A) a study or report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical con-
sultant; and 
(B) the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's appear-
ance before an administrative law judge. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the expenses described in Subsection 
(2) (i) (i) shall be paid from the Uninsured Employers' Fund whether or not the 
employment relationship during which the industrial accident or occupational 
disease occurred is localized in Utah as described in Subsection 34A-2-704(20) . 
CREDIT (S) 
Laws 1951, c. 52, § 1; Laws 1955, c. 57, § 1; Laws 1969, c. 86, § 9; Laws 1979, 
c. 138,.§ 6; Laws 1982, c. 41, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 116, § 7; Laws 1991, c. 136, 
§ 13; Laws 1994, c. 224, § 7; Laws 1996, c. 240, § 173, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 
1997, c. 375, §§ 138, 329(9), eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 183, § 1, eff. July 
.1, 2000; Laws 2002, c. 303, § 1, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2009, c. 215, § 1, eff. 
May 12, 2009. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 42-1-71.10; C. 1953, §§ 35-1-77, 35A-3-601. 
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in determining the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or more 
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1. Conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease; 
2. Conflicting medical opinion of permanent physical impairment which vary 
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3. Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary 
more than 90 days; 
4. Conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total disability, 
and/or 
5. Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $10,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there is a 
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report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical evidence, the 
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C. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical consultant 
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Laws 1988, c. 73, § 1. 
Laws 1988, c. 210, § 141. 
Laws 1988, c. 248, § 8* 
Laws 1990, c. 80, 5 5. 
Laws 1990, c. 224, § 3. 
Laws 1991, c. 268, § 22. 
Laws 1992, c. 127, § 12. 
Laws 1994, c. 13, S 45. 
Laws 1995, c. 299, S 47. 
Laws 1996, c. 159, 5 19. 
Laws 1996, c. 198, § 49. 
Laws 2001, c. 255, § 20. 
Laws 2001, c. 302, S 2. 
C. 1953, § 78-2a-3. 
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(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, sup-
port, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges 
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 
4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceed-
ings . 
CREDIT (S) 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 350, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2210, eff. May 5, 
2008; Laws 2009, c. 344, § 42, eff. May 12, 2009. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1476, provides: 
"Section 1476. Coordinating H.B. 78 with H.B. 63—Superseding amendments. 
"If this H.B. 78 and H.B. 63, Recodification of Title 63 State Affairs in General, 
both pass, it is the intent of the Legislature that the amendments in this H.B. 78 
supersede the amendments to the same sections in H.B. 63, except that the section 
renumbering and internal cross references to Title 63 in H.B. 63 supersede and 
shall replace the section numbering and references to Title 63 in H.B. 78 when the 
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel prepares the Utah Code database 
for publication." 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 350 and Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2210. 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 1986, c. 47, § 46. 
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 304• 
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U.C.A. 1953§78A-4-103 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-2a-3 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78A. Judiciary and Judicial Administration (Refs & Annos) 
*g Chapter 4. Court of Appeals 
^ S 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of in-
terlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudic-
ative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State 
Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division 
of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of 
the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the 
state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state 
or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
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